Conference Proceedings

Beyond Recognition?
Ukraine and Europe after the Orange Revolution

Geir Flikke & Sergiy Kisselyov [eds.]
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The present collection is a pilot project. It consists of articles from 18 scholars in Ukraine and Norway, presented and discussed at a workshop at the Kiev Mohyla Academy on 30 September 2005, one week after the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government and what has been characterized as the break-up of the elite coalition that had led the ‘Orange’ events in late 2004. The backdrop for the workshop was the events themselves, and the framework a joint project between Ukrainian and Norwegian partners on governance and transitions to democracy based on a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The ambition of the workshop was to conceptualize and examine the events that overturned the 2004 electoral falsifications, discuss them in earnest and create breeding grounds for more nuanced perspectives on the events themselves and Ukraine’s challenges after the Orange autumn. The editors/moderators posed some direct questions: has Ukraine changed radically after the ‘Orange autumn’ – or is this a part of a longer and protracted process from semi-authoritarian rule to an as yet not fully consolidated and qualitatively new political regime? Is Ukraine ‘beyond recognition’ in this sense, or are old problems still dominant – such as the sharp elite–society division, unsolved problems concerning the essential features of a functional polyarchy, and a basically elite-driven struggle for votes in a relatively pacified, yet gradually more self-aware society of civilians? And as to what has become known as the Orange Revolution – was it really a ‘revolution’ in the sense that the ‘old’ is gone and the ‘new’ is now flourishing? Did in imply a regime change, or was it simply a change of elites in post-Soviet Ukraine?
Contributors were free to answer these questions in accordance with their analysis of the events themselves, and also in accordance with various theoretical approaches. The editors had but one criterion: to be liberal in allowing a range of perspectives, and to couple this with the academic responsibility of the contributors. This may have made the volume itself somewhat ‘dispersed’ in terms of approaches, but it is still a joint effort in terms of coming to terms with the basic challenge – what do these events imply for Ukraine in the future?

The contributions are divided into two sections. The first focuses on the relationship between state and society after the Orange Revolution; the second on questions of foreign policy and European integration, with several contributions dealing with the regional aspects. Mohyla specialists have dealt extensively with issues of civil society and democracy, definitions, concepts and assessments of the state of civil society in Ukraine, and also with more philosophical questions of values. Is there a widely shared perception of what a ‘civil society’ is in Ukraine today? Can the aspirations of the Maidan be transformed into a lasting ‘pact’ between elites and society concerning expectations and – importantly – serve as a launching pad for a whole new set of civic values? Contributors see this as dependent on various factors: whether is room for a real opposition (not just perennial elite struggles and quarrels), whether there are factors for a genuine polyarchy in Ukraine today, whether the coalitions prove themselves sufficiently pragmatic to find a modus vivendi, and whether the new set of values from the Maidan is reflected in new values and practices in the political elite itself. Contributors also set forth various interpretations of the term ‘revolution’ in the Ukrainian context. Was it in fact a ‘regime change’, or will corporatist practices of regime consolidation prevail? How mature is civil society in terms of serving as a reference point for reforms, and what are the structural impediments to a continued reform drive?

The second part of the collection deals with historical analogies of Ukraine’s position in international relations today, as well as attempts to redirect foreign policies and the regional dimension of Ukraine’s new ‘European’ foreign policy vector. There is no scholar in Ukraine today who does not acknowledge that Ukraine is a ‘divided’ country, but there are several who argue that this division has acted to obscure the fact that there is also an increasingly positive assessment of Europe and European institutions, and more so – that Ukraine is indeed a country in Europe. The
book’s co-editor, Sergiy Kisselyov, states this explicitly: ‘not only have the Europeans discovered Ukraine, but the Ukrainians have discovered Europe’ (pp.36). This recognition is boosted by the fact that the various challenges confronting Ukraine today cannot be surmounted unless the country’s new aspirations are supported internationally, through assistance, analysis and encouragement. One task consists in enhancing public awareness about Europe and the European Union.

Of course, contributors and editors alike take care not to confuse political aspirations with de facto success in transition. As agreed by many contributors, directly and indirectly, ‘no one would contest the necessity of democratic institutional transformation’ (p. 53), but cautious assessments still dominate as to the actual degree of transformation that has taken place in contemporary Ukraine. There remain considerable question-marks concerning still-prevalent corporatist practices in the elite, the weakly defined role of the opposition, the significance of a politically self-aware but weakly integrated civil society and the efficiency of government at large. Most analysts definitely look beyond the 2006 Verkhovna Rada elections for further indications as to the direction and scope of changes in Ukraine.

As mentioned, the background for this workshop was a grant project to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and our partners at the Kiev Mohyla Academy, enabling the Academy to draw on training resources in order to strengthen their educational programme. The mandate of this grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not been to produce any specific advice, but instead to help scholars and students to understand events within a larger theoretical perspective, and to provide Ukrainian specialists with a platform on which to discuss and debate political changes in their country, and the challenges ahead. The editors wish to express their thanks to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their grant support.

The current collection is prepared in two versions: a Ukrainian one, and an English one. A primary challenge has thus been to edit two versions of the same manuscript. We acknowledge our gratitude to the International Department at the Mohyla Academy for all assistance rendered in this process, especially to Laryssa Chovnyuk, to the Mohyla Academy Administration, Kateryn Maksim and Mikhail Brik for making this project possible, and to two Ukrainian students, Maksim Yakovlev and Olena Yasinetskiy, for valuable help in translating the Ukrainian contributions. Valter Angell from
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Geir Flikke Oslo, 9 March 2006

Sergiy Kisselyov Kiev, 9 March 2006
Introduction

Political developments in the post-Soviet space have reached a new climax that might be compared to that of the early 1990s. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution stands out as perhaps one of the more important events in the post-Soviet space, or what should more rightly be termed the space of the newly independent states (NIS). Important it is, since it offered an opportunity to reverse trends in ‘managed elections’ and reintroduce discussions and – possibly – practices of a script for democratic transition. It marked a decisive moment to solidify, reinvigorate and secure the gains achieved during a decade of post-authoritarian institution building, nation-building and democratic consolidation.

At the same time, it has made us recall not only what the stakes are in transitions, but also what the challenges are. The events of the Maidan remind us that transitions are never linear, straightforward or schematic, although our theory textbook may suggest as much. Social forces mobilize – they do once a regime has initiated liberalization, or once expectations of continued liberal policies have reached a certain level. Conflicts erupt between elites on the most important questions for the political future of new independent states, and alliances are built – but will they last? We are, in a manner of speaking, engaged in keeping track of political events – not testing or applying models, analysing events and checking them against empirical evidence. This is a challenging task, and we should admit that any attempt to follow political events, analyse them and try to predict their possible outcome must be experimental at most.¹

¹ The comprehensive debate on whether transition studies of the former Soviet
Like most transitions, also that of Ukraine – even beyond the Maidan – offers many theory challenges, as well as practical ones. Theory can allow us to move beyond tentative conclusions, and highlight some questions for possible research, while practical recommendations should extend beyond the research agenda and focus on policy options. The one does not go without the other, however. Researchers often speak in several contexts – for example, one relating to purely academic aspects, the other to international politics at large. One context stands out as important – that of tackling a transition to democratic rule, thereby meeting the emerging expectations from the international community that political gains can be accompanied by a comprehensive vision for change within a country. This workshop offers a possibility for discussing problems in earnest – concerning expectations, identifying pressing problems and relating these to overall academic concepts, such as transitions.

The purpose of this workshop is then to highlight some of the ‘we do not know, but should discuss’ questions concerning the current political situation in Ukraine. The frame for this workshop is simple: ‘Beyond Recognition? Ukraine and Europe After the Orange Revolution’ introduces a limited number of main themes for discussion. Has Ukraine changed substantially after the three rounds of the presidential election in late 2004 and the democratic elections of Yushchenko? Or are there permanent challenges that will remain and have an impact on Ukrainian politics for years to come? Briefly put – are there prospects for a more deeply rooted popular democracy in Ukraine? Second, Ukraine is recognized as a European country, both geographically and culturally, but what will it take to transform this recognition into a more streamlined policy for approaching the institutionalized European community? What are the optimistic and negative scripts for Ukraine’s European policies in this respect?

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2 This position is reflected in the Batory Report, which rightly states that, according to Article 49 of the EU Treaty, all European states can apply for membership, ‘and Ukraine is, after all, a European country’ (More Than Neighbours, 2004: 9).
Transition studies: a useful paradigm?
Whenever political events have an effect internationally, as the Orange Revolution did – on EU policies and regionally – considerable innovation can be observed in the press. At worst, these views are pessimistic about the challenges; at best they can offer insights as to defining the scope of challenges. One such innovative concept is that fronted by Canadian defence analyst, Patrick Armstrong, who has launched the idea of ‘staglution’ – which he defines as a hybrid of high short-term expectations and long-term challenges: ‘In short, it’s one thing to have a quick and exciting change of leadership, but it’s another to expect an equally quick solution of the deep underlying problems of the post-Communist countries’. For all the pessimistic aspects of this conceptual innovation, it touches on a core truth: transitions are long-term processes that are not installed over night. Moreover, in the increasingly abundant literature on post-Soviet transitions, there are some general lessons to be drawn – first at the theoretical level, then at the practical level.

Let me start by outlining the major questions emerging from transition studies as such, and then move on to some practical challenges. In discussing some findings, coupled with a theoretical debate of some concepts, I will then try to identify some pertinent research questions. In order to find answers to how to deal with long-term challenges, we will have to dig deep in the theoretical toolbox, increase our knowledge about the workings of a political system, and draw on what research there is on the topic. This will also involve moving beyond certain superficial generalizations about shifting tides and effects frequently emerging in the media. We should not allow ourselves to be derailed by political events.

3 For a pessimistic account of the ‘coloured revolutions’ in the former CIS space, see Kirill Nourzhanov, ‘Colored revolutions revealed to be hollow at core’, posted on Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), no. 9244, 2005. For an optimistic account, challenging Åslund’s (2005) accounts that the economic policies of the Yushchenko administration have had shortcomings in their first 100 days, see Kuzio, 2005.


5 Concerning Ukraine, much has been written internationally about intra-elite relations and new institutions – such as Pigenko et al., 2002; Protsyk, 2004; Kubicek, 2002; Herron, 2002; and Kubicek, 2000. The crux of these studies has been to examine the performance of institutions and elite behaviour in Ukraine during the 1990s and after. I return to some findings in the discussion below.

6 There is already talk of the break-up of the ‘Orange coalition’ in Ukraine, not about the gains brought about during the massive demonstrations against ‘electoral management’. See Peter Lavelle, ‘Ukraine and the colors of change’, Russia Profile, 16 September 2005, reproduced in JRL, no. 9247, 2005. Transitions studies claim, however, that we should remain neutral in our assessments.
to the degree that we fail to assess what progress has already been made – especially in post-Soviet institutions – but should at least try to reach some partial conclusions about what needs to be done.

My first point will be a purely theoretical one. When Soviet-ology collapsed, a central question emerged among researchers: Is it possible to draw on transition studies derived from Latin America to analyse post-Soviet events in the former Soviet space? What would be the challenges for traditional area studies in this respect? How far would it be possible to stretch the general tools of transition studies to an area formerly dominated by the single-party state? (Schmitter & Karl, 1994; Bunce, 1998a; 1998b; and Fish, 2001.) While this debate is still ongoing, new generations of researchers are emerging who claim that there is a difference between using certain tools for understanding transitions in a country and making qualitative judgements about the end-point of the process. (Gans-Morse, 2004.) Transition studies are a way of discussing problems, increasing knowledge about a certain region and pinpointing certain required changes. Transition studies can indeed serve as a useful tool for understanding post-Soviet change, as well as being a catchword that has gained salience in foreign policies – not least within the EU.

This has not meant a lack of recognition of region-specific and system-specific challenges. Several specifically post-Soviet variables have troubled both practitioners and critics of applying transition studies to Eastern Europe. Widely discussed variables include the relationship between liberalization and democratization, the sequence of reforms and the degree of cohesion and agreement within the elite on their scope, and the viability of civil society as not only a counterbalance to elite politics but also an ally – as with the Maidan event. Transitions in the post-Soviet space are special cases, due to the very density of problems, their urgency and their scope. State dissolution of multi-national entities is always unprecedented, as is the task of building new independent states on the basis of what is left. Post-Soviet ‘triple transitions’ have hence stood out as special cases: to define a state and its people, to introduce democratic reforms that can extend beyond the initial promises of

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7 This in no way is to say that states are directly comparable across regions and across traditions and heritages. Transition theories are an analytical tool, not an attempt to box cases in the international system.

8 The nature of EU ‘actorness’ is a case in point here, since the EU both aware of its attractiveness to would-be members, while it is also an actor that encourages transitions and transformations by providing a checklist for partnership and possible accession.
liberalization, and to define and solve the most pressing economic tasks as well as introducing necessary institutional changes.9

What is most important about transition theories is that they provide us with certain criteria, or test cases for consolidation. I will run through these shortly.

**Research question 1: Elite agreement**

In most post-Soviet transition studies, there is one common denominator worth dwelling on – the role of elites. In the widely acclaimed attempt to bring transition studies eastwards, Stepan & Linz (1996) raised what might be considered the fundamental criterion for successful transitions – elite agreement. All too often, they observed, elite strife over the reform agenda and over legitimacy has undermined the possibilities for rooting democratic political reforms in a state. Hence, they argue:

Disagreements among the democrats over such issues as a unitary versus a federal state, a monarchical or republican form of government, or the type of electoral system may create questions about the legitimacy of the emerging democratic government, the decision making process, and indeed the future of the political system. Such institutional indeterminacy about core procedures necessary for producing democracy may not only leave the transition process incomplete, but also postpone the consolidation of democracy. (Stepan & Linz, 1996, p. 4)10

The importance of the role of elites has been recognized also by analysts who have studied elite stability and institution building in Ukraine. Pigenko et al. (2002) have effectively coupled consensus to institutions and institutional learning. While transitions start with

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9 For an account of Russia’s triple transition, see McFaul, 2000, pp. 342–344. Many analysts claim that Ukraine is facing the same task now – to consolidate elites, to define what a nation is under conditions of a sharp East–West division, and to embark on the reforms needed to enter into the globalized economy. See Peter Lavelle, ‘Ukraine and the colors of change’, Russia Profile, 16 September 2005, reproduced in JRL, no. 9247, 2005. For more on the dilemmas of state-led nation building in Ukraine, the discourse on unitary state versus federalism, and also what has been termed a ‘quadruple’ transition for Ukraine, see Kuzio, 2002, and Riabchuk, 2002.

10 The term ‘among the democrats’ was used originally in Linz and Stepan, but has been omitted elsewhere places (Pigenko et al., 2002), simply because in some post-Soviet systems, not all elites favour democratization. I have chosen to use it here, since it reflects the criterion of a minimalist definition of democracy – widespread elite agreement that democracy should be the ‘only game in town’.
pacts and negotiations on future institutional frameworks, balance of power and so forth, the introduction of new institutions leads the democratization process into a new phase. Hence, they argue: ‘The scope of debate among political elites must narrow from the choice of institutions to the distribution of powers between institutions, and ultimately to questions of policy within the context of an agreed institutional framework’ (Pigenko et al., 2002, p. 91).

In order to modify and sculpt this prerequisite to current political realities, we would have to make the following assumptions: Firstly, institutions and balance of power as crucial factors in determining prospects for consolidation of democratic rule. Pigenko et al. (2002) have found in general that there has been agreement on the basic balance of power in Ukraine in the period 1994–98. Also other studies confirm that consensus was reached on the ‘quadruple’ transition of Ukraine in the 1990s – involving state and institution building, borders and territorial integrity, federalism and regionalism, pragmatic state nationalism, national integration and foreign policy (Kuzio, 2002, p. 9). Secondly, even a partial and logical change of institutions and improvements in them may create a temporary flux in elite preferences and allegiances. Clearly, institutional indeterminacy is not a recommended place to stay for states in transition, whereas there might be certain gains in change – such as moving towards a parliamentary system versus that of a presidential-parliamentary system. In such a phase, there is all the more reason to ask about the effects of institutional changes on elite agreement.

These assumptions then lead to an initial research and discussion question: while we may assume that elite consensus is materialized in institutions, and that these institutions solidify patterns of negotiation, we must also assume that if institutional balances of power are changed, new questions will have to be asked. One such question will be an analysis of elite attitudes to a new institutional power balance. Surely, this is a question for the future – and also for discussions here. In turn, it involves a second question: What are the specific conditions under which it is possible to move beyond assessments of ‘political situations’ in a country to more specific analyses of political systems?\footnote{This question is formulated very precisely by Schmitter & Karl (1994), who speak of moving from studies of transitions and political flux (political situations) to studies of processes pointing in the direction of consolidation (transitology versus consolidology). The crucial transit point here is the availability of empirical data, but also the decisions of researchers themselves to make the leap from discussing uncertainties and elite deliberations to discussing possibilities for consolidation – i.e. institutional arrangements (Schmitter & Karl, 1994, p.175)} Examining the nexus between
institutions and preferences will at least help us to recognize the importance of institutions and their long-term effect on elite consensus, and also to treat institutions not as floating variables, but as independent variables that facilitate that crucial factor in transitions: elite agreement.

One question that we could derive from this is simply the following: is the division within the Orange coalition, as expressed in the recent government turnover, a preliminary one relating to the effect of changes in the institutional framework, and can a new equilibrium be reached? This would entail discussing the most pressing tasks ahead, a possible consolidation of the agenda, and also of the political situation in more general terms.

**Research question 2: Effective, viable civil societies**

A second area pertains to the role of civil society in transitions, a topic that we will return to at some length during this workshop. It is well known that the EU emphasizes the presence of functional civil societies as a part of rapprochement to the Union. The EU recognized the growth in civil organizations in Ukraine from the early 1990s and onward, but some reservations remain: ‘civil society does not play a decisive role in public life’ (*More than neighbours*, 2004, p. 49).

Turning to transition theories, we note that the original assumption was that once liberalization starts, or expectations have reached a certain level, civil society may appear, as if out of the blue, and exert a decisive effect on pushing forward the process of political change. Schmitter & O’Donnell (1986) have talked about a rebirth of civil society during transitions, an awakening of democratic aspirations that may prompt elites to embark on full-scale democratization.\(^{12}\) The perhaps most seminal work on the role of emerging post-Soviet civil societies is that of M. Steven Fish (1995), who has conceptualized the rise of a democracy movement in post-Soviet Russia in the early 1990s as a ‘movement society’ – a society manifested in massive pro-democratization movements. His study certainly does not underestimate their power in changing a political agenda for the sake of what is a clear public good: the freedom to

\(^{12}\) Some researchers on post-Soviet Russia have also spoken of ‘rebirths’, but in a less distinct manner – such as the rebirth of ‘politics’ in post-Soviet Russia in the early 1990s. But it is premature to consider civil society as a given in Russia, although there certainly has been a process of political discussions calling the notion of a civil and political society into existence (Urban, 1997).
nominate (elites) and the freedom to choose (electorate).

Post-Soviet transitions have revealed that civil society has a weak capacity for sustaining itself politically – through generating interests and representing interests. One key factor is found in former Soviet systems: where the state in general has been considered as strong, there is certain resentment about statehood nascent in society that evokes intransigence and scepticism against all state affairs. Civil society retreats from politics once the political agenda again turns toward what politics are – institutions and parties. Moreover, there is always a point in transitions where the question of statehood occupies the centre-stage of political discourse. If statehood and economic restructuring gain the upper hand over pressing needs for democratization and institutional changes, transition processes may lead to institutional deadlocks, much like the case of Russia in 1992/93.

Let me add one corollary here. There is one aspect where transition studies fail in estimating the viability of civil societies – that is in the field of history and culture. It has generally been assumed that democratic interaction and debates are created as if from scratch – that they stand as unprecedented examples of civic organization and action that emerge from a special structural context. This assumption overlooks the fact that there might be historical precedents for a limited experience with civil society, and more generally, that historiography might play a role in bringing these forth from the collective memory. At times, historiography can be highly ambivalent as to the origins of statehood and also on civil society experiences. Nevertheless – and this will probably be reflected in our discussions – there may be good reasons to examine also the historical roots of civil society, and the role of these traditions in forming a viable nationhood, with a widely shared sense of belonging to an independent nation.

It would be good for clarity to arrive at a minimal definition of a civil society, yet post-Soviet transition studies have constantly returned to the concept as a ‘slippery’ one (see Fish, 1995, p.52). At least we can distinguish between two central themes – that of the normative-philosophical dimension, and that of the functional

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13 See for example M. Steven Fish’s discussion of the term ‘political culture’ and its irrelevance for analysing pro-democratization movements in post-Soviet Russia (1995, p. 27). What could be said against this is of course that cultures are not only ‘political’. They also involve a deeply rooted sense of identity as reflected in nationhood. National independence aspirations often play a crucial role in bringing forth movements for democracy.
Beyond the Orange Revolution

Concerning the former, we would talk about historical roots, identity issues (self-expression and individuality), privacy and liberal values. Concerning the latter, it would be more precise to talk about civil society in a political manner – as a continuous variable encompassing not only inter-personal relations and civil organizations (NGOs and trade unions), but also a functional party system (see Gill, 2004, p. 42). If we settle for both definitions, then we could agree that the issue is not whether post-Soviet civil societies are mature. If maturity means being capable of influencing political events, then the ‘Orange Tent Camp’ in the autumn of 2004 proved effective in Ukraine. Moreover, we need to reconsider the assumption that, in Kubicek’s phrase, post-Soviet Ukrainian civil society is like the ‘dog that did not bark – or could not bark’ (Kubicek, 2002, p. 604). Civil society can have an effect on politics, and can make its voice heard. From point of view of academics, it can even be studied.\(^{14}\)

These assumptions allow me to formulate yet another research and discussion question for our discussion and deliberations: What is the role of civil societies in transitions, and how can civil societies be strengthened? Recommendations are to focus on the legal basis, to improve the Law on Association of Citizens (1992) and the Law on Charity and Charitable Associations (1997) and move forward the project of non-profit organizations that has been in the pipeline since 2000 (see More Than Neighbours, 2004, p. 49). These are technical amendments that should rest on the fact that civil societies are guarantees against excessive ‘politicization’ in times of transitions.\(^{15}\) But what do we know about the deeper levels of emerging civil societies? How do they work? How can they help to support a consolidation process?

Research question 3: A functional party system

A third issue pertains to the electoral fabric itself and also the aspect of a functional party system. Much of the literature on post-Soviet transitions has stressed that a certain minimalistic prerequisite for

\(^{14}\) See for instance Kubicek, 2002.

\(^{15}\) In many transitions, a frequent problem is that too many questions become politicized – that there is too much politics – so that some sort of ‘management’ is needed. This again has bearings on the development of ordinary civil societies – the realm of free organizations, and free inter-personal relationships. Functional democratic procedures and a viable civil society have the prerogative as a system of rule simply because they organize competition for votes in an orderly manner and help to distinguish between what is not politics and what is.
democratic competition for votes is basically a technical matter, and is something that should be in place once states have adopted a new electoral formula for holding multi-party and SMD elections. If we look at the original definition, however, it is one pertaining basically to norms and behaviour.\textsuperscript{16} There have been several discussions on the phenomenon of post-Soviet political parties – whether they are functional or not, whether there are clear rules for party affiliation in institutions, and whether there are systems of cleavages supporting various party projects. Many have asserted that parties remain the victims of most transitions in the post-Soviet space, and that a specific ‘non-party’ politics has emerged. In some instances, the electoral law itself has encouraged a proliferation of parties by setting too low a threshold. Moreover, the effect of a mixed electoral law allowing a combination of SMD mandates and party-list mandates has had a varied effect on political parties, and, in Russia at least, enabled a somewhat confusing ‘centre-field’ in the parliament.

Again, it would be worth clarifying what academics say about the issue, distinguishing between transitional phenomena and consolidation, and looking at the normative dimension. The transition literature warns explicitly against considering the minimalist prerequisite for democracy – national elections – as a sufficient criterion for consolidation. Some have claimed that this ‘electoral fallacy’ is inherent in transition studies as such\textsuperscript{17} – but clearly it was never the case that transition studies induced this in the calculus of transition. On the other hand, repeated elections may have a normative component which over time will be reflected in elite consensus on the minimalist prerequisites for democratic procedures. Conducive factors here include preferences in the populace concerning democracy, but also elite behaviour. This leads us back to the assertion above – that successful transitions are most likely once there is agreement among the elites about the direction.

Again, we return to what has been singled out as the most pressing issue in transitions – avoiding conflict between democrats

\textsuperscript{16} The minimalist definition is applied widely in the literature, but most precisely in Stepan & Linz (1996, p. 5): ‘Behaviourally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state. When this situation obtains, the behaviour of the newly elected government that has emerged from the democratic transition is no longer dominated by the problem of how to avoid democratic breakdown’.

\textsuperscript{17} Concerning this point, see for instance Cohen, 2000, and Reddaway & Glinski, 2001.
about the agenda for change. If one is to achieve the common goal of democracy, it is not good to have too many democrats in a fluid electoral setting. When the ‘democrat’ label is up for grabs politically, and the actors have entrenched themselves in power games, general fatigue with party politics may be the result.

This entails a third research and discussion question: will institutional changes boost the emergence of a functional party system, and will political parties be able to provide electorates with structured choices for future ballots? We might examine these issues from several angles – either as pertaining to the electoral law as such (the threshold for parties, the mixture between SMDs and party lists, and the strength of factions in parliament), or we might look more specifically at party organizations, their leadership, incentive structures and programmes. Again, to a certain extent we are looking at political situations, but with the specific aim of identifying long-term trends that might prove conducive for consolidation – or not.

**Workshop themes: Summary**

The short discussion above is merely an outline of central issues that are of importance in transitions: it is not meant as a conclusive list of recommendations on what to do and how to deal with these challenges. There is clearly a role for the international community to play here, in assisting and highlighting specific problems and challenges. As yet, there is no script, but there might be a checklist to follow. Moreover, the international community may well provide incentives for following that checklist. At the bottom line, we may conclude that optimistic Eurovisions will need to be supplemented by hard work on realities.

Of course, it can always be questioned whether it is possible to fuse the ‘outsider’ view with that of the ‘insider’ in international affairs. But this is what the concept of epistemic communities is all about – creating cross-border communities among academics to discuss problems and challenges in earnest, without resorting to a structure indicating what ‘they’ say about ‘us’. The academic literature on Ukraine has been expanding from 2000 and onwards, and seems to be growing also after the Orange Revolution. One

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18 For an account of fluid membership in factions in parliament, see Herron, 2002.
basic academic task would then consist in discussing this literature more widely, drawing also on specific empirical knowledge in the country at hand.

A widely accepted prerequisite for viewing transition studies as a theory of ‘abnormality’ was lack of social data. Much of what has been written on the case of Russia’s post-Soviet transition reflects this. Observations had to be made in ‘the field’ so to say – case studies that were identified and isolated primarily as testing laboratories for some limited transitional phenomena. Although these ‘minor test cases’ sometimes happened to be in line with certain central assumptions of transitions, their long-term effect proved to be nebulous. As they were basically about observed participation in selected social phenomena, their impact was left pending on elite struggles and a continuously moving political field.

To be sure, comprehensive data were lacking, but surprisingly few lasting epistemic communities were formed between universities and foreign research think-tanks. In Russia, many actors were drawn into politics, formed their own institutes or left research altogether. In the economic field, there was a tendency to create ‘in-and-out’ epistemic communities, where specialists flew in, dumped their conclusions and left again. If we are to avoid this, stable research communities will have to be formed. Research should be conducted at the level of universities with access to empirical material and analyses, and the material will need to be circulated, discussed and shared. Naturally, this will involve research exchange – but there must also be recognition of the fact that states involved in transitions often have both considerable research resources and the capacity to identify the most pressing questions.

Difficulties in determining the trajectory of post-Orange events should be recognized by all. There are no swift solutions as to when or whether a consolidated democracy will appear, or what form it will take. Many models of democracy might well be applicable – and they share one common denominator: they are all long-

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20 The founding fathers of transition studies saw the lack of solid social and economic data as one of the major wildcards in studying states in transition.

21 A case in point is Fish’s 1995 study of Russian political society and the mobilization of democratic forces in the early 1990s. While his concept of a ‘movement society’ proved an interesting test case for the formative period of an emerging political society, Fish concluded generally that civil society was not strong enough to withstand pressure from the state and develop into a political society capable of generating and representing interests. See Fish 1995, pp. 53–54.

22 See for instance Bukkvoll in this volume for reflections on regime change, and policy processes and output.
term projects. The international community can help to highlight certain needs, but also pin-point deficiencies. Often, transitions have been imbued with expectations that they will take place as sudden ‘leaps’ – that such changes can come about quickly. Moreover, there might be general misunderstandings in international relations as to having reached a final stage in democratic development. Here we should note that EU accession has long been deemed a criterion for having reached a benchmark in democratization – and rightly so – but talks about accession are no substitute for the hard work that needs to be done.
Part I  Regime and Society after the Orange Revolution
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Introduction
The presence of an opposition in the political system of any society – its involvement in events and changes in the life of a nation, as well as its participation in agenda setting, and its ability to influence those in power – is among the incontestable features of democracy. Indeed, it serves as an indicator as to the implementation of democracy in that country. An organized and recognized political opposition is particularly important in post-totalitarian societies, where the previously dominant totalitarian maxims had been unquestioning acceptance of the ruling party’s policy and the correctness of government’s political course, as well as the assertion that all party activity should be directed toward securing the well-being of society at large. Any opposition to ‘monolithic unity’ in society, not to mention any resistance to official policy, was branded as anti-state and treacherous, bordering on criminal and counter-patriotic activity.

How can the parameter of opposition be applied in assessing the current state of emerging democracy in Ukraine? Do we have an opposition at all? How does it work? Such questions lead us to the problem of defining political opposition as a phenomenon, and how to recognize and understand it in accordance with democratic principles. Any political and legal recognition of opposition forces requires a conceptual recognition, i.e. an appropriate definition. This is not so much a question of identifying the formal characteristic features or prerogatives of the opposition as such, or how these are defined through a legal framework of the given political system: it is more about scrutinizing the social meaning and mission of the
opposition and its role in establishing a system of divided, balanced and limited power.

‘The opposition’: coming to terms with a term
There has been a lengthy debate on whether we have an opposition at all in Ukraine. And, if so, the next questions are who belongs to it, what rights does it have and what functions should it perform in the political life of society? Participants in this debate are often satisfied with a populist, superficial and undefined application of the term. The search for a sound definition has been replaced by almost artistic epithets concerning whether it has ‘status’, is ‘radical’, ‘tough’, ‘decisive’, or ‘constructive’. From time to time, some political forces and public figures declare themselves as being ‘in opposition’. However, they are quick to discard their oppositional status as soon as the state allows them to come closer to power, or offers select members a high position in government.

After the 2004 presidential elections, the issue of the social orientation of the political opposition has become one of crucial importance in Ukraine. On the whole, the final result of the election campaign appeared to harmonize poorly with what the current power and authorities had been demanding. The change in forces brought new opposition politicians to power, whereas those who supported the ‘old’ power were forced to accept their new role as opposition.

Events connected to the resignation of the Tymoshenko government and the subsequent nomination of Yuriy Yekhanurov as prime minister in September 2005 sharpened the discourse on the role of the opposition. Two questions have been debated in detail: Can the current party in power reach arrangements with those who were among its most embittered enemies in the campaign, in order to overcome a crisis of government and establish some modicum of societal and political stability? Should those who critically assess the policy of the current authorities, who remain distant from them and position themselves as an alternative, be required to support the formation of a new government, and – in this way – take responsibility for something they are not capable of influencing?

The Ukrainian opposition has a short history – and indeed, seems set to remain embryonic or continue to exist in some elementary form. One of the first signs that democracy was underway in the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the establishment of popular elections. This political practice had support worldwide.
Despite various distortions, the first elections in the USSR boosted expectations in society that, along with candidates from the nomenklatura, it was also possible to nominate candidates who did not belong to the current system of government and who expressed dissatisfaction with the authorities and held them accountable for their actions.

Since then it has become prestigious among politicians to identify themselves as being the opposition. Unfortunately, the term ‘the opposition’ is often a part of the problem. There are at least three main notional meanings of the term: 1) it implies political competition and also resistance; 2) being in opposition follows from political defeat, which means being in the minority; 3) it implies disagreement with the course of the ruling party in government. The understanding of ‘opposition’ becomes limited and thus less valid when only one of these meanings is applied. In order to overcome this limitation, and to understand the term in the framework of democratic practices, we should strive for a synthetic, holistic understanding of the concept.

In understanding the opposition as resistance, counter-action, and the confrontation of political forces, we are touching upon the etymology of the term. It is derived from the Latin for ‘contraposition’ – from ob (against) plus ponere (to set or emplace). The Modern English word ‘opposite’ means ‘one situated on the other side’, ‘contrary’ to a given position. From this we see that opposition implies counter-action, resistance, aversion, animosity and contrast. Therefore, in this interpretation, the opposition comprises political parties, forces and ideologies whose positions and actions are mutually exclusive. However, that would also mean that if politics is an everlasting sequence of clashes of mutually exclusive interests and ambitions, it will reproduce a permanent binary opposition. When political forces define their political space, they often tend to imply that there can be no alternative to it. If the understanding of opposition implies an irreconcilable animosity, political competition is unlikely to contribute anything valuable to political analysis and social practice. After all, it is not common to call, for example, Basque separatists, the IRA, Chechen or Palestinian rebels ‘the opposition’.

Let us take an example from Ukrainian politics. Subsequent to the 2004 presidential elections, the parties that had a decisive impact on the government and the presidential administration formed a majority in the Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. Although the Social Democratic Party (united) (SDPU (u)) and ‘Partiya Regioniv’ (The
Party of Regions) had lost their dominant positions, they had also exchanged their places in political system with ‘Nasha Ukraina’ (Our Ukraine) and now became ‘the opposition’. However, as of this writing (autumn 2005) they have not yet managed to become a fully fledged and recognized oppositional force in society. The oppositional character of their activities has been basically limited to attempts at obstructing the ruling force in implementing its plans (yet another example of the populist and utopian nature of pre-election promises), in order to prove why it is necessary to remove the current political force from government.

It is worth asking whether society actually benefits from having such an opposition – that is, an opposition solely concerned with trying to overthrow the competitor currently in power. The interests of society in preserving political stability and in finding solutions to urgent public problems are not among the priorities of such an opposition: its concerns focus on gaining victory at a later date.

A similar example can be found in the behaviour of political forces when the Yekhanurov cabinet was appointed in late September 2005. A paradoxical shift of positions took place: the opposition camp now included such ‘partners’ as the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), the Block of Yulia Tymoshenko, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU (u)) and ‘The Regions of Ukraine’. Suddenly, they were all called ‘the opposition’. It seemed as if the party factions of the Verkhovna Rada voted against the nomination in order to weaken the positions of President Yushchenko, without caring whether this was appropriate with regard to the increasing political and economic instability of the state, which had been developing since the change of power early in the year. The political forces that act according to the principles ‘the worse – the better’ cannot be called a democratic opposition. The role of an opposition cannot be limited exclusively to political fights to combat an opponent and the selective utilization of ‘political mistakes’ to increase political conflict. If being in opposition is reduced to this, then it fails in its role as a critic of governmental policies: this is an activity which also includes agenda setting, and the joint search for new ways to solve the problems of ordinary people.

The second interpretation of the term ‘opposition’ implies seeing the opposition as the result of defeat, and hence a minority. This then means that a given political force loses the opportunity to influence the centres of governmental decision-making, to have an impact on events in society, and finds itself on the periphery of political life. Here, political life is often understood as something
like a self-proclamation of the victors, whereas being in opposition implies countering this with something else, most often ignoring and rejecting any proposal from the influential forces by all means, including insinuations and provocations. In this sense, then, being in opposition is a question not of providing alternatives based on political positions and political programmes, but more of mobilizing the personal rejection of the winners. This is a psychological state – like some kind of personal offence resulting from the fact that nobody cares what ‘oppositionists’ do, or like a self-given label used by marginalized politicians when trying to reap political benefits (by saying something like: ‘It’s all right even if we don’t have power now, we are the opposition – the state has to fear us, because the day will come for us to win and show them who we are!’). This kind of ‘self-nomination’ is frequently used by politicians as a technique to attract voters, as people are rarely satisfied with their government and are inclined to think positively of those who criticize it.

If being in opposition is seen solely as residing somewhere in the political outskirts, in the case of Ukraine it will comprise approximately one hundred and twenty parties which formally exist but have not the slightest influence on the political life of the country. Those parties (sometimes called ‘pocket-parties’ or ‘couch-parties’) have been formed and exist as ambitious projects of deviant personalities, or as ‘technological’ stage projects of ‘big’ politics directors. A clear example is the Progressive Socialistic Party of Ukraine. Having no significant political power, it regularly reminds the public of its existence by brewing up various scandals, and trying to persuade everybody that it has the longest service period in opposition.

The third interpretation of an opposition comes to light when we accept it as the organized form of disagreement of some political parties with the political course of the ruling force, the party currently in power. In English there are two alternatives to being in opposition – namely being a ‘party in power’ or being a ‘party in office’. Here ‘full’ opposition implies political rivalry and competition. But it does not imply rivalry or competition with everybody – only with the party in power, with the political force that won the last elections.

This entails some preliminary qualifications. We cannot consider competition between political parties, their quarrels about ideological or organizational issues, as ‘oppositional politics’ (as often happens with Ukrainian parties, especially among those having the
adjective ‘people’s’ in their names). Active resistance of a political party to the government (such as disobedience of laws and other nationwide regulations, as well as attempts to overthrow authorities) cannot be termed oppositional activity either. Being in opposition differs from radical forms of political struggle aimed at changing the current political system (e.g. from democratic, national-deliberative movements or separatists’ movements), because its actions are aimed not against power, but at gaining it. The opposition’s action is not directed against power as such, but against the party in power or in office.

Practising opposition: what does it mean?
From the above discussion, we may arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of ‘being in opposition’. Opposition politics appears at the junction of two areas of political interaction – competition between corporate political forces which represent differentiated group interests, and the organized counter-action of society against those holding power. The latter should not be understood as a state of anomie: it is a natural condition of a society submitted not to hegemonic power, but to a power that can be held accountable and operates in partnership relations with the people, trying to solve their problems, protect them, satisfy their needs etc. The existential controversy between government and civil society thus becomes the precondition for the institutionalized existence of a political opposition.

This also implies that the configuration of political parties claiming to be in opposition should be a manifestation of competition between political forces and leaders conducted independent of the current state of affairs, self-identifications, agreements etc. Thus, if until mid-2005 there had been an oppositional confrontation between ‘The Party of Regions’ and ‘People’s Union Our Ukraine’, after the fall of the Tymoshenko coalition cabinet in September that year, and despite reassurances of ‘parallel courses’ and ‘open hands’, the political tension is now being formed in the axis between the ‘People’s Union Our Ukraine’ – and the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko.

If being in opposition implies a conflict between one political actor and an actor equal to him/her in standing, then it is often nothing but a self-proclaimed status, a name-tag worn by a participant in some fair trade of political electoral arrogance. It is like a move in a game, a rhetoric of competitiveness, tactics, and hence a tech-
nique for gaining political benefits. However, the preoccupation with questions like: ‘who are our friends, and who are we against?’, ‘what pacts to make to ensure our position and to satisfy our needs?’ is a private business of the actors of politics. Why does this need to be the concern of ordinary people? How can the phenomenon of opposition be significant for the whole of society?

This significance appears only when the oppositional role is carried out as an institutionalized tool for smoothing the contradictions between civil society and the state. The opposition is not only an occasional utterance of the situational dissatisfaction of certain individuals with the actions of the government, or a reaction against certain policies for failing to solve the problems of the people. The overall social (not corporate meaning) of opposition as a phenomenon is that its essence involves a permanent manifestation of the eternal antithesis of society and state, the freedom of private life of people and realization of the power the government has, based on formal regulations, on a hierarchy of subordination and on accountability.

Competition between parties in parliament is a demonstration of the opposition of society against state power. Here they co-exist, not as liegeman and sovereigns, but as counterparts – ‘counter-partners’ who need each other, while also competing on an equal footing. This meaning of opposition is formed as a result of mutual understanding, recognition and the practical embodiment of the ideal of people’s sovereignty, as well as adherence to the principles of human rights.

The privileged position of society in its relationship with the authorities can be assured also by civil organizations, political parties and mass media. In countries with a presidential form of government, this mission is carried out by the representative bodies – parliaments, when they act as the main counterbalance to the head of state. A peculiar example is the United States of America, where it is not common to use the term ‘opposition’, because it often happens there that the President represents one party while the Congress (or one of its two constituent bodies) has a majority of another party. Moreover, Congressmen who belonging to the same party as the President can criticize his initiatives, because they act not as representatives of an executive body, but as representatives of their voters, their communities and their states. The Congress itself as an institution of social representation exists to make known and to serve the interests of different communities, and in this way it is a type of opposition to the President. In the parliamentary system,
the mission of social opponents is placed on those portions of the representative legislative body which are not a part of ‘the party in power’: this means the parliamentary opposition.

The very essence of the parliamentary opposition is that it is a tool for the structured, systematic articulation of the interests of society, and an assertion of the interests of the people before the power, irrespective of how they voted in the latest elections. The parliamentary opposition is a demonstration of the magnitude of interests in given society, a guarantee for the existence and recognition of positions on public problems different to those taken by the current government.

The constructive mission of the parliamentary system is not to deny and negate power in general, but to enable a dialogue between society and the state, to discuss various issues, to provide the whole spectrum of existing points of view, as well as discussion on them. This then is the very essence of the parliamentary system. Being in opposition represents a real opportunity to express positions and implement propositions that exist in society, but are out of focus of the currently ruling political force.

The opposition, if it attains this role, is now not only in the self-appointed position of one of the political competitors or a given political force with no participation in the government and subsequently forced to play a second role in the social and political life. It has a constructive mission – to initiate discussions, to control, to identify mistakes and problems, to ask for correction of policies, to suggest programmes of its own to satisfy the needs of communities. In this meaning, the opposition becomes a lever of political equilibrium in society, a demonstration of the principle of the division of powers.

The social mission of parliamentary opposition implies that the opposition is formed not as the result of self-identification, of its own will to ‘become opposition’. The status of opposition of parties or coalitions has to be recognized in society; this, in turn, provides them with opportunities as well as responsibilities. In Great Britain for instance, a party that has at least two seats in the parliament is accorded the status of ‘opposition’ and receives state financing; the leader of an opposition holds an official position that is well-paid. In the House of Commons there are at least 20 working days each year when the oppositional factions, and not the majority, choose the issues for parliamentary debates.

The opposition has to ensure that the needs of society, and its minority groups in particular, will be heard and taken into account
when discussing the common problems included in general debate. If possible, it should see to it that their needs are satisfied by the allocation of state resources. The guarantee for this lies in the institutionalized status of the parliamentary opposition, which, for example, involves being considered when allocating the managerial positions in the parliament (e.g. the vice chairperson of the parliament) and its committees and commissions. It also involves the right to participate in setting the agenda of the legislative body of power, the right to hold speeches when various issues are being debated, the opportunity to prepare and submit requests to the cabinet, etc.

The responsibility of the opposition lies in the fact that it does not exist simply to refute the policy of the cabinet and the government, but is obliged to propose alternatives, reasonable programmes to solve social problems. By ‘alternatives’ I do not mean contradictions, because the most important feature about the alternatives of the opposition is the capacity to produce a viable, but different, policy on a high professional level. It is such professionalism and responsibility that make the opposition a real alternative to the government and the cabinet – one capable, should the need arise, of managing the social issues of the state without jeopardizing the stability of the state.

Therefore, further functions of the opposition could be said to be the recruitment and training of specialists in public administration, the formation of the ‘shadow cabinet’, which involves mobilizing experts, searching and proposing optimal remedies to existing controversies, social problems, alternative policies. In Ukraine, the experience of public policy administration in 2005 has shown that the absence of such a true culture of opposition leads to amateurishness and irresponsibility of those who carry out public administration. The result then becomes unprofessional state management, almost a kind of political karaoke.

**Conclusion**

Interpreting a political opposition as not merely a quarrel in the political establishment but more as an expression of the contraposition of society against state power necessarily generates certain inferences about the rhetorical nature of the question as to whether there exists any opposition in Ukraine. On the other hand, we need additional discussion of what factors form the culture of an opposition, and whether it simply appears as a result of adopting some laws. What is beyond doubt is that a true opposition, and not
A mimicry, is an essential precondition for achieving solid democracy in any society.

In the case of Ukraine, the opposition needs to solve the problem of recognition. The absence of clear definitions of the term leads to ambiguity in interpretations as well as fuzziness in practical application of the idea of being ‘in opposition’. It is extremely unlikely that the opposition will be able to serve as a vehicle for democracy as long as it remains a rhetorical name-game, seen by politicians as an impediment on their way to creating a convincing majority – with the subsequent victorious implementation of their own particular political course.
Introduction

The Orange Revolution can be assessed from various points of view, but an objective assessment cannot allow itself to be influenced by political preferences. However, it is possible to have different understandings of this revolution: it can be seen, for example, as an event that took place from 22 November 2004 until the victory of Victor Yushchenko in the presidential elections; or as a process of democratization, starting from the same date and still going on today. What is incontestable is that the events of autumn 2004 marked a step in the development of Ukrainian society from authoritarianism to democracy. That said, the Orange Revolution cannot be regarded as a social revolution, because it has neither changed the social structure, nor reformed the political system. On the other hand, we can definitely note some positive changes in the relationship between the state and civil society – towards the strengthening of the latter, towards the freedom of individuals in society and a better understanding of civil society, not only in terms of its institutional forms.

Due to the events of autumn 2004, Ukraine has gained some positive responses, including its recognition among the countries of ‘old’ Europe, the USA and other countries. Moreover, there has been some development toward a state based on the rule of law, and – perhaps the most important result – civil society has begun to develop. Ukraine was not particularly well-known in the world as an independent state until the Orange Revolution. Any fame it had was due to a few prominent sportsmen and actors, whereas after the revolution the Ukrainian nation has become recognized a sovereign European nation.
Without neglecting the ancient history of Ukraine – which is an integral part of European history – we should still focus on the contemporary values of Ukrainian society. The political values, at least those declared by the Orange Revolution, are the values of the liberal democracies of Europe and America. Ukrainian culture, its language and morality, is a part of the European culture. Moreover, the number of Ukrainians who identify themselves as ‘Europeans’ has increased after the Orange Revolution: not only have the Europeans ‘discovered’ Ukraine, but the Ukrainians have ‘discovered’ Europe.

The process of democratization, the advance towards a market economy and a state based on the rule of law were declared as the values of the Orange Revolution. The people of Ukraine have demonstrated that they are capable of sacrificing comfort and even their health, if necessary, to establish and strengthen these values. The liberal values appeared to be natural to Ukraine and its citizens. It is now a fact of history that the Orange Revolution took place in a peaceful and civilized way. We may recall Aristotle’s formulation: ‘a death is always a tragedy, and a tragedy is always a death’. By that yardstick, there were no tragic events whatsoever during the Orange Revolution.

This perspective on the Orange Revolution sees it as a long-lasting political process with positive results. These results are the outcomes of decisive actions taken by the government and by civil society. The revolution has made clear the degree of transformation of Ukrainian society after more than ten years of post-totalitarianism. It has demonstrated both a certain development in the self-awareness of the Ukrainian people, and a turn towards the values of democracy and social justice.

Models of democracy: Definitions or levels?
After the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian politics have revealed new tendencies in the country’s legal system and the system of public administration, with attempts to implement democratic principles for the 2006 parliamentary elections. Ukraine today can boast a generally free mass media. The authorities also hope for a rise in public confidence and that the positive changes will not slide into reverse. It would appear that Ukraine has chosen a democratic path for its own development, and here a prime factor is the willingness to integrate with the united Europe.

However, this is only one possible point of view on the Orange
Revolution and its outcomes. There are also others that are also supported by sufficient scholarly evidence. The notion of democratization implies a process of achieving an expected result, a goal existing before the beginning of the process. The goal and the result never match one another entirely, of course. The degree of fit between the goal and the end-result will depend upon the process of progressing from the first to the latter, as well as upon the tools applied to reach the goal. For many transitional societies, the ultimate goal is democracy – after all, this is the major motivation for transitions. On the other hand, the term ‘democracy’ depends on who defines it. There exist a great many models of democracy, and some practices of ‘democracy’ that accord with one model may be regarded as characteristic of non-democracy in another model.

Let us – just to illustrate the point above – compare The Green Book of Muammar al-Qaddafi and the course book The Fundamentals of Democracy (Osnovii demokratii), which is a result of a joint Ukrainian-Canadian project. The first chapter of al-Qaddafi’s book is titled ‘the essence of democracy’. It begins by stating: ‘the parliaments make the core of traditional contemporary democracies, but the representation of the people in parliaments is but a hoax, and parliamentarianism is an ignominious solution of the problem of democracy’.\(^1\) Al-Qaddafi also holds that the party system is an emasculation of democracy, and that membership in a party is treason. The class system is very much like a party system, and ‘referendums are a democratic fraud’.

In The Fundamentals of Democracy we read a quite different definition (p. 649): ‘the characteristic features of democracy are participation of citizens in formation of the government bodies, control over the government’s activities, influence on decision making on common issues based on universal suffrage in elections, referendums etc, as well as the participation of citizens in solving common problems’.

The notion of ‘power emanating from the people’\(^2\) has changed in form throughout history and through regime-practices. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle held form to be essential: ‘I call the form the essence of every single phenomenon and also its primary essence’. ‘The power of the people’, ‘the power of the majority’ – these terms

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1 All quotations are translated from the Ukrainian edition of the book. [editorial comment]
2 The Ukrainian term narodovladdya cannot be translated by a single word in English, but the Swedish and Norwegian terms folkstyre, folkvälde/folkevelde correspond to the Ukrainian narodovladdya [translator’s remark].
are either utopian, or – if we base ourselves on the classic writers of antiquity – do not reflect the essence of a stable social system. In an historical context, ‘the power of the people’ is the exception rather than the rule.

When trying to understand what democracy is, we may note that an enumeration of its characteristic features often replaces a real definition. A list of characteristic features is not a definition, nor does it adequately reflect the phenomenon itself. Hence, the characteristic features of democracy are perhaps better understood as levels of development: reaching a certain level of democracy implies a transition to a more democratic society.

**Ideal democracy and polyarchy**

Still, the historical models of democracy are obviously deflections from the ideal type of democracy. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant wrote about the ideal: ‘far from objective reality is what I call the ideal, because in my understanding an ideal is not only an idea in concrete, but also *in individuo*, i.e. a single thing, which defines and is defined only by an idea’. According to Kant, ideals do not have an objective existence, but they play a role in shaping the criteria for reasoning, and the assessment and evaluation of the flaws of more imperfect phenomena. Therefore an ideal democracy is a guideline that shows the way to the improvement of society and allows us to bring the social order closer to the nature of man. On the other hand, democracy as an ideal – and here we mean any ideal model of democracy – has relevance for one reason only: it encompasses the relationship between the individual and the state, between the realm of individual freedom and the realm of social necessity, not only from the perspective of existing social realities, but more from the perspective of independent and ideal realities. An ideal plays its role as far as it is based on a certain notional idea of the ‘best’; this is also a normative rule for defining how to develop towards it, and how to assess each stage along the way.

In this way, the efficacy of an ideal model of democracy, provided that we use Kant’s methodology, depends upon the definition of the subject based on *a priori* rules and principles, even without historical conditions for their implementation. Democracy is an ideal and it has to be regarded as an ideal – i.e. we need to distinguish between the end-point of the course of a society’s development (in this case – democracy) and the attempt to implement this ideal into a practical social-political reality. Again, according to Kant: ‘Attempts to apply
an ideal to an example or to some phenomenon are as absurd as attempts to portray a wise man in a novel. Moreover, such attempts are senseless and not very instructive due to the natural limitations which constantly disturb the perfection of an idea. Such attempts will most likely end in illusions, and in this way they make all that is good in an idea appear suspicious and invented.’

Does this not resemble what we are doing in trying to apply the ideal of democracy to the Orange Revolution and the performance of President Yushchenko? The impossible mission of applying the ideal of democracy to social realities forces us to search for definitions that reflect the real goal of political activities. That is why the concept of ‘democratic elitism’ has appeared – to replace the concept of ‘liberal democracy’.

The impossibility of practical implementation of an ideal democracy forces us to direct our search elsewhere, creating practical models that would advance a given society towards the democratic ideal. One such concept is the model of ‘pluralistic democracy’. To some extent it intersects with ‘democratic elitism’, but stresses different issues like the principle of plurality concerning centres of power. Such a model would enable us to consider a representation of different elites in governmental bodies, under the criterion that centralization of power would mean a threat to democracy. Hence, a theory of polyarchy emerges – and one of the prominent representatives of the theory of polyarchy is the US political scientist Robert Alan Dahl.

In fact, ‘the rule of the majority’ is a polyarchy, even though it departs from the ancient Greek understanding of democracy, and is aimed not so much at defining the goal of social development as at assessing existing democracies. In 1953, Dahl and Lindblom considered polyarchy to be a process of effectuating citizen control over political leaders (accountability), but in the 1980s, polyarchy was re-conceptualized as a set of given features of any real democracy. Dahl has identified the following criteria of a polyarchy: the instalment of governing bodies through elections, regular and free elections to the governing bodies, universal suffrage, the right to be nominated to the bodies of power, the right to express one’s thoughts on all social and political issues, the right to receive information and the legal protection of media, and the autonomy of civil organization as well as political parties. (Dahl, 1989, p. 221)

According to Dahl, all characteristic features have to be regarded and examined in their entirety. The establishment of polyarchy is possible only insofar as all the features mentioned above work
together in one single complex. Hence, transitional societies with no stable traditions of democracy and polyarchy are either unstable or end up as hybrid regimes, with mixed degrees of polyarchy and non-democracy.

Let us take Dahl’s polyarchic model of democracy as a base for assessing Ukrainian society and apply his criteria to the possibility of establishing stable polyarchy. Dahl claimed that the establishment of polyarchic institutions in a given country is possible under the following conditions: dissemination and neutralization of forced constraints; the presence of a modern dynamic pluralistic society; cultural homogeneity; a supportive political culture and set of beliefs among citizens, especially among political activists; and the absence of any intervention of a hostile polyarchy of a foreign state.

Since it is difficult to find a truly mono-cultural state, except possibly for a few in Europe, Dahl set out following characteristics that support the establishment of polyarchy in a heterogeneous society: the absence of strong subcultures in a heterogeneous society, and if they are present, the creation of consociate mechanisms of subcultural conflict management by its leaders. Here we should note that Dahl’s definition of a ‘subculture’ differs significantly from the better-known cultural anthropological definition; and it is also necessary to distinguish between a subculture and a local culture – but on the whole these issues are not essential in this context.

An assessment of contemporary Ukrainian society in the framework of the polyarchy concept generates more questions than answers. The most important problem has been already mentioned: is it possible to assess the events of the end of the year 2004 on the basis of the results of the new government’s performance? The government itself has provided such an assessment – obviously in order to extrapolate the positive results of the Orange Revolution to what the current government is doing. Such a solution to our problem makes sense to some extent, because the power itself has been transformed as a result of the Orange Revolution. However, this is but one among several possible assessments. If it is true, the performance of the government is the end-result and therefore reflects only one aspect of the revolution – that some political elite groups have gained power. The results of these groups’ performance are not certain, however. Moreover, the events of the autumn and winter of 2004/2005 have undoubtedly generated results and outcomes, but they need to be examined separately from the assessment of government performance.

To be sure, ‘democracy’ was the catchword of that part of Ukrain-
ian society that supported the current President of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, in the 2004 presidential elections. The fact of the Orange Revolution is in itself evidence of the democratization process, and proves that civil society in Ukraine is rather strong. Here we should add that the problem of ‘civil society’ was quite popular in Ukrainian academic circles until November 2004, but today this issue no longer tops the agenda. As mentioned, an understanding of civil society should not necessarily reduce it to its institutional forms. The Orange Revolution and its victory can and must be regarded as the victory of Ukrainian civil society.

However, there is one more issue concerning the assessment of the Orange Revolution which has to be viewed independently from political preferences. This is whether the outcomes of the revolution match its goals and objectives – and if so, to what extent? Does the performance of the new power in Ukraine in 2004–2005 correspond to the ideals of the liberal model of democracy, which, despite other models of democracy, by default remains the criterion of true democracy?

If we do not appreciate these outcomes today, we can only hope for a further democratization of the Ukrainian society according to the principles proclaimed by Yushchenko and his team during the Orange Revolution. The weak point of such hopes is firstly the absence of any connections of the current government practice with the main principles of liberal democracy. Secondly, it depends on one centre of power only, and such an approach is non-democratic in its very essence. The very fact of the Orange Revolution is a vivid example, or even proof, that democratization implies steady progress towards the abstract ideals of democracy, but it does not prove that the outcomes of the revolution correlate with this ultimate goal. The dependence of the political regime on civil society and the state’s dependence upon one person and his/her team cannot be a guarantee of democratic changes in society. That is why it is essential to have a sound definition of the term ‘the Orange Revolution’, and to compare the outcomes of the revolution with the results of Yushchenko’s performance as head of state.

**Conclusion: Beyond the Revolution**

The support of Victor Yushchenko by various Ukrainian political forces (e.g. the Socialist Party of Ukraine) in the 2004 election brought into being a political and constitutional reform in Ukraine, and subsequent changes in the form of government. Such a reform
means a more serious and profound implementation of liberal democratic principles, and not solely the exercise of the political will of the chief executive and his team. Still, the development of parliamentarianism, which is the intention behind the reform, can have two scenarios: either real democratic changes in Ukrainian society, or the establishment of an oligarchic republic. The results of this political reform will depend upon which power will become dominant in our society: is it to be the power of political teams, or the power of legal principles?

Why is politics so popular in transitional societies, as in Ukraine? One answer can be: because the political future of the whole society depends on the governing bodies and the state authorities. By contrast, in stable democracies, election results do not radically change the strategic development course of society. Indeed, history reveals many examples of democratic transformation that has been carried out by authoritarian personalities. We have all heard of Oliver Cromwell, Thomas Jefferson, and Charles de Gaulle. Is there in Ukraine any personality like that, capable of doing what they did?

At present there are three potent political forces in Ukraine, but a ‘dark horse’ may yet emerge out of the blue. So far we have three forces, three parties, and three leaders: the current President of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, and two former prime ministers – Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yanukovych. The implementation of political reform will enable two out of the three to concentrate state power in their hands, provided that they can unite in their efforts.

A possible victory of Victor Yanukovych seems very likely to bring to naught the positive results of the Orange Revolution, which was aimed not so much at support of Yushchenko as it was directed against Yanukovych. A possible victory of Victor Yushchenko or Yulia Tymoshenko is not quite ideal either: they have proven that they cannot work together as a team. Unfortunately, the Presidential team has failed to demonstrate the high professionalism they claim to possess. Indeed, the post-revolutionary governments of Ukraine have examples of very strange political appointments, such as the appointment of Roman Zvarych as Minister of Justice or Igor Lykhovyi as Minister of Culture and Tourism, and with even more examples at the lower levels of government.

In my opinion, Ukrainian society can only rely on its ability to consolidate civil society. It has to create social conditions that do not render it dependent on political power. Relative independence of the country’s main provider of democratic development will serve as the most persuasive evidence of true Democracy in Ukraine.
The Problems of Democracy Development in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution

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Introduction
Ever since Ukraine gained its independence, the problem of democratization has been the focus of attention, as a crucial point in assessing the success of transition, and the competitiveness and partnership potential of the state. In the early 1990s, it was expected that a democratic system-change would be implemented almost automatically, as a natural consequence or even a mandatory supplement to independent statehood. Since then, the dominant trend has been the acknowledgement of objective problems and difficulties in the transition to democracy and the recognition that the state would have to undergo a long transition period. In Ukraine, as well as among its Western partners, the prevailing hope was that the political regime would gradually evolve towards democracy. In fact, however, the establishment of a democratic opposition proved to be slow, and there was no systematic struggle against the consolidation of authoritarianism.

The resignation of Victor Yushchenko’s government must be seen as marking a watershed between the time of hopes for the self-affirmation of democracy and the beginning of the struggle for its formation. The correlation of forces between the followers of democracy and its opponents, as well as the readiness of society to complete the transition to democracy, has become more obvious. The gradual strengthening of the democratic movement and its great progress during the 2004 presidential elections demonstrates a shift to the practical stage of establishing a rule-by-law democracy. What is of urgent importance now, is to analyse the most pressing problems, and evaluate the perspectives.
Ukraine’s fourteen years of independence cannot be considered as a time of steady transition toward democracy. New opponents of democracy have appeared during these years – the oligarchy and the bureaucracy. The basic conditions for a democratic transition have deteriorated. The political and moral act of condemning Soviet and post-Soviet authoritarianism has not taken place. Issues of national revival and independence have generally been taken up and resolved outside the context of democratization.

Societal support for democracy still remains limited. Basic material needs have not been met, preventing democratic values from occupying the leading positions in mass consciousness. Most people do not realize that there is a connection between democracy and welfare. The attitude of the elite towards democratic values is contradictory, and any real readiness to follow and promote these values is inadequately embedded in the elite’s attempts to move Ukraine forward to democracy in accordance with the experience and patterns of its Western neighbours.

**The new impulse of social and political development**

Considering democratization as a practical issue has become essential after the events connected with the presidential elections in 2004. Experts assess the Orange Revolution phenomenon in various ways, and it will long remain an issue of ideological controversy. However, there can be no disputing the fact that the Orange Revolution marks a watershed in the short history of independent Ukraine, and is considerably more significant than the ‘Kravchuk’ or ‘Kuchma epoch’. The Orange Revolution came as an important response to the challenges and contradictions of social and political development in the young state. It demonstrated Ukraine’s non-acceptance of the Russian political model as well as a shift to its own unique historical heritage based on the broader European tradition.

In practical terms, however, the Orange Revolution has failed to provide perspectives for a more intensive movement toward stable democracy. The appearance of a more civilized political practice is neither normatively nor institutionally fixed. Ukraine today is a state where authoritarianism has been surmounted but where democracy is still not formed. The impulses of Orange Revolution have had a greater influence on society than on the country’s elite and the authorities. The forces that have recently relied on the clan-bureaucratic mechanisms of control are still influential, and can count on considerable electoral support.
The reconfiguration of the deputies’ corps subsequent to the elections never allowed the formation of a new majority, and this matter never particularly concerned the democratic majority. The ‘Nasha Ukraina’ (Our Ukraine) and ‘Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko’ factions were too weak to take the initiative. Relations between these forces and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), which in the government were far from being harmonious, were considered ‘remarkable’ in the parliament due to their close cooperation. Eventually, under the influence of the Orange Revolution, an obstruction of the work of the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) has taken place. In addition to a significant group of deputies outside any faction, there are some groups with ill-defined and unstable political orientations. The lack of an adequate democratic opposition has had a negative effect on the activity of the authorities as well as on the development of the political situation.

Not only has the split within the coalition of winners in the revolution led to discussions concerning the correspondence of the activities of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko followers with the ‘ideals of the Orange Revolution’, but it has also given rise to competition for the position of protecting these ideals. Far more dangerous is the possibility that democratic flank expansion and consolidation is again fading away, including the prospects of intensifying the natural exclusion of destructive political forces from main positions of power. The position of President Victor Yushchenko has been substantially weakened, making it very hard for him and his team to prepare for ratification of amendments to the Constitution and to act effectively within the framework of a parliamentary-presidential republic. There is little time left before parliamentary elections, and it is already apparent that they are highly unlikely to renovate the political elite.1 In fact, some mutual understanding has already been reached among the team of Victor Yushchenko, the regional representatives and those who have joined Volodymyr Lytvyn’s party. It serves as a basis for a mutually beneficial conservation of the political situation.

As far as the issues of ownership of strategic economic objects are concerned, the peace treaty declared by the new prime minister implies a correction of the country’s economic policy.2 It is of urgent importance to avoid conflicts and scandals, create stable conditions for business and improve the investment climate. At

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1 This paper was written in September 2005 [eds remark].
2 This concerns the new government of Yuriy Yekhanurov that took power in September 2005 (eds remark).
the same time, this may be interpreted as evidence of changes in the political strategy and readiness for peaceful co-existence with representatives of the former political regime. It is widely believed that, after the renewal of government, the President found himself forced to proclaim a policy of reconciliation and stability. But there is good evidence to indicate that such a policy corresponds to his views as to the depth and rate of changes in the economic as well as in the social and political sphere. Restrictions of the scope of transformation, and counting on the weakening of resistance and on ensuring control over the political situation, imply a cessation of revolutionary fervour. Besides, this represents a rational motive for breaking off with Yulia Tymoshenko, who is inclined to continue the ‘Orange cause’.

Hence, the post-revolutionary Europeanization of the power and the state is being obstructed. The most probable scenario here is the consolidation of this position as a consequence of the parliamentary elections. The coalition of winners in the Orange Revolution made it difficult to distinguish between separate political forces, thus ‘levelling’ their positions and behaviour. After the political divorce of the most popular leaders, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, their teams found themselves face to face with hypocritical opponents and a by no means indifferent society. Having dismantled the coalition with the ‘Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc’, ‘Nasha Ukrayina’ has identified itself as a moderate right-centrist political force, which makes it a natural partner of the People’s Party of Ukraine, headed by Lytvyn. After the elections, cooperation with the Party of Regions will also become possible, because it may prove more flexible than the team of Tymoshenko. Similarly, the ideals of the revolution are of scant concern for the socialists.

Pragmatists in the power circles and pragmatists who have not yet joined the opposition will probably gain considerable numerical superiority in parliament, and it is these people who will later be searching for the majority configuration. Due to the Orange Revolution – or despite it – all the above-mentioned political forces will succeed in the coming elections and will determine the further development of the state. They will have to come to an agreement and establish cooperation, but it is evident that democratic principles and the practical steps towards their realization are unlikely to form the basis of their common strategy. Here we must take into consideration the fact that the ‘Orange’ phase of democratization has not yet struck deep roots or attained a systemic character. True, it changed the rules of the game in politics and business, having
partially redistributed the possibilities and the roles of the players, but it hardly influenced the nature of these players. They appear more interested in keeping the actual state of affairs as it is. Thus, we have to admit that ‘the building material’ on which the majority in the Verkhovna Rada is likely to be based in spring 2006 will hardly suffice for establishing democracy in Ukraine.

**How democratic is Ukraine in autumn 2005?**

In order to evaluate the actual state of democracy in Ukraine, formal criteria are needed. Let us apply some basic indicators used by Freedom House as defined in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. The dynamics of the situation and the stability of tendencies should be considered here.

**Political activity.** The qualitative shifts in Ukraine have come about through the guarantee of free and fair elections. The experience of the year 2004 stands as a positive example for future elections. It is fixed in legislation, as well as in the efforts of institutions that directly organize the election procedure. However, the question of the effectiveness of laws remains open – for example, whether the initiators of mass falsifications and pressure upon voters will be held accountable for their actions.

The mechanisms for change of power have worked for the first time in Ukraine, while the mechanisms of political responsibility have only started to function. There are still residual reserves that may expand the use of the appointment-by-election principle. On the regional level, the administrative system corresponds poorly with democratic principles. Mainly, it is all about the distribution of authority between the heads of oblast and regional administrations and radas\(^3\) of the appropriate level.

Freedom of political choice has increased significantly. The improvement of political competition and transparency radically decreases the risk of utilizing administrative resources as well as black political propaganda and informational technologies. Remaining problems in this sphere mainly concern the specifics of mass awareness and the remnants of Soviet subculture. However, in the eastern oblasts, the pressure and political choice manipulation of civil society will come to pass. Similarly, some regions are notable for the differing social and political conditions of holding local elections.

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3 The *rada* is the Ukrainian equivalent of local community councils (eds remark).
The situation is far more complicated when it comes to the quality of the representation of civil interests as well as the level of development of political parties. As yet, a stable and socially rooted party system, capable of articulating and generalizing social interests, has not been formed. The level of trust in political parties is still low. The dominant role in political life belongs to parties that neither have natural connections with voters, nor represent clan interests. Similarly, the network of social institutions, associations and groups able to cooperate and mediate between society and political system needs further substantial improvement. A further problem is that of realistic political choice: the possibility to join, support and put into effect a concrete, functional social-economic and political project.

The opposition is a comparatively weak point in the political organization of Ukrainian society. Even though the conditions of its activity have approached democratic standards after the Orange Revolution, its rights must be clearly registered and fixed in legislation. Without changes in Constitution, there will always be some uncertainty in distinguishing between political forces in power and those in opposition to it. Moreover, a culture of relations between those holding power and the opposition has only just begun to take shape.

*The state of political rights and civil liberties.* Freedom of expression and beliefs is generally provided for in Ukraine today. Citizens have attained the freedom of meetings, demonstrations, public discussions and manifestations of civil activity. No longer are the authorities able to restrict civil liberties. As a consequence of the Orange Revolution, the state has made a significant step in guaranteeing the freedom of speech and information. A network of free and independent media is being formed. The system of censorship, distribution of information, mass consciousness manipulation, and black propaganda has been dismantled.

The objectivity/impartiality of information has become a commonplace phenomenon, but it remains to be seen whether it will become a standard and whether it will work during the election campaign.\(^4\) The present legislation contains several undemocratic regulations concerning the terms of mass media activity during elections. There is no proper transparency concerning the influence of mass media owners on editorial policy, and there are no clear prospects for transforming the national TV and radio companies.

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4 The Rada elections in March 2006 (eds remark).
into channels of public broadcasting. Also the privatization of state-owned printed mass media is being obstructed. Public awareness of crucial issues of the state of the country and its people is poor.

What is special about the present-day situation in Ukraine is the fact that the firm establishment of democratic standards at the level of local authorities and separate groups is taking place at a slower pace and with greater difficulties than at the national level. Moreover, personal rights and freedoms appear to be less guaranteed than political ones, and there are critical problems involving the consolidation of academic freedom. Trade unions are weak, leading to unaccountability on the part of managers of institutions and factories. Recently, a law was adopted that proposes alterations in some legislative acts. It aims at reinforcing legal assistance and implementing mechanisms to effectuate civil constitutional rights for private enterprises, personal immunity and security, respect for human rights, legal protection and assistance. Ukraine has signed Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; it has ratified the European treaty on the freedom of the individual, and is taking part in the European Court process of implementing human rights. At the same time, however, the authorities’ daily practice and the high level of bureaucratization are evidence of the unjust dependence of citizens on the authorities, and of the interference of the authorities in social and personal affairs.

Supremacy of law. This primary principle of a democratic regime remains the least guaranteed. There are three essential complex issues here. The first is the imperfection and incompleteness of the existing legislation. Second is the lack of development of a legal culture in the elite, among state employees and at the level of the citizenry. And the last one is the inappropriate status and arrangement of the judicial authority’s activity.

Ukraine lacks legislation for implementing and developing constitutional norms. These include laws on the presidency, on the government, special and temporary Verkhovna Rada commissions, the Order of Verkhovna Rada, among others. Such normative insufficiencies make the division of authority and responsibility among the branches of power problematic. This situation also creates space for ‘manual’ governing – the arbitrary expansion and usurpation of authority, and behind-the-scene politics. And finally, it renders democratic control over the activity of authorities truly complicated. There is a need for increased normative provisions for local government. Moreover, existing legislation is of low effectiveness and is not observed.
Social factors further complicate the supremacy of law. Among these are the lack of a civilized tradition of obeying the law, low level of confidence in state institutions, insufficient awareness of one’s rights and a lack of interest in maintaining them. The new legal and political culture just beginning to take shape in Ukraine can contribute to transforming the style of governing and legal procedures, as well as to creating of a system of active civil control over the legal machinery.

The judicial branch is in practice not separated from the executive, and thus lacks independence from it. This is determined by either institutional or material factors, above all by the procedure financing the courts, as well as the assignment and remuneration of judges. And finally, there is the problem of the effectiveness of the judicial branch, including the implementation of court decisions and improvement of access to justice.

Conclusion: Perspectives for further democratization
Thanks to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has passed through the stage of social and political progress in which it was gauged as being ‘a relatively democratic state’. Today, however, it has become apparent that the country is far from a stable democracy, and that further exploration into the deeper layers of democracy will not be an easy matter. The consolidation of democracy requires broad systematic reforms in the economic, political and legal realms. It is in this phase of democratization that Ukraine needs a new quality of political administration, and cannot be reassured only by the citizens’ mass movement. Therefore, the assessment of various perspectives for democratization is closely connected with the presence of a proper potential for democracy among the political elite, and with possible changes in power.

The main question is as follows: is the reduced team of Victor Yushchenko that has stayed in power after the September crisis able to guarantee a democratic progress of the state? Many people say ‘no’, drawing up a scenario of stagnating reforms. Even more pessimistic views see the current power degenerating into the former regime of Kuchma. Though the probability of such a negative scenario does not appear high, it ought to be recognized as a potential menace that requires serious counter-action. The possibilities of the current authorities are obviously limited, because constitutional reform is about to be carried out in the state. But even now, the role of the president is diminishing, with the emergence of new and
independent political players that enjoy real support in society.

This optimistic perspective is based on the fact that since September 2005, Ukraine has gained not only a democratic power able to promote the reforms, but also a democratic opposition. In order for such a scenario to proceed, the cooperation between Victor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko has to be renewed, and a Verkhovna Rada majority based on a coherent democratic programme should be established. This will most likely not be sufficient, however. There is poor correspondence between the personages of the winning coalition and future leaders of a stable democracy. The characters of both political leaders with whom the perspective for democratization is directly associated correspond mainly to the conditions and directives of the transition period – in lack of consistency and adherence to principle, and in the lack of personal dedication to democracy and tolerance. The People’s Union ‘Nasha Ukrayina’ and the ‘Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc’ are still far from serving as examples of immanently democratic organizations. Both they and their teams will have to not only confirm their ability to struggle for and protect power, but also effectively utilize it for the sake of the people, consolidating the state without slowing down the reforms.

Concerning the rest of Ukraine’s political forces, it is only the Social Party of Ukraine (SPU) that can somehow reinforce the democratic front and support the promotion of reforms. The Party of Regions now appears quite moderate in comparison with the presidential election period. If it could change its leader, this party might become a respectable player, but in its current state it cannot be considered an adherent of democratic change. From this point of view it seems a rather doubtful partner and hardly an appropriate participant in a real democratic coalition. Almost the same can be said about the People’s Party with Volodymyr Lytvyn at the helm. Moreover, if these two forces exploit the rivalries within the democratic front and have an immediate influence on legislative and executive power after the parliamentary elections, the state will become either a hotbed for bureaucratic and oligarchic revenge, or the driving force in slowing down and constraining democratic reforms.

However, after the Orange Revolution, the main political actors cannot choose their own scenarios at will. No longer can the authorities dictate their own rules on society – instead, society itself has an increasing influence on those in power. The revolution has led both to a desacralization of power, as well as to a more rational, calm
and at the same time critical attitude towards it. The genetic fear of power that held millions of people in its thrall has been swept away. The revolution cured millions of citizens of social anaemia and outsider mentality; it revealed their ability for self-organization, initiative and practical solidarity. Now society has got an aversion to manifestations of corruption, bureaucratism and insincerity. Having managed to outmanoeuvre power, it has gained a fresh experience. Nevermore will society remain passive when its expectations are not met. This in itself represents a firm guarantee for the continued democratic progress of the Ukrainian state. The specific itinerary and the speed of this progress will be determined in 2006.
After the Orange Revolution

Social integration in Ukraine

Introduction
To understand the events known as Ukraine’s Orange Revolution we need a diagnosis of the current state of social integration concerning values widely shared in civil society. Intellectual and political debates tend to centre on institutional changes, taking as their point of departure a functional-institutional understanding of social and political life. Adherents of such an approach view – deliberately or not – the Orange Revolution in such terms as an awakening of civil society, a bourgeois-democratic revolution, the destruction of the oligarchic regime and the victory of liberal democracy with its principles of inalienable rights and liberties and people’s sovereignty, etc. Such an approach has proven fruitful in analysing stable liberal social-political institutions, but it is inadequate for conceptualizing the establishment of fundamentally new social and political structures like those in Ukraine.

No one in contemporary Ukrainian politics would contest the necessity of democratic institutional transformations. True, the Communists engage in revolutionary rhetoric – all the while interacting with government on a liberal-democratic basis, which indicates that they are not pursuing a revolutionary practice but in fact engaging in parliamentary democracy. Progress in the institutionalization of democracy depends nevertheless on one very important matter: a complete democratic transformation, to such a degree that freedom of speech, human rights and liberties become essential guidelines for any actor involved in collective action and political life. Unless the actors themselves are guided by democratic values in their political activities, democratization risks remaining limited to government and elite rhetoric.
In the following I highlight the value dimension of the Orange Revolution. Values will be understood as virtues. My approach is based hermeneutics and phenomenology as reflected in political theory and philosophy.

**Understanding values: The values of the Maidan**

Paul Ricoeur (1991) has interpreted politics in a hermeneutical and phenomenological manner by indicating that the behaviour of actors in political events is reconstituted through slogans, gestures, symbols. This draws on the phenomenology of religion and phenomenological sociology. In my view, also political science has every reason to study not merely institutions, ideologies and political theories, but also the practices of political activity and collective values.

Although Martin Heidegger has contributed to making theories about values irrelevant, the issue of values does not wane in significance during revolutions – on the contrary, it becomes essential. This is evident when we consider the Orange Revolution, where the participants – in their perception of state power, society and socio-political institutions – engaged in political struggle on the basis of sharp dichotomies and binary opposition models like ‘pure–impure’ politics, and ‘moral–amoral’ behaviour. The slogans ‘for pure elections’, ‘for moral power’, ‘Yushchenko – a moral politician’, which made up the core of political activist messages during the Maidan events and were repeated continuously, demonstrate this. The dichotomy ‘pure–impure’ in Ukrainian tradition was equated with the binary opposition ‘moral–amoral’, because ‘pure’ first of all meant ‘not implicated in any intrigues’. The sense of ‘purity’ of power and political conduct implied the basic demand that political power should not be involved in any machinations.

But the discourse of moral values was used not merely to identify a more or less moral political force: it was performed in the context of a binary mythical discourse of confrontation between good and evil. The Manichean division of the world into the powers of good and evil speaks to the mythological aspects of these events. ‘I don’t know how to explain this’, said one of Yushchenko’s supporters, ‘but I gather there are forces of good and evil. And for the first time we have a candidate representing the good forces. And there is another candidate that even cannot be said to represent evil forces, because he is really so insignificant’ (Petasyuk, 2005). In other words, anyone in opposition to Yushchenko was denigrated.
and demonized – and the same goes for representatives of the old power structures, like Kuchma and Medvedchuk, who were depicted as the ‘great evil’, while Yanukovych was demoted to the rank of a minor demon.

This ascription of morality to a given candidate formed the basis for this sacralization. He stands out in contrast to the fallibility of the other candidate(s) – not in the framework of a legal perspective, but in terms of a Christian-moral set of values. (Shchotkina, 2004) This morality, based on binary opposition models, set the agenda for viewing the external world as ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, with the USA and Russia seen as the main actors with the greatest impact. The ‘Orange’ side interpreted foreign influences as a confrontation between Asia (an authoritarian regime with strong imperial encroachment upon Ukraine) and Western democracy, with its principles of the inalienable rights and liberties. The Yanukovich ‘white–blue’ side saw the revolution as a struggle between a friendly country and its brotherly people and a world aggressor, considered to view the world – including Ukraine – in the light of its anti-Russian geopolitical interests.

Although the discourse has a mythical character, characterizing the opposite side as evil and demonizing it, this does not conceal the underlying moral core of the discourse: indeed, it intensifies it. Even if we assume that the ascription of morality to the candidates and political parties was an artificial creation of ideologists and political technologists, we must still admit that among the ‘consumers’, these ideas received a powerful backing and resonance. Through the mythical character of such a binary division of the world, politicians are confronted with ethical demands that might force them to consider their responsibility and accountability. The ethical message emerges and matures, as shown by the manifestations of solidarity among the ‘orange’ and the ‘white–blue’.

**Moral majorities: Expectations of the Maidan**

The Orange Revolution was by implication a phenomenon of public liberation, even an explosion of moralistic feelings that had long been suppressed by social injustice and the legal cynicism of power politicians, debated only in the kitchens of private life. An argument in support of this thesis can be found in the very nature of the requests and slogans of the revolution. Its participants demanded not merely that property be redistributed or that political authority be based on the separation of powers, but also that a new genera-
tion of moral politicians should engage in direct dialogue with the people, seeking not power incentives or the protection of financial interests, but showing themselves capable of communicating values like justice, honesty and dignity.

Of course, such demands can seem naively romantic for those critical intellectuals who claim that politics as a matter of principle cannot be moral. Politics is as such ‘beyond good and evil’, and has been so ever since Machiavelli. Abuse of authority and economic misconduct of politicians can be restrained only by law, or rather, by the principle of equality before the law. Hence, the moralistic comprehension by the participants of the Maidan events concerning the very essence of power can be explained in two ways: either by the primacy of ethics over ‘law’, or by an undeveloped legal consciousness based on the assumption that the law is but a formality and very much an abstract one.

Understanding values as virtues presupposes a more existentialist line of reasoning: in this sense, values are essential for co-existence, and an idea that can make it possible to live together. Undoubtedly, if some of those who stood on the Maidan managed to formulate this common image of co-existence, which was so long expected to be formulated in terms of a national idea, then this image would have had all the characteristics of Christian morality or Kant’s categorical imperative: do not steal, do not impede the freedom of speech, do not lie. That is, morality itself would have been the basis for the idea of social integration and co-existence, an embodiment of a truly ‘unselfish’ value, transcending the boundaries of economic and political expediency. It is ‘the moral enlightenment’ of power and citizens that is the true concern of many Maidan participants, and that legitimizes such democratic transformations as the development of the constitutional state, an independent court, and the institutionalization of the rights and liberties of the individual. The fact that the collective actors of the Maidan perceived democracy in a value perspective has set the criteria for assessing the activity of the new figures in government. Unlike those on the Maidan, however, the new power elite have treated democracy very instrumentally, basically as a means of redistribution of property and political positions. They have preserved moralistic slogans, but mostly as a means for political rhetoric. This is an impingement upon popular moral standards and does not serve to legitimize the activity of political elites.

Disillusionment with the revolution is not a consequence of the socio-economic policy of the government and the President; it is
mainly connected with the revelations of immorality in the ranks of the new power. People supported Yulia Tymoshenko in her attempts to reverse the unjust privatization of large enterprises by the oligarchs close to Kuchma. But when she was accused (although not by the courts) of lobbying for the interests of certain business groups, this gave rise to feelings of disappointment. And then, when the public discovered corruption in the circles around of President Yushchenko, this radically reduced the moral standing of the President and his authority.

Unfortunately, the new power failed to live up to the values of the new moral community. The new team in power was more connected with both economic and political common interests – a legitimization that stands in contrast to the communitarian values of the Maidan. The essence of the events of the Orange Revolution was the formation of both collective and individual subjects of political action. Even though both the ‘orange’ and the ‘blue–whites’ were supported financially and also were exposed to pressure, people took action and stood up for their rights without expecting anything in return. Most importantly, the Maidan programme was perceived existentially, and not instrumentally. The experience of the Maidans in Kiev, Donetsk and elsewhere is that of the ‘moral majority’ in terms of Hegel – the free, unselfish moralistic unification and political action of people. The division of society into two camps of different colours was not made on the basis of the ‘unselfishness and purity’ of one side and the ‘corrupt and compromised reputation’ of the other, although such accusations have often been used by both sides concerning the other political force. Unfortunately, the cleavage runs through vital values. This is a menacing situation, for it touches on the essential difference in real-life value orientations, as evinced in life-styles, festivals, rituals and ceremonies and myths.

The importance of common rituals for the integration of society is widely recognized. According to a study of the Razumkov Foundation, Easter is the only festival that is equally important in the East and the West of Ukraine (these terms are used not in terms of geography, but in terms of values). State festivals operate as religious ceremonials in the churches: by appealing to widely shared senses and feelings, such festivals ‘cement’ the nation. But while 9 May is the most important festival for one part of the country, it is not recognized by the other part, whereas the New Year and Christmas are celebrated in accordance with two different religious calendars (Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic/Gregorian), this value cleavage under the current conditions of underdeveloped
civil society and social solidarity renders the formation of a united civil nation impossible. Nor can language, or common festivals, or history (currently described by modern intellectuals as a fight for independence against the main enemies – Russia and communism) serve as value-integrative factors.

Attempts to find a common ‘arche’ of the nation in the extreme antiquity of images like the ‘way of the Aryans’, ‘the Cossacks’ democracy’ or even ‘Tripolian culture’ performed by our literary men and philosophers cannot unite the nation, because such images are artificial and do not correspond to the real experience of our people. For older generations, the experience of the Soviet times is still alive, but most of today’s evaluations of Soviet history stand in contradiction to these notions. Many of the creators of the ‘national idea’ neglect the fact that such phenomena as language, the victory over fascism or liberation struggle against the Stalinist regime, the attitude towards Russia and Poland are all existential values or anti-values. Their destruction means the existential death of the personality, the abolition of the meaning of life. By interpreting the history of Ukraine in terms of a sacred war against the enemies of Ukraine personified by communism and Russia, historians, along with philologists and philosophers, have been performing ritual murder of their own national identity. It is this author’s opinion that the specific ‘national integration project’ should be based not on a mythical past experience, but on one capable of transcending such limitations.

European values: A possible dimension?
The European life-sense orientation can become a good example of such projects. The new authorities have clearly announced their orientation toward European integration. This new value seems attractive to intellectuals, to students and youth from both the East and West of Ukraine. But politicians and political scientists generally interpret today’s integration processes in Europe as joining EU institutions, or the building of civil society and a constitutional state, without significantly changing the value motivations. We should remember that these are precisely the cultural values (tolerance, respect for private life, rights and liberties, freedom of belief and conviction) on which political institutions are based. In my opinion, it is the choice that is the most important value. That is why ‘the European choice’ means first and foremost the ‘right to choose’. It means that a European citizen has the experience and the right to
choose his/her identity, language, profession, place of living and personal affiliations. The right is conceived both as liberty and personal responsibility; and liberty is characterized by personal courage, rationality and resistance against any authoritarianism – be it of power, of society, of the crowd. In Ukraine, ‘Europe’ often has a mythical image of being ‘the oasis of the light-hearted life’, with generous social benefits, a high quality of life and moral social-political institutions. Though all these advantages do exist in Europe, this is not what makes up the core points of ‘European-ness’.

The real conditions of modern European life consist of rationally organized economics, with politics and social life based on rights and laws, which an adult person has the ability to comprehend (in turn necessitating a certain level of rationality). True, the modern European citizen does not always follow the rational choice in his/her social and political behaviour; and there are Western European thinkers who assert that Western European democracy is threatened with ‘instrumentalization’ and ‘technologization’. But these are very sound and stable political ‘mechanisms’ and ‘instruments’ that permit Europeans to be traditional. In Western democracies, democratic institutions have already become traditional.

During transitions, only an irresponsible authority will rely upon emotions and mythical slogans. The moralistic feelings of the Maidan, as reflected in the value perception of the rights and liberties of the citizens and democratic institutions, never became rationalized in a programme that could guarantee the institutionalization of the rights and liberties and of the people’s will. Unfortunately, realization of the ‘ideals of the Maidan’ was held in a non-legalistic way – and indeed, one which strongly resembled the ancient principle of blood feud.

When conducted in isolation from a legal and rational discourse, value-based thinking is often a trademark of a pre-modern, traditional attitude towards power, characterized by patriarchal features and paternalism. Such conditions enable the authorities, to a greater extent, to apply these principles as criteria for official appointments and for building up the relations between politicians and the citizenry. The principles of ‘nepotism’ and ‘revolutionary fraternity’ have become determinative for the formation of the new authorities.

Such principles are familiar to the average Ukrainian, who is also aware that relations within the family are far from the standards of morality and unselfishness. That is why the average Ukrainian also recognizes that the extrapolation of family, friendly and other
patriarchal relations onto power relations is inadmissible. Thus, the Maidan expressed a vote of no confidence also in the principles of the formation of the new power clans that sought to manifest their authority in this way. Subsequently, the Maidan implied a necessary transition from traditional ways to modern models of power.

Today’s Ukrainian President has not been able to abandon the traditional values that are so close to him. That is why admiration for Tripolian pots, embroidery and family bonds has already become a part of his political image. Such an image does not correspond to the concept of a modern dynamic politician with a strong belief in the importance of technological innovations and universal human rights. The President’s image is clear and close for the baba Paraska from the western Ukrainian village, but this seems odd to the estranged workers of the big industrial enterprises in the East and the South of the country. Thus, the very image of the President is unhelpful in the context of promoting value integration in Ukrainian society.

Modernization in the sphere of politics means both rationalization and professionalization of the public administration, by adopting laws directed toward the formation of an impersonal public administration where the bureaucracy is representative; and also the democratization of the decision-making process, which means fulfillment of popular sovereignty in forming and controlling power and in defining the main strategic goals and values of the state. According to Habermas (2001), the very existence of a public discourse about strategic goals and values can act to confine the endeavours of the public administration to using the democracy instrumentally – reducing it to an instrument for the realization of clannish interests and goals.

Modern politics emerges after its separation from market economic relations. The public administration cannot be dominated by the interests of market relations, and market relations cannot be dominated by the public administration, despite all the regulation the state may apply. A popular slogan on the Maidan focused on the separation of business and power and the urgent need for legal institutionalization of this principle.

**Conclusion**

The democratization of Ukrainian society is threatened with an instrumentalization of democratic institutions as a result of the penetration of market interests into the sphere of the political deci-
sion-making processes. A market globalization that runs roughshod over the establishment of democratic institutions prejudices the modernization project in the post-Soviet countries, provoking a blind imitation of Western European institutions that fails to take into account the need to form a democratic subject where political action is guided by a soundly based value orientation.

The strategic direction for Ukraine’s future decisions concerning joining NATO, EU or EEC (Eurasian Economic Cooperation) require not merely a people’s referendum to legitimize the decisions made by officials, but also consensus through public discourse concerning the strategic goals and values of society. The lack of the value perception of democracy in our society is reflected in the general ‘instrumental’ attitude towards Europe and European institutions. For Ukrainians, the question ‘What can Europe give us?’ is still reduced to the question ‘Can European institutions give us the welfare, the working places and the light-hearted life we want?’

Unfortunately, the problem of embedding European values has not been verbalized and debated in the political and intellectual life of Ukraine. Cultural transformations are still regarded by our politicians as a means for legitimizing liberal reforms. In practical politics, the liberal-Marxist approach prevails, so the formation of a political nation is taking place by imposing liberal economic, political and legal changes that will automatically result in a transformation of the value system. That is why different variants of the ‘national idea’ justify the oligarchic-clannish redistribution of the power, instead of integrating society into politics.

This ongoing ‘war of values’ may end with the total obtrusion of a certain ideology, which contradicts the recognized democratic pluralism of parties and ideologies – or it may result in social integration by means of public political and intellectual discourse between the representatives of different regions and political forces on values. But this discourse can be effective only to the extent that it recognizes the equality of all values in what Habermas (2001) has called ‘constitutional patriotism’.
Introduction
The criteria and conditions of contemporary Western democracy are widely agreed to be as follows: universal suffrage and a representative government; an effective opposition to government power (multi-party system); an independent and effective judicial system, with the supremacy of law and equal protection before the law; freedom of the press and mass media; and an active and resonating civil society that enjoys freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to create associations.

‘Civil society’ can be interpreted in two ways. According to a sociological definition, civil society consists of voluntary associations, and is sometimes understood as synonymous with communities. The economic definition connects the term with economic risk, individualism and business undertakings, thus denoting the area of economic relations. This article focuses on civil society in its sociological meaning.

Civil society and the state – a scholarly debate
One of the most controversial problems in the sociological definition of civil society concerns its relations with the state. Some liberal political theorists assume that civil society is not only different from the state, but can also exist on its own, without political support. This approach sees civil society as an embodiment of pluralism that balances the state, thus restricting its authoritarian instincts and making it socially accountable. John Keane (1988, pp. 6, 9) claims that civil society and the state are two institutionally different
‘unfeasible extremes’, in which civil society is ‘an ideally-typical category describing and foreseeing a complex and dynamic whole of legally protected non-governmental institutions that are inclined to be non-violent and self-reflective. These are being in permanent tension between each other as well as with state institutions that form and restrain them and make their activity possible.’

Along the same lines, Zbigniew Rau interprets the state and civil society as diverse objects with well-defined limits. ‘Civil society’, he argues, ‘is a historically developed form of society which admits the existence of space […] between the relations, which come from family duties, and man’s liability concerning the state. Civil society is free from either family or state power influence.’ (Rau, 1991, p. 4)

Such liberal views point out that civil society associations manage to function regardless of organizational and financial control on the part of the state. Consequently, the state cannot ‘demand any right to regulate, direct or thrust its will upon citizens unless it breaks the basis of political order’ (Tismaneanu & Turner, 1995, p. 4).

Such accentuation of the non-political aspects of civil society has given rise to two essential remarks. The idea that civil society is totally separated from the state has been criticized for leading to an inevitably negative concept of the state as well as an excessive idealization of civil society. In his Conditions of Liberty (1994), Ernest Gellner points out the intellectual and political complacency of liberal civil society theory, which assumes that current civil societies are ‘the refuges of pluralism and choice as well as the movers of justice, providing natural environment in which freedom could really flourish’ (p. 1). However, followers of the Antonio Gramsci tradition hold that civil society and the state, being analytically and methodologically different elements in the social sphere, are closely connected and inter-dependent.

For Michael Walzer, civil society includes all voluntary forms of associations, whether they are beyond the reach of the state or under its shadow. No state can exist for a long time if it is estranged from civil society. The state ‘not only forms the civil society, but takes place within it. Also it sets the boundary conditions and a main rule of all associations’ activities (including political ones)’ (Walzer, 1995, p. 23). Even in Western countries with long traditions of strong civil societies, the third sector as a social service provider as well as an object of governmental policy has increasingly been developing a political slant. Although civil associations thrive ‘beyond’ the state, the government forms the architecture of the public sphere by means of formal laws and political culture.
When civil organizations gradually become an object of governmental policy, two processes take place: the ‘polarization’ of civil society and the ‘pluralization’ of the state, thus uniting the state and civil society into a single whole (Passey & Tonkiss, 2000, p. 49). Although they are still controversial, these ideas about the limits between civil society and state originate from the classical heritage of Hegel, who, regarding the state as a political structure for civil society, held that the latter has to be subordinated to the state; and Locke, who, in contrast, saw the government as the provider of civil society, through whose help the rights of its members are realized. Clearly, the Soviet system can be identified as an offshoot of the Hegelian doctrine.

**Civil society as an ethical driver of change**

What attracts me is the conception of civil society as one of the important forces in a functional society. Government, market (economics) and civil society are like the three legs of a tripod: they have to be dynamically and harmoniously balanced if the result is to be stable. (See Shipley & Masson, 2004, p. 17.)

The market is a realm of reality where passions, interests and the pursuit of profit rule. It has a tendency to interfere into political life as well as into the life of civil society: economic forces are forever seeking to have an influence on the state and on public opinion. Although the state generally does not attach great importance to the defence of the needs of ordinary people, it may become the instrument of economic forces. Under such conditions, civil society is put under great economic pressure. Moreover, political actors, knowing about the dynamism of some social movements and associations, try to devour them. In that case, civil society actors lose their autonomy and serve as mere additions to political agents. Such ‘free associations’ are no longer free, and thus forfeit the trust of the people. Civil society soon becomes a part of a social reality in permanent tension. Because of their power, economic forces always affect public opinion. Social consent is usually formed according to the intentions of economic forces and their interests. That is what Gramsci (1985) has called the ‘common sense’: a series of assumptions, values, manners, expectations shared by the majority. Ruling groups of economic structure thrust their interests upon the state and its organizations as well as on the NGOs of civil society.

Gramsci draws a line between that ‘common sense’ and that which he calls ‘good sense’. The latter is ‘philosophy folklore’,
a kind of pseudo-knowledge hiding the ruling power domination; good sense is a mover of consciousness based on the defence and realization of people’s needs. ‘Good sense’ grows from the strong core of ‘common sense’, which corresponds to understanding of that people need in order to realize themselves. According to Gramsci, ‘good sense’ (never categorical) criticizes the ‘common sense’, in trying to establish a world view more appropriate for human consciousness. This becomes possible especially when crucial changes in history act to challenge human perceptions of the world. Such permutations in civil society produce the moral basis for the whole of society. In other words, if there are people or groups in civil society who attempt to resist harmful political and cultural hegemony, we can observe movements striving for, as Gramsci calls it, ‘moral and cultural revolution’.

Hence, civil society is not just a creation involving the state, the market and the family. Since the activity of voluntary organizations is oriented towards improving the common welfare, civil society needs an ethical interpretation. Civil society is the only social area in which public dialogue about ethical norms and values takes place. The dialogue initiated by civil society not only has a potential for creating consensus concerning ethical norms and values, but also becomes a social capital and an energy for solidarity essential for the realization of these norms in daily life.

Freedom is one of the main democratic values. Western democracies develop by means of expanding the limits of freedom (whether political, religious, gender, sexual or private). Freedom provides us with the possibility to make choices; it protects human dignity and gives us the chance to become mature. It lets us live according to commonly held values and succeed according to our own free will.

Freedom assumes personal autonomy – the freedom to make plans for life and live freely. Personal autonomy in turn presumes the individual freedom to do what that person wants to do, and to be answerable for the consequences. As long as individual activity does not harm others, no one has the right to set any constraints on the behaviour of others, even if a given individual’s behaviour might seem stupid or misguided or false. Freedom is an essential condition for the prosperity of civil society. On the other hand, it is civil society that creates new possibilities for expanding the limits of freedom.

This brings us back to the role of the state. The role of government in the democratic state consists in maintaining an order that
does not restrict the rights and freedoms of the people. But the problem is that any power is inclined to authoritarianism. Government is rarely able to resist the temptation of usurping power; it justifies itself by claiming that it knows our needs better than we do. That is where we see the importance and the necessity of developed civil society as a freedom guarantor. If the defence of freedom (or the absence of infringement on it) is not a function of the state, the presence of a series of associations and organizations is necessary in order to provide freedom as well as defend various interests and needs.

**Conclusion**

Today the third sector in Ukraine consists of some 40,000 NGOs. Data from 2004 give evidence of a stable upsurge of organizations for protecting and lobbying citizens’ interests. The share of organizations whose main activity is ‘defending and lobbying interests’ has increased from 16% in 2002 to 45% in 2004.\(^1\) In my opinion, it is the presence of civil society that made possible the democratic development of the events in 2004 in Ukraine, when, on the insistent request of civil society, the government had to return to the legal and moral field of activity.

Now an active core of civil society has formed in Ukraine. In its level of education, professionalism and devotion to democratic values, it surpasses the ruling political elite. The practice of recent months has shown that the active core is putting pressure upon power everywhere in order to defend its legal interests, upholding democratic values. Today our task consists in creating institutional forms of civil society which can make possible a permanent and ongoing dialogue between all the actors of society.

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\(^1\) These figures are from *The State and Development Dynamics of Non-governmental Organizations in Ukraine 2002–2004* (2005).
Introduction

How can we understand Ukraine as a democratic state from the perspective of political culture? Political culture is an indirect but very important theme in the analysis of social relations, which seeks to comprehend the intellectual basis for cultural freedom and democracy in a given state. This article sets out to pinpoint several problematic issues in contemporary Ukraine, using the concept of ‘intellectual honesty’ as established by Max Weber, rather than analysing the phenomenon of pseudo-patriotic sentiments.

To begin with, we must pay attention to a major problem, and one that remained unnoticed during the ‘orange’ events, represented neither at the level of political debates nor in everyday civil life. Even today it has not been sufficiently discussed even today, although it is fundamental for analysing Ukraine’s prospects as a democratic state. The problem is this: how can we – the people of Ukraine – live together? After all, Ukrainians differ greatly in mentality, in world views, social interests, intellectual and spiritual needs, political orientations, culture and language, appraisals of the past and visions for the future.

This problem is very real indeed, and it impinges on a variety of other issues. Among these a problem that concerns all Ukrainian citizens – whether ‘white and blue’ or ‘orange’ or those of a neutral political colour: in a clan-based, semi-democratic society (with avowed democratic values and purely bureaucratic principles of management and powerful strata of bureaucrats) it is impossible to make a democratic choice, to fulfil the civil right to choose. All these features are characteristic of Ukraine today. In such a society,
the people will always support only those programme goals that are close to their own interests – even though such goals may prove illusory.

I would warn against the temptation to assess the events of the 2004 election campaign as a revolution based on a romantic vision of political processes. From a classical perspective, there was no revolution whatsoever, because the system of power as well as the political regime has remained the same.1 The events of 2005 prove this point. It seems likely that expectations of revolutionary changes in the social situation have been exaggerated.

**Social division: the logics of the barricades**

During the ‘orange’ events, opposing political movements successfully utilized both the desire of the people to have pure forms of rule (democratic forms according to certain proclaimed principles) and the fatigue of society with the short-sightedness of the authorities. A division took place not at the level of ‘honest’ versus ‘criminal’ power structures, but at the level of society’s expectations of modernization and a clear understanding of the problems that had been obstructing this.

Even now, a year after, it is still possible to encounter political assessments like ‘we went onto the streets (voluntarily)’ contrary to ‘they were brought to the streets’. Through this example we may sense that disrespectful attitudes to some groups of people were present. These groups are sometimes described as ‘immature teenagers’ without any independent will of their own, who can easily be governed by others. Not only is this not correct – it also shows what happens when only one’s ‘own’ truth is accepted. This demonstrates the low level of culture of political thinking in society as well as the ideological underpinnings of such thinking.

With the revolutionary fervour gaining momentum, we have somehow forgotten about the principle of a ‘third way’ – the importance of recognizing the common good of the struggle in the freedom of others, and the evil that one is struggling against in oneself. People cannot be divided into either bad or good. Such a white/black division between good and evil should not be used to divide people into camps – rather, this is a dividing line that is inherent within every single individual.

The events of 2004 clearly displayed that the culture of social

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1 See Tor Bukkvoll in this collection (eds remark).
tolerance is still in an embryonic stage in Ukraine. They also demonstrated the recurrences of a strong ideological culture, which revealed itself in civil confrontation over the principle ‘those who are not with us are against us’. No matter how hard the Maidan tried to proclaim acceptance concerning the social culture in other oblasts, there was a tendency to consider some people as different, as being ‘Other’, thus revealing a central challenge for Ukrainian society. This consciousness of the barricades evidences an aversion to the ideals of communicative rationality and cultural dialogue – the basis of consensual decision-making in a truly democratic society. The dominance of the paradigm of the monologue should signal to us that democratic culture and tolerance in Ukraine are not developed.

The conclusion of the 2004 events is clear in one sense: they demonstrated a situation of cleavage, civil and social disagreement which cannot be solved solely by calls for unity and solidarity. In order to achieve real integration, Ukraine will have to embark on the complex path from perceiving the events through the logics of the barricades (where mythological conceptions are cultivated and a phantom perception of reality resulting in confrontation is dominant) to a clear-cut understanding of pressing social problems and the subsequent formation of a culture of dialogue and public tolerance.

In 2004, we could observe a special phenomenon of mass awareness, here defined as ‘speech consciousness’. This implies that the collective proclamation of ideas by activists creates a sense of community and unity with others and a desire to join in political events. But we must ask whether people can really achieve a certain level of critical thinking in this way. This question is a main issue behind the formation of a stable political culture. In contrast to this approach, the principle of dialogue as a democratic form of social activity offers a mode of critical thinking which takes into consideration the whole range of social interests on the basis of civilized discussion of principles of tolerance, non-violence, and tolerance of the Other. It is not sufficient to declare a general acceptance and tolerance of Others and employ slogans of unity without paying specific attention to the concerns and values of the Other.

Civil society can be understood as a conglomerate of varying positions and interests, but under no circumstances should it be perceived as a street-camp of restless teenagers who do not understand what is important and what is not. Ukrainian society has probably understood that the past civil confrontation has an origin in clan
divisions. Still, the forces of civil society have been oriented toward its interests and defended the proclaimed programmatic aims. The elections have shown how different these interests are. Scholars, politicians and the populace in general have to understand why society was divided according to interests, why the interests of one part of society did not coincide with those of the other, and how a compromise can be found in this situation without strangling the free will of other citizens.

**Civil society and elites**

Another problem for Ukraine during past decade has been the conflict between civil society, which was formed on the basis of a traditional moral dimension, and political community (the state), with its propensity for fortifying the economic positions of elite groups. These elite groups were formed by merging political power with business lobby interests.

It resulted in a permanent conflict of value orientations in our society, a conflict that emerged during the 2004 elections. Some of our politicians were quick to use this conflict by appealing to moral values – honesty, justice, freedom, responsibility, protection against crime, and social protection. Under these circumstances, the actions of politicians appeared as cynical ploys, mobilizing the moral feelings of the people, who were tired of authorities using their positions as a tool for business interests and not as a means to promote civil society. Politicians were not intellectuals and did not appear as such later, despite their declarations.

This situation involves a very effective method of political exploitation of moral categories. This method was rarely used in politics before, because political relations were built on amoral or morally neutral actions. During the 2004 events, the right to profess moral views was practically privatized, as all behaviour and actions were given labels of this kind. The result has been a visible disenchantment and disappointment among citizens who have been politically active during the past year. Analysts notice (and sociological research has confirmed it) massive disappointment in the ideals of the Orange Revolution. They claim that the hopes of the participants on the Maidan have not been met. Personally, I must concede that another issue is disappointing: I cannot understand the nature of the exceedingly high expectations and how it has been possible to hope for the realization of democracy as long as the overall system of power still rests upon clan relations and upon clan ways of organizing power.
This disappointment results in a situation when society has low confidence in political parties, although each and every political party aspires to be morally clean. Thus, to my mind, the core of the above-mentioned event was a peculiar ‘exploitation’ of moral virtues, manipulation of moral categories and values. The moral component of consciousness, which was traditionally significant for the nation, has been transformed into an instrument for political speculation. Once society is bribed, then everything is allowed for profit – it is not important what type of profit, be it material or political. Even the right to adhere to the principle of moral behaviour or action becomes privatized.

The tendencies of some political forces to stage political exhibitions are also unacceptable in democratic societies. In these exhibitions, some politician is presented as the only hero of the game, as one clad all in white, or the knight in shining armour – in contrast to whoever happen to be his current opponents. The inculcation of such mythological constructs into political reality demonstrates that the Ukrainian political elite are not ready to play by the civilized rules of established European political tradition. At the moment, we are spectators attending a special theatrical performance, but we don’t know who is who. The producer appoints new actors, but he has forgotten to conceptualize their roles. All the actors speak about values – but who is the hero among the dramatic personae and who is the latent scoundrel – that we do not know. This performance can go on indefinitely.

When the mind does not work, room for faith appears. Faith as personal belief is derived from the aesthetic taste of the individual. That is why it would be better to learn how to believe in the effectiveness of the principles of state organization and government, instead of believing in individual politicians. It would be preferable to rely not on individuals, but on the system of democracy, under which change of power does not take place by exploiting the cultural reservoir. Today we are witnessing an exceptionally active myth construction. Some individuals had been wearing white clothes before; others want to wear them today. A political process totally dependent on political faith will always entail a constant shifting of roles and costumes.


**Politicized and regressive societies**

When analysing the present situation of the country, we need to pay attention to contradictions between the various spheres in the life of society, as they also constitute a problem with negative impact on societal development. Why has the political sphere greater impact on determining the priorities and direction of state development than the academic or scholarly sphere? Why are scholars and academics absent from the political sphere with their ideas, sociological results and prognostic conceptions, while politicians are increasingly becoming exponents in the realm of academe? Why do politicians become scholars – and not the reverse?

Surely, such a disproportion is an indicator of the system crisis of Ukrainian society which affects all key elements of social production – economy, politics, culture, education, science and civil society (which may die before its birth). In our case, it might be more correct and honest to speak not of crisis, but rather of a state of systematic regression of society, as the term ‘crisis’ carries with its implications of a forthcoming ‘transition’ to a new state of specific relations between the indicated spheres. Borrowing Ervin Toffler’s terminology, we might say that there are no efforts in contemporary Ukraine towards building a foundation for a ‘third wave’ civilization development, directed at the formation of an information society. Instead, what we see is a ‘second wave’ accompanied by the decentralization of economy and the rebirth of old social institutions. In this respect, and taking into consideration the ongoing discussions on European integration, we should not be concerned about when we become *de facto* ‘Europeans’ – but rather what kind of Europeans we are. Are we the providers of a cheap labour force – or an economically, mentally and culturally powerful nation?

How can such an important component of democracy as the culture of freedom be introduced? There are no cure-all remedies, nor will they ever be any. The only thing that seems inevitable is a long and painstaking effort by the intellectual strata of the Ukrainian society, focused on developing serious expertise in the field of the humanities and the study of society in general, including events that take place in our country. Such analysis must be critical and unprejudiced. If this process is not to become transformed into yet another illusion on the way to democracy, European institutions must support the freedom of speech in Ukraine. It is tradition and experience with the functioning of democracy, whether personal or taken from history, that will have to educate civil society, and not some public ‘official’, no matter how high he or she is in the state hierarchy.
Today the Ukrainian people realize their likes and dislikes towards specific politicians and authorities, but there is no understanding of whether these politicians and authorities in general are capable of fulfilling their promises. That is why the actions and behaviour of politicians will have to be examined by impartial scholarly analyses. Nowadays society deals with political analysis and sociological forecasting (both of which may be useful, but are insufficient), but not with expert conclusions of specialists from the humanities, which is needed to develop a culture of political thinking.

Critical philosophy and polyphony
The specificity of a philosophical text, which can serve as an expert assessment tool, is determined by its pragmatic dimension, related to the principal deontology of philosophy. Deontology – i.e. the dimension of necessity – creates the principles which in real life become incarnated in various norms and rules – ethic, aesthetic, legal and other norms. Such an approach can enable us to perceive the confluence of the existing order and its moral underpinning as being culturally determined.

Philosophy has traditionally served to channel our thought towards a regime of criticism, as a form of problematization of social situations. That is why Nietzsche’s Anti-Christ, Heidegger’s Being and Time, Theodore W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment as well as the works of such thinkers as Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Marx, Freud, Derrida and Habermas have opened new layers of human self-awareness, enabling new ways of cultural development and demonstrating new worldview perspectives. Such writers can thus be perceived as diagnosticians of their time, passing a verdict over the epoch and outlining alternatives for change – in other words, acting as experts from the field of the humanities.

This dialoguization of culture began with the affirmation of the principle of text ‘polyphony’ in the context of post-modern culture, although this tendency has a long history. Due to its cultural borderline status, the new discourse required the abolition of all forms of monism and unification. It required cross-cultural communication and it determined a cultural re-orientation characterized as a ‘communicative revolution’ in modern history. With time, however, the inability of post-modernism to conduct true dialogue and the indifference toward settling intricate issues gave birth to a practi-
cally oriented communicative philosophy, now being developed in modern German philosophy. This school interprets discourse not only as dialogue equal to the total of statements and an act of communication between representatives of different social strata, but also as a dialogue aimed at establishing concordance among different positions and elaborating solutions. The latter have to be suitable for civil society because of its non-confrontation with the interests of strata and of concessions made by the main social groups.

Personal experience with expert reflections has helped me to see the main difficulties in conducting an expert evaluation. The significance and practical direction of assessments will depend on the readiness of society for such knowledge – and this readiness, in turn, depends on the presence of a culture of political communication in the system of social relations. Otherwise, the problems revealed by experts will remain unheeded. Here we should note the typical position of our government as observed in its dialogues with mass media. When reporters request clarification of an issue or an outline of ways for solving it, officials usually dismiss the question by retorting: ‘What’s the matter? There is no such problem in Ukraine’.

If we are to consider opportunities and conditions of expertise from the sphere of the humanities, we can speak of cultural, existential, social and political circumstances. I would like to question the readiness of our society for such expertise. Is it possible under the given social and political circumstances in our country? At this stage I am inclined to say ‘no’, because expert assessments should be built upon such principles of social life as tolerance, openness, democratic nature of political institutions, as well as focus on the realization, and not only the proclamation of the rights of the individual. As yet, our society has remained oligarchic and is aimed at protecting the interests of the rich. High property qualifications thus become the measure of the realization of one’s rights, and all social institutions are focused on serving the upper class.

In Western European history, the ‘communicative mind’ became the basic principle of the formation of democratic and social institutions. The same principle must be central in the development of social relations in Ukraine. That is why an important indicator of the readiness for accepting the expertise of the humanities is the culture of dialogue. It aims at establishing a civil activity of dialogue between participants and their counterparts. It should take a non-ideological stance, relying on moral criteria of assessments. And there must be no premature determinacy of public communication
‘results’ by the ‘bureaucratic’ mindset – which is so frequent in a clan-based, oligarchic society.

**Conclusion**

We should first of all look into the objective reasons for public communication, because only it can form a reliable basis of expert activity. Here we are talking about the communicative relations of discourse participants who must be concerned with social progress and the fate of society. They have to be able to identify ‘trigger areas’ of civil life and think them through publicly; and they must be capable of developing a setting for solving such problems, taking coordinated action that should also involve dialogue among the members of different political groups or powers.

Therefore, it is the issue of the sources of solidarity that is on the agenda in Ukraine today. These sources are becoming increasingly apparent in inter-personal communications, and it is impossible to ignore them in the era of globalization. This means that specific political communication should be the basis of solving urgent problems in society. Such problems can be solved only if there is cooperation involving a whole range of organizations, from the state authorities to civil society organizations, with the mass media, civil movements and political parties serving as an intermediary links.

It is exactly this kind of communication that is essential to a democratic type of a political regime. In my opinion, there is no other way to solve these problems – unless, that is, we revert to the outdated approach of incongruous ‘care’ for the individual, whereby different authorities are charged with solving all problems, with no consideration for the interests of the people themselves.
Introduction

There are serious discussions concerning the assessment of the socio-political nature of the 2004–2005 events in Ukraine. A major aspect of their content can be briefly expressed in the question: ‘Is it in fact a Revolution’? Specific arguments and conclusions depend not only upon the political views and the situational (or perhaps tactical) pragmatic intentions of the participants in such disputes, but also to a large extent upon the conceptual instruments used by those interpreting these historic events – regardless of their political convictions.

The academic and political dispute concerning the relevance of concepts like ‘revolution’, ‘coup d’état’, ‘uprising’, ‘revolt’ is well known.¹ By applying the general theory of states in transition from authoritarian rule, this article seeks to provide arguments in support of the revolutionary character of the processes which began in Ukraine at the end of 2004. The focus will be on the three main spheres in which the nature of these events may be characterized as a revolution: political, social and spiritual.

The Orange Revolution as a political revolution

The term ‘political revolution’ implies a democratic, anti-bureaucratic, anti-corruption revolution liberating the powerful spiritual-emotional energies of the broad popular masses. The term can

¹ For more on this, see e.g. Mirskii 1976; Woddis, 1977; Politicheskie sistemy v stranah sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii, 1985; Chirkin, 1984; Entin & Entin, 1986; Yakushik, 1991; 1992.
also apply to a revolt of some political-economic and political-administrative clans against the authority and domination of other clans. But in any of its intrinsic manifestations, the term refers to a revolution connected (in form) with protesting forces obviously transgressing the limits of the norms (regulations) of the legislation in force, and pushing beyond the framework of the existing type of legality. That vividly points up the revolutionary character\(^2\) of the relevant events and processes.

The extra-legal methods of political action in Ukraine in late 2004 and early 2005 were manifested in the direct pressure exerted by revolutionary forces and their representatives within various organs of state power and political organizations on the president and his administration, the Parliament and the government, on the Central Electoral Commission and bodies of constituent power of other levels, on the Supreme Court and the Attorney General (General Public Prosecutor), on the top management of the ministries and departments, regional and local authorities, and on local administrative-industrial and educational structures (e.g. the management of institutions of higher education and enterprises). These revolutionary extra-legal methods were also demonstrated by roadblocks, capture of buildings, as well as systematic actions aimed at the authority of military units and sub-units of the police (militia). The whole system of state authority was in a state of shock, conditioned by the rapid self-destruction of the accustomed system of functioning. In fact, for several months there was a dual power system in Ukraine. In some parts of the country, there emerged new, real authorities; in other parts, two different competing authorities were functioning simultaneously, in parallel: both the revolutionary new authorities and the old, traditional ones (though with some internal changes). Thus, diarchy was manifest both in territorial and in institutional forms, as some components of the national state bodies actually ceased being subordinate to the old authorities even before these authorities could be legitimately replaced by new ones.

Nevertheless, all these extra-legal actions – the direct pressure upon the authorities, the creation of an alternative system of state power, actions outside the framework of the existing type of legality, transgressing the limits of the legislation in force – are not specific attributes of a revolution. These are common signs and features of other types of events as well – a coup d’état, an ‘uprising’, and a ‘revolt’. Political revolutions differ from these, first of

\(^2\) In a purely political aspect, and not in the profound socio-economic context.
all, by being at some final stage (or after a considerable period of time) recognized by a sovereign authority and usually also by the international community as: (a) legitimate; (b) having succeeded in achieving its political aims; (c) having brought essential changes into the political system. All these three components were clearly present in the processes that took place in Ukraine from November 2004 to January 2005, as shown by the subsequent responses by the authorities of Ukraine and of the majority of other states.

The Orange Revolution as a social revolution

If we use the traditional methodological toolkit of class or strata analysis, it would not be correct to try to identify only one specific social characteristic of the Ukrainian revolution. This complex process has been many things at the same time: a revolution of ‘millionaires against billionaires’; a revolution of the middle class against the bureaucratic, nomenklatura nepotism of the new bourgeoisie; and finally, a revolution uniting a significant part of the dominant national bourgeoisie with the working class of the East and the South of the country in direct confrontation with the petty, middle and transnational bourgeoisie followed by broad sections of working-class masses of the Centre and the West of the country.

By mid-September 2005, the Ukrainian revolution spread to the socio-economic sphere. It resulted in a situation where the direct representatives of national oligarchic circles could no longer enjoy immediate control of the basic levers of state executive power. The further socio-economic evolution of political power (which in 2005 underwent certain qualitative changes) will in many respects depend upon the results of the March 2006 parliamentary elections, and the format of the future government. Several trajectories of further development are possible: for example, there could be a sliding back to the former (pre-revolutionary) positions with a simple redistribution of spheres of influence and some changes in the correlation of forces between various clans of national and ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie; or there could be a strengthening of the anti-oligarchic character of the transformations.

The immediate future will show whether the Ukrainian political revolution will finally turn into a fully fledged socio-economic

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3 The specific content of the basic relations of ownership in Ukraine – both as to their genesis, and their present social nature – remain oligarchic and criminal (even upon the re-privatization and the new privatization of ‘Kryvorizhstal’ – probably the only case of an honest and transparent privatization tender in the whole CIS).
revolution. An especially important point is whether it can succeed in becoming an anti-criminal revolution⁴ – a revolt of the ‘healthy forces’ of civil society against the powerful criminal strata (including the corrupt officials) that have legalized their control over a huge share of national wealth; and at the same time if the revolution can avoid yielding to populist temptations that in the final analysis could mean the ruin of economic infrastructures. The real question is: In what form Ukraine will put an end to the ‘Great Criminal Revolution’⁵ which has been unleashed on the post-Soviet space in the 1990s of the 20th century, and has been progressing in Ukraine in the epoch that nowadays is called ‘Kuchmism’. What form will it take? A reasonable (and favourable to society) compromise between the state and the oligarchs, a compromise of political and economic elites in the shape of a certain redistribution of property and levers of real economic authority, or a political victory of the radical populist movement, with consequences for the sphere of economy?

A spiritual and civilizational revolution
The notion that a spiritual revolution took place in Ukraine in 2004–2005 has manifested itself first of all in the fact that the people of Ukraine have realized and have felt in practice the value of their own human dignity. There have been essential qualitative changes in the emotional state of the society.

The broad masses – not only those who have become ‘orange’, but their opponents as well – have been convinced and have themselves experienced that there are peaks of the ‘soul’ in a human being and in society when one feels a deep awareness of the pleasure of life and of belonging to a period of great shared deeds and historically noble actions. Memories of such peaks will remain the highest measure for the gauging events and one’s own behaviour. Having once experienced such a state of elevation and completeness of feelings and vital forces, people and society as a whole become qualitatively different – rejuvenated on the emotional-spiritual plane. After such a renewal and re-freshening experience it is difficult, if not impossible, to accept the mediocrity of everyday life and the domination of disbelief and lack of spirituality as being the ‘normal’ or ‘inevitable’ state of affairs. In strategic terms, the

⁴ And if it would be able, then – in what form: in a ‘pure revolutionary’ one, or in a form or a compromise and evolution?
⁵ A term introduced by Stanislav Govorukhin, a famous Russian cultural worker. (See Govorukhin, 1993).
Ukrainian revolution has delivered a crushing blow to the prosaic programme of struggle for survival prepared by the post-Soviet plutocracy for the absolute majority of ordinary citizens, and the programme of pursuit of illusory quick profits.

The revolutionary crisis has shown that there is a strong sense of willingness to sacrifice personal gains for the sake of public and spiritual ones, and also that everyday life can be like a holiday, that relations between people can be truly humane. People have heard a sincere appeal (and have felt a moral stimulus) for fair productive work, including fair business, an appeal for the creation of a fair and effective Civil Service, and for improving the entire community environment. The sincere mass desire to trust and to love has strengthened the vital forces of society.

This said, it is still necessary to continue through a period of further maturation, including shedding naive illusions. Already by the autumn of 2005, the Ukrainian revolution had gradually allowed the people to get rid of many illusions, including the (traditional for East Slavs) ‘messianic expectations’ directed towards politically strong and active representatives of the male population. And here we should recognize that, in the sphere of overcoming such illusions in Ukraine, much remains to be done for the achievement of full gender equality.

The process of spiritual renewal of Ukrainian society has shown itself in another important way. Society has cast a glance beyond the veil of the public sub-conscious, and has been terrified by the steadily approaching destructive conflict which has been avoided either by sheer luck or by Divine Providence. Society has rejoiced as if by a lucky coincidence, and has experienced a painless escape from the most severe political confrontation – a national crisis. Thus, now Ukrainian society is capable of imagining the impossible – a threshold beyond which a return is practically out of the question. Ukrainian society has matured: it is now able to stop political manipulators and adventurers, and not yield to smart provocations of ‘political technologists’ and their customers, their refined multi-step operations and cynical circuits, and – most importantly – not to find itself again at the abyss of civil war and dictatorship, facing the danger of a true disaster. Thanks to the 2004–2005 Revolution, Ukrainian society has got a strong and effective ‘vaccination’, an antidote against any further attempts either to destabilize the country through illegitimate actions on the part of the authorities, or to stage coups, revolts or revolutions.

The following two inter-connected facts also allow us to char-
acterize the 2004–2005 events as a civilizational revolution in Ukraine. On the one hand, the Euro-Atlantic tendency managed to attain relative hegemony as an alternative to the Eurasian tendency. And on the other hand, as a result of a direct collision between the forces representing these two basic civilizational orientations – essentially two geopolitical orientations in their almost pure form – a qualitatively new spiritual state has been achieved in society. Civilizational awareness and clarity are finally brought in concerning the dual nature of contemporary Ukrainian society: and this is a society which is not simply poly-cultural, but first of all bi-civilizational and bilingual.

Many politicians and analysts have seen the most important geostrategic and geopolitical question concerning Ukraine as being similar to that formulated at the end of 2004, before the revolution, by Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, one of the most illustrious representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora: ‘Ukraine is facing a very serious choice, the consequences of which will have an impact even on the Western world. There is a choice between Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian integration’ (Hawrylyshyn & Vyshnevskiy, 2004). But the revolution has proven beyond any doubt that in order to preserve public peace, strengthen the national security of Ukraine and security in Eastern Europe as a whole, the question of the ‘choice’ of Ukraine will have to be re-formulated. Will Ukraine be capable of endorsing the values of being of a bi-civilizational nation? What is the best way to preserve and strengthen its real status as a viable and united country? Does the political status of Ukraine as a neutral state meet the expectations of its citizens and correspond to the prospects for democratic social development? These are the important questions to ask.6

Finally, as a result of the 2004–2005 Revolution, the values of cultural pluralism have become stronger in Ukrainian society as a whole. It now recognizes the ‘normality’ of the fact that the regions, the cultural and social strata of the country are highly diverse, that they wish to preserve their uniqueness in the future – and hence do not want to subjected to the dictates of an ‘imperial’ centre.

The basic civilizational instincts that have arisen among all the major cultural and political components of Ukrainian society are politically well-articulated nowadays, and not only within the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ or the ‘Ukrainian Vendee’. These instincts cannot be driven back to the sub-conscious by any sort of old

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6 See Amelchenko in this collection for an alternative view (eds remark).
wives’ tales about how the problems similar those of Ukraine are being resolved ‘correctly’ and ‘unequivocally’ in the practice of ‘the whole civilized world’, or should be resolved according to some ‘uniquely true doctrine’. And it will not be possible now to reduce them to a mere description of chosen ‘patterns’, edited and retouched by historians, political scientists and lawyers who are in fact propagandists of some particular cultural and political trend. The sense of dignity and self-esteem awakened in the people and the freedom of speech are the real political achievements of Ukrainian society in 2005, and this has put forward new requirements as to the discourse of all the actors of the political process. In particular, they demand that special attention be paid to the correctness, completeness and depth of the arguments employed. Artificially construed combinations of unrepresentative (for a society like that of Ukraine) historical national or regional examples can no longer work as effective mechanisms of political propaganda. What is needed now is a serious expert discussion – widely disseminated – on the most pressing and important issues. These include: the state language policy, decentralization, regionalization and federalization, economic, political and cultural integration into regional and global communities (organizations), the creation of supranational bodies within the framework of inter-state political and economic associations, and the transfer of some sovereign nation-state rights to them, as well as an in-depth discussion (in a form comprehensible to the people) of many other major questions of the present state construction and prospects for the country’s development.

Conclusion
Doubts as to whether a revolution really did take place in Ukraine in 2004–2005 start to wither away as soon as we distinguish clearly between the various types of revolutions, and also when we take into account that there are completed revolutions and uncompleted ones. The 2004–2005 Ukrainian Revolution is a clear example of an uncompleted revolution. As to its type, it is similar to the 1905 Revolution in the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, despite their incompleteness, these two revolutions – this young one, and that already old one – both stand as true revolutions. After such revolutions there emerge real opportunities for a strategic choice of new ways and new types of further development. Today’s Ukraine is gradually creating the necessary political, social, emotional and spiritual preconditions for the conscious use of new effective tech-
nologies of social engineering and new mechanisms of mobilization and concentration of intellectual and spiritual forces of society, working out of strategy for national consent and the dynamic future development of the country.

How, then, might the Ukrainian Revolution be characterized in some years’ time? Certainly, much will depend upon the subsequent stages of its development, as this is a revolution that has not yet been completed. And its prospects may vary. The main thing is that it demonstrates the inexorable course of humanistic development in the world, despite all the obstacles erected by selfishly-oriented strata and groups.

As to the colour scale used to designate the present Ukrainian Revolution, I really doubt that in the long-term perspective it would be unequivocally characterized as ‘orange’. It has also been a ‘white and blue’ revolution – and a comprehensive revolution that has released the living spirit and the soul of the people. It takes up the issue of regional and cultural-civilizational diversity of Ukraine and heterogeneity of the present revolutionary events. Not only the ‘orange’ Kiev with its Maidan, and Galicia (Western Ukraine), but also the ‘white and blue’ Donetsk, Crimea and Odessa – indeed, all Ukraine – have become qualitatively different as a result of revolutionary events. The revolution has spiritually changed and liberated us all, in various ways, as a result of a range of psychological processes. In some places there has been an initial euphoria of a triumph of ‘our revolution’, followed by disappointments and doubts. Other places there have been bitterness of a defeat, but also a real spiritual revolution; and then there have been new disappointments and awakening of new hopes. Throughout the regions of Ukraine there have been different, dissimilar revolutions – but they have been revolutions!

Let us not be hasty in making final assessments. History will put everything in place. Meanwhile historians and political scientists will offer their theories and versions concerning the recent historic events in Ukraine. We should concentrate on not getting lost and confused in the complexities of the present historic moment. It is essential not to destroy the basic infrastructures of society, but instead to create conditions for social consensus while preserving the cultural and political pluralism and dynamism of our nation.
In the aftermath of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution has come a debate about what terms of social science can best describe these events. Is it proper to call it a revolution? Was it a case of regime change – or was it simply a matter of one segment of the elite replacing another?

In this contribution I discuss the issue of regime change. The obvious answer to the question of whether the Orange Revolution was a regime change or not, is of course that it is still too early to say. Thus, my analysis starts with a discussion of how far Ukraine has moved since the revolution, in terms of various criteria of regime change. The criteria used are initially those proposed by the UK think-tank Policy Exchange.\(^1\) In addition, a further set of criteria specific to Ukrainian circumstances will be examined. Finally, I consider some factors that are often mentioned as criteria of regime change but which might not belong to this category.

‘Regime’ is a useful but inherently loose concept in terms of definition. In this context, Kenneth Shepsle’s definition of ‘regime’ as a ‘game form’ will be preferred (Shepsle 2001, p.322).

### The check list

Policy Exchange proposes a list of eight criteria for evaluating degrees of regime change: leadership replacement, support structure reform (= reform of state apparatus), accounting for the past, new elites (= replacing the old elite), dispersion of economic power, growth of civil society, openness of the political system, and an overall assessment.

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\(^1\) See report at http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/
The Orange Revolution replaced the old leadership to a significant extent – but far from completely. Former President Kuchma had based his leadership on a balance of power among the three most influential business clans in Ukraine: the Donetsk clan, the Kiev clan and the Dnipropetrovsk clan. These three all united behind the regime candidate Yanukovych in the elections. However, on becoming president, Yushchenko chose largely to ignore clan interests in his appointments to high positions. Still, this change in cadre policy did not mean that everyone in high office was new to a position in the political leadership. Yushchenko himself, as well as Prime Minister Tymoshenko, Vice-Prime Minister and later head of the Security Council Kinakh, and several others had previously held top positions also under Kuchma. When it still is reasonable to speak of a change in leadership, this is primarily because the principle for its composition was different from before, and also because it brought a considerable number of new faces into governing circles.

To date, structural reform, or reform of the state apparatus, has been even less complete than the replacement of leadership, as well as being very uneven throughout the state apparatus. For example, reform of the armed forces has made significant progress, whereas reform of the judicial system has progressed only little. Limited reform should come as no surprise, since this must necessarily take longer than for example leadership replacement, but the widespread impression remains that less has been done than could have been reasonably expected.

There has also been scant accounting for the past. Some initial arrests and interrogations in the spring of 2005 indicated that such a process was underway, but since then little has happened. According to Minister of the Interior Yurii Lutsenko, his agency has investigated and prepared more than one thousand cases concerning crimes committed by representatives of the old regime.² These have all been sent to the General Prosecutor. Lutsenko claims that the lack of progress in this area is the fault of Sviatoslav Piskun, who was General Prosecutor until November 2005. According to Lutsenko, Piskun stalled the process of accounting for the past by not pressing charges although investigations were complete. It remains to be seen whether the new Prosecutor General, Serhii Holovaty, will speed up the process. According to Lutsenko, there are many prominent names from the old regime among the thousand cases, including that

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² Interview with Iurii Lutsenko in Zerkalo Nedely, No. 44, 12–18 November 2005.
of former President Kuchma. However, for a significant number of these cases, any charges will have to be pressed soon, as many of these individuals are now registered as candidates for the parliamentary elections in late March 2006. If elected to parliament, they will enjoy parliamentary immunity against criminal prosecution.

The Orange Revolution has been referred to as a middle-class rebellion against an alliance of the bureaucracy and the oligarchy. This claim probably contains a lot of truth, although the demonstrations in Kiev and other cities recruited far beyond the still small Ukrainian middle class. In terms of elite change, it can be argued that the Orange Revolution represents a change in the elite structure in Ukraine, in the sense that the middle class for the first time showed political ambitions. The new leadership, however, cannot be characterized as a dedicated spokesman for the middle class. It is still too heavily dominated by bureaucrats and oligarchs.

Changing the structures of economic power has been one of the most contested issues in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. President Yushchenko and his closest advisors were always against radical steps in this sphere, whereas Prime Minister Tymoshenko and her supporters suggested major restructuring of the structure of ownership, and at one time talked about potentially reversing the privatization of up to three thousand enterprises (Ishchenko, 2005). It was, nevertheless, unclear how many of these were to be re-privatized and how many should remain state property. After the September change of government, the consensus seems to be that major alterations to the economic ownership structure will not be implemented.

On the question of civil society, this is an area similar to that of reform of the support structure in the sense that wide-ranging changes cannot be expected to take place quickly. The revolution itself was of course a major manifestation of the strength of Ukrainian civil society. Some estimates claim that as many as one in every five Ukrainians in some way was actively involved in the revolution. However, it is still too early to say whether this outburst of civic engagement will translate into a civil society that has an impact on Ukrainian politics also in non-revolutionary periods. Opinion polls indicate that if future political leaderships should try to steer elections in the way the Kuchma administration did, more than 50% of the population are ready to take to the streets again.³

The area where the Orange Revolution has arguably resulted in the most change is in the openness of the political system. Today’s Ukrainian press is generally free from state interference, and the political leadership has also made insight into the political processes much more accessible than under the previous regime. True, there have been occasional episodes indicating that also the new leadership is not quite happy about all the effects of a free press, but they have not led to suppression.

The overall assessment is therefore that the Orange Revolution does represent a break with past in terms of how the country is run – but not a clean break.\(^4\) This means that in terms of the criteria laid down by Policy Exchange, it is still far too early to pass judgement on whether the revolution constitutes a regime change or not.

Additional criteria
In addition to the Policy Exchange general check list, there are also several more specific characteristics of how the old regime functioned that will probably need to be altered if we are to be able to talk about genuine regime change.

First, there must be an end to state capture by business, or at least a substantial decrease. During the Kuchma regime it is not unfair to say that the state was at least partly privatized. Businessmen entering positions of political power in order to secure their private interests rather than those of the state became a dominant theme in Ukrainian politics. Such practices are less legitimate under the new leadership, but they have not disappeared altogether. When one of the chief figures of the Maidan, Oleksandr Zinchenko, stepped down from his position as head of the Presidential Administration in September 2005, thereby initiating the autumn governmental crisis, he explained his move by claiming that many of the old ‘privatized state’ traditions had taken root also under the new regime. As yet, Zinchenko’s accusations have not been proved, but they cast additional doubts on the new regime’s willingness and ability to part with the ‘privatized state’ traditions.

A major test in this regard will be what policies the new parliament adopts after its election in March 2006. The electoral lists of the main Ukrainian parties and electoral blocs reveal that most major Ukrainian businessmen are again likely to take parliamen-

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\(^4\) I have borrowed the description ‘break, but not a clean break’ from the British scholar James Sherr.
tary seats. After this election they will enter a parliament with greatly expanded prerogatives – the result of the compromise between Yushchenko and his antagonists at the height of the Orange Revolution, a compromise necessary to make possible a third and decisive round of elections. The big question will therefore be whether these businessmen will use their positions mostly to defend narrow self-interest, or whether they also will acknowledge their responsibilities to state and society. Yulia Mostovaia of Zerkalo Nedely has suggested that the best one can hope for with the new parliament is that Ukrainian big business realizes that promotion of the interests of state and society will in the long run correspond with their business interests as well (Mostovaia, 2005). In that case, even if there is a situation where the dominant motivation of the businessmen in parliament is their self-interest, they might still end up additionally promoting also national interests. Some areas where the interests of business, state, and society coincide could include WTO membership, the establishment of genuine rule of law, and reduction of corruption in the bureaucracy.

It should, however, be emphasized that this is a best-case scenario. To date, the track record of businessmen in the Ukrainian parliament has not been overly encouraging in this respect.

Second, the Constitution must become a constraint on politics rather than an outcome of politics. This is not to say that constitutions should never change – they do so, also in stable democracies – but it means that the domestic political actors must recognize the existence of stable and agreed rules of the game, embodied in a constitution, as something natural – not as something to be ignored or changed whenever they do not work to one’s own advantage. In the early period of the new leadership there were some disturbing tendencies in this regard, but that situation seems to have improved somewhat.

Third, political ideas need to be taken seriously. This means that they must come to guide policy rather than merely have a rhetorical existence separate from policy. This was another defining criterion of the Kuchma regime, especially in foreign policy. Many politicians in Ukraine seemed to think that it was enough only to pretend an official state allegiance to liberal democratic norms, and that nobody actually expected them to act in accordance with these norms. The scholar Taras Kuzio called this phenomenon ‘double talk’. We can posit at least two reasons for the existence of this

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5 On Ukraine’s quadrouple transition and ‘muddling through’ see Kuzio (1998).
‘double talk’. First, the Ukrainian politicians engaged in ‘double talk’ understood that this was not acceptable, but continued the practice because it served their own self-interests. Second, these same politicians in fact did not understand why the ‘double talk’ was a problem, for example in relations with the West. Such lack of understanding could be connected to the survival of an old Soviet tradition of declaratory politics. In 1992, the Ukrainian observer Oleksandr Shmorhun had argued that the political system of the Soviet Union had led to a political practice whereby people in public office suffered from a ‘total loss of connection with reality, an ever growing illusion that numerous declarations, resolutions and conferences by themselves will change things for the better’ (Shmorhun, 1992, p. 309). In April 2005, Daniel Bilak, a Canadian lawyer with nine years of experience as governmental advisor in Kiev, said at a conference in New York that for the first time he had the impression that political ideas were being discussed in earnest in the corridors of power. We can only hope that this practice has survived beyond the spring of 2005.

Fourth and finally, the political leadership must give priority to the provision of public goods rather than private ones. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James Lee Ray (2001) have developed several theory propositions for how different types of regimes give priority to public or private goods. They operate with the concepts of ‘electorate’, ‘selectorate’, and ‘winning coalition’. By the electorate is meant the whole enfranchised population, the selectorate refers to the groups of society with resources that can effect the election outcome, and the winning coalition is the minimum number of groups within the selectorate that help the leader to enter and stay in office. Winning coalitions can be found within all kinds of political regimes. The assumption behind the ‘winning coalition’ concept is that political leaders provide a mix of both public and private goods; and that, in order to maintain a winning coalition, the leader has to provide its members with a certain amount of private goods. Bueno de Mesquita and Ray indicate that leaders in semi-

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6 Daniel Bilak, speaking at the Association for the Studies of Nationalities 10th Annual World Convention, Columbia University, New York, 14–16 April 2005.
7 For more on the ‘winning coalition’, see Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002, especially pp. 560–563.
8 It is often difficult to tell whether a particular good is private or public, especially in foreign policy. The difference between private and public goods in the present context should be understood as the difference between whether a particular decision was made primarily on the basis of considerations of the national interest, or primarily on the basis of considerations of the private interests of one or more of the actors of the winning coalition.
democratic or authoritarian regimes are more likely than leaders in democratic regimes to let their policy decisions be influenced by the private interests of groups. ‘Democratic leaders tend to be deposed or retained primarily in response to their performance in producing public goods, the type of good on which the absolute size of their winning coalitions, as well as a large size of those coalitions relative to the selectorates in such systems, leads them to focus. Autocratic leaders are retained or deposed, in contrast, primarily on the basis of their provision of private goods that are able to purchase the loyalty of their winning coalitions, which are relatively small both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the selectorates.’ (2001, p. 11) High provision of private goods was a defining characteristic of the Kuchma regime: it will have to be avoided by the new regime in order for us to be able to talk about regime change.

Criteria not necessary for regime change

The final remarks are a caution against demanding too much in order to identify regime change. Important to keep in mind during this discussion is the definition of ‘regime’ as ‘a game form’.

Many of the problems of the new leadership in Kiev are probably rightly attributed to the excessive personal political ambitions of many of the leaders from the Maidan. These ambitions have made cooperation difficult, and obstructed decision-making. This observation, however, should not lead us to conclude that politicians must be devoid of personal ambition for true regime change to take place. It is quite possible to be both personally politically ambitious and at the same time keep in mind the interests of state and society. Personal ambition is a characteristic of politicians in all states. Given the right political culture and institutions, it can be made to serve common interests.

Nor should we demand the removal of all elements of informal politics. It is true that the Kuchma system depended on such politics to an extreme degree, and that this contributed to making the regime unaccountable to the population. However, absolute popular display of all political acts would probably jam the system by creating a multitude of additional conflicts among the various political actors and between the political players and the population. Thus, a certain degree of informal politics is probably necessary if the wheels of the political machinery are to turn smoothly. Informal politics is an important element also in established democracies.

And finally: an end to corruption in the bureaucracy, and pros-
perity in society, should also not be considered criteria that must be fulfilled before we can talk of regime change. As mentioned above, the leadership must pursue public goals in order for us to talk about regime change, and both a reduction of corruption in the bureaucracy and increased prosperity are crucial public goals. However, we must allow for the possibility that even a changed regime can fail. Thus, the discussion of regime change needs to focus on policy process and policy output – not on policy outcomes.
Lessons of the Orange Revolution

Public Administration Reforms in Ukraine

**Introduction**

Ukraine’s struggle for independence in the early 1990s and its recent Orange Revolution were both – at least judging from the declarations and intentions of the national leaders – directed towards starting a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. The internal and external conditions for the two ‘revolutions’ were different, but both aimed at deep changes in social leadership and in social behaviour. Hence, with regard to public administration, deep reforms of the public policy processes were expected.

Both revolutions were characterized by changes in the upper levels of public administration, the executive power in particular. This contrasts with ‘classical’ revolutions, which generally lead to radical changes of the entire political and administrative system, especially in the structure and functions of the components of political power. While the ‘first revolution’ of 1991 was not followed by deep changes of the political system, the Orange Revolution shifted its functions, without changing the structure. (See Pavlenko, 2004)

The administrative reform announced in 1996–98 was caused by a compromise between a pluralist political system in slow transition to elitism, and the executive power, which evidently favoured a ‘Marxist’ model (Demyanchuk, 2005). The authoritarian tilt of Kuchma’s political regime (not unexpected, as one possible version for the development of a Marxist-based elitist political system) logically led to the dawning of administrative reform. This reform had as its primary goal simply to introduce management approaches into the executive power, rather than any deep transformation of the structure and principles (paradigm) of the entire state power system.
Proceeding from Ball’s (1988) typology of models for political power distribution, let us see what lessons can be learnt from the Orange Revolution by the state and its political leadership, as well as what tasks the new authorities face, and how they should be implemented.

**Conditions for a second attempt of democratization**

After thirteen years of Ukrainian independence and reforms, including some democratic transformations, a new set of popular attitudes emerged, making an impact during the 2004 presidential election campaign (Hillebrand, 2005). Despite some achievements in the economic sphere, politically and administratively, Ukraine could be characterized as what Wesson (1988) has termed a ‘pseudo-democracy,’ however. By this is meant that real democratic principles and processes have been replaced by rhetoric and certain external signs of democracy, such as formal elections, the existence of a large number of political parties (the vast majority with no influence on political processes) and institutions of civil society, represented mainly by financially dependent and politically engaged NGOs.

The almost unanimous national support of Ukrainian sovereignty in the 1991 Referendum, as well as the actions of many people on both sides of the barricades of the Orange Revolution, was motivated more by a desire to destroy the old system than to build a qualitatively new society. (Sztompka, 1991a) Another feature of the transition process has been the pragmatic approach of the vast majority of citizens to social reforms. Extending Sztompka’s ideas, we could say that instead of the ‘revolution’ of society, Ukrainian reforms have taken the form of implementing some components of a new society that have proven of practical use: free market, parliamentary democracy, political management etc. The political elite, as well as most of the population, see the main goal not so much as establishing fundamental civil values like freedom, rule of law, equality, as in reaping such purely economic benefits as improved standards of living, increased consumption and other ‘tangible’ indicators.

Following this scheme, the events of autumn 2004 (and the ensuing ten months) indicate that the actions of both the power and the competitors in the presidential elections were based mainly on their desire to change the distribution of political power, to their own benefit.
Features of the transition process in Ukraine

The pluralist, subsequently elitist, model of the political system was not accompanied by a total restructuring of the public administration system. The country’s policy-making system has retained many characteristic of a Marxist model of political power distribution, essentially the following features:

- Rigid verticality in policy agenda setting. Information flows concerning social problems are initiated within the system of governance, filtered by it and directed towards decision-makers – in other words, information moves through vertical channels.
- Closed decision-making and choice. One requirement of the Marxist system is the isolation of decision-making systems from external influence as well as protection against early ‘leakage’ of information.
- ‘Linearity’ of policy-making/implementation process. Marxism does not allow an iterative or incremental approach to public policy-making. (See Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993.) Thus, in case of a mistake in policy design, a Marxist political power is incapable of correcting it (because that would entail admitting the mistake) or making radical changes.
- As a consequence – high probability of failures and errors in public policies.

The special brand of elitism formed during the second presidency of Leonid Kuchma has differed from Marxism by its relative collective style of decision-making. Inside the elite circles, the hierarchical dependence is relatively weak. Hence the process of policy-making and implementation has a weak horizontal component in the upper levels of the political system. Another feature of this elitism is the presence of a large number of ‘professionals’ in the system of policy-making and administration (Henshel, 1990). This includes administrative personnel – specialists in the corresponding fields of economics, production or social life (health care, education etc.) – as well as business people from specific spheres of human activity. These ‘professionals’ are granted important authority and instruments to influence the setting of the policy agenda, the identification of social problems and the search for alternatives to solve them. Given this ‘side branch’ in public administration, the range of social problems brought up for consideration narrows, and may lead to a partial acceptance of such problems: only those social problems that are selected and identified will appear on the
policy agenda that directly concerns the ‘professionals’. Moreover, because problem-solving implies attracting state resources, in the struggle for these resources a compromise may be reached among the ‘professionals’, with the advocates of specific policy fields agreeing on an artificial definition of priorities. An example of such a compromise may be the situation which occurred in autumn 2004, when the ‘professionals’ in acquiring resources for the ‘policy of public administration formation’\(^1\) made an agreement with the ‘professionals’ in social welfare and in public finance to introduce the problems of social welfare into the public agenda in such a manner that possible consequences for inflation and a subsequent limitation of resources available were not taken into account.

In sum, the contradiction between the elitism of the political power and the Marxist managerial approach of the administrative system can be seen as a major cause of the failure of the previous power in maintaining its influence in Ukrainian society.

**Rise and fall of a ‘corporatist’ model of power distribution**

In a developed representative democracy, a political system looks like a ‘market’, with its entrepreneurs\(^2\) (the state power, political parties, interest groups etc.), management (central and local governments), negotiations and agreements, exchanges, competition and compromises. Such a ‘market’ can exist only in the environment of a ‘corporatist’ model of political power distribution, because it requires structures of resource exchanges that are both horizontal (between the entrepreneurs as in the elitist or pluralistic system) and vertical (between the political system and society). This model is characterized by conscious citizen support of political entrepreneurs not caused by manipulations and informational blockades; separation of political and administrative functions in the public administration system (and the corresponding separation of mutual influence between politicians and administrators); and the absence of antagonism between participants in the political market, despite possibly sharp competition. Streeck and Schmitter (1991) argue that political corporations try to introduce interests and expectations of civil society and business into the public administration agenda.

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1 The formation of public administration in a democratic society (by means of political elections) is a specific kind of public policy. (See Demyanchuk, 2004.)

Unlike other models of political power distribution, the corporatist model makes possible a complex, almost comprehensive consideration of social problems, and correspondingly provides complex approaches to their solution. This is provided for by the competition of ‘political entrepreneurs’ in attracting the ‘consumers’ – the electorate. Thus, they have to look for ways to involve into their structures representatives of the target groups whose interests they claim to represent.

During and after the Orange Revolution, the corporatist model started to emerge due to the concentration of small political entrepreneurs around one of the two most powerful actors – Victor Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovich. In consequence, big political corporations began to form. Unlike the more temporary and situational alliances within a pluralistic/elitist political system, such corporations have long-range perspectives of cooperation, cover a broad spectrum of public policies and allow for the involvement of high-quality professionals without negative consequences for the coherence of policy-making processes. During the first half of 2005, active and successful actions were seen from such ‘political corporations’ as the People’s Union ‘Our Ukraine’, the Party of Regions, The Union ‘Motherland’ and other powerful actors. Each of the political corporations has direct relations with certain social groups (their ‘consumers’) and receives from them material, financial, human and intangible resources (support, ideas).

But after the events of summer 2005, when the ruling coalition split into several smaller parts, conflicts exploded between the power and the business circles around the re-privatization of ‘Kryvorizhstal’, and many social problems that were attempted solved in unprofessional ways. This shows that corporatism as a principle of political power distribution in Ukraine has not become a reality: it was only a temporary confluence of several phenomena.

The main negative aspect in implementing and making effective the corporatist political system was the actual preservation of the Marxist model of the executive power throughout state life. Appointments to the highest political and administrative positions were made according to decisions taken in closed circles, with subsequent uncertain underpinning, and sometimes even contrary to all logic. The public was kept uninformed until the last moment. Actually, Ukraine’s leaders embraced managerial approaches to the administration processes which contradict the principles of the political market and convert democratic corporatism into a clan-based corporative model.
The character and ways of making personnel decisions in Ukraine at the end of 2005 (dismissal and appointment of the government based on a small circle of people from which the cadres are selected) correspond to an elitist political system. Such a system is characterized by a significant limitation of the choice of political versions and cadres because of the sizeable gap between the ruling elite and society and the lack of institutionalized support from the voters. Before the parliamentary elections such a turn away from corporatism necessarily meant a return to the antagonistic rivalry within the frames of the pluralistic political system: if the ruling corporation should lose, that would slow down any democratic social development.

Return to Marxist elitism: How can it be prevented?
The transition from totalitarianism to democracy and market economy has to happen in an avalanche-like manner (Sztompka, 1991b), by means of a radical transformation of the model of society in a short time-span. It requires the creation of a new system of values inherent in an open society, in both the social and individual consciousness (Mijatović, 1997). In order to achieve such a rapid transition, a ‘window of opportunity’ is needed: special conditions in which political leaders can implement the changes in various fields with the support of the population – or at least in the absence of serious resistance.

Such a ‘window of opportunity’ was opened by the Orange Revolution. Here, the oppositional forces came to power supported by active and voluntary support of a large part of the population, without significant resistance from other social groups in the opposing political camp. Unfortunately, in many cases, the actions of the new authorities proved to be inadequate attempts to adjust to the social environment and expectations of the population.

From a total of 22 formulated in the paper by Piotr Sztompka (1991a), let us consider three dilemmas which the country’s new authorities will have to solve in order to succeed in the announced social, economic and political reforms.

The dilemma of self-limitation: A well-established market economy and democracy are self-regulated and encounter minimal intervention from the state, while the introduction of democracy and market economy on the ruins of authoritarianism requires significant intervention ‘from the top’. So, the ruling elite and the bureaucracy must be reasonable enough to restrict their own power to the benefit
of the self-regulated liberal society, not only after the victory of the reforms, but also during their implementation. Here we see the conflict between the authoritarianism required for the transformation processes, and the liberation of the economic, political and social life inherent in an open society. Since President Victor Yushchenko and his administration have failed to take into account this dilemma, the Ukrainian public administration has been pushed aside in the transformation processes at a time when their strong ruling actions were necessary. Symptomatically, the administrative reform has been reduced to discussions of possible territorial reform, without clear concepts or support from the population or the local governments. In a political sense, it could be said that the new authorities have proven incapable of self-limitation, endeavouring instead to replace the corporatist model with an elitist or even Marxist political system. Among the consequences of the lack of self-restriction are numerous scandals in the country’s administrative and political circles, which consist almost exclusively of the representatives from the winning coalition. Additionally, the pragmatic approach and absence of a clear theoretical basis for the transformation of society have reanimated some active ‘critics and promisers’ (Social Democrats, Labour Ukraine, Progressive Socialists and other ‘new opposition’ forces), who propose nothing positive – only ‘quick fixes’. Phenomena like corruption, crime in the public administration system, violations of human rights, which surfaced in the later stages of post-revolutionary transformations, have alienated a significant part of the population from the ruling political coalition and induced others to take a wait-and-see attitude.

The dilemma of a social vacuum: An elitist/pluralistic system is characterized by inter-personal relations within a family or a small group (clan) at the state level, versus social relations on the national level. As a result, a social vacuum emerges between the two micro- and macro-levels. In the corporatist system, this vacuum is filled with relations among various civil/public organizations and groups of people united by common interests (not necessarily political and not always related to political entrepreneurs). In Ukraine some of these civil organizations have announced their intention to become political actors (e.g. Public Union ‘Pora’) or have chosen narrow fields of activities which have failed to fill the social vacuum.

The dilemma of difficult abdication and lost innocence: This dilemma is related to the revolutionary masses and their leaders. The transition from the status of being a charismatic leader to that of being a public servant means losing ‘charisma’, the ‘mythology’ of
a popular leader, and brings about a distancing of a leader from the masses that support him. Those leaders who together were headed for victory may begin to dispute the leadership and their roles in the victory. Their unity dissipates, and they lose popularity among the masses. The revolutionary basis for their actions is replaced by the legal basis of administration. As Sztompka has noted: ‘Charisma rarely survives the dreariness of holding office’ (1991b, p. 19). This is in reality what we can observe more than a year after the Orange Revolution.

**Conclusion**

Seen as whole, the course of events after the Orange Revolution does not inspire optimism to expectations that these and other dilemmas will be successfully solved as a result of the reasonable and purposeful actions of the leadership. Perhaps the ‘elitist’ model of the political system is too attractive to the ruling business and political elites for them to embark on a positive problem-resolution of the dilemmas. On the other hand, there is hope that the 2006 parliamentary elections can inject a sense of uncertainty in the elite in its current attempt to escape social accountability. New configurations of the authoritative hierarchy, which plays an increasingly important role at the local governmental level, will require first a ‘foreplay’, and then a serious collaboration with civil society.
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Introduction
The social-political events in Ukraine from 22 November 2004 to 23 January 2005 mark a milestone in the history of our country. Should we express our sincere admiration of the Maidan events, which created an unprecedented example in modern Ukrainian history where the majority of the nation expressed its will in the face of desperate resistance? Have the perspectives of joining the ‘mainstream’ of progressive development of human civilization been restored for Ukrainians? Was not the entire democratic world – even the USA – aroused and enthusiastic about the events that unfolded? In mass consciousness and language, these events were granted the proud name of the Orange Revolution.

On the other hand, such a positive evaluation is not shared by the political forces that suffered a decisive defeat. From their point of view, in the life of Ukraine there have been changes not for the better but for the worse. They see the events not as a social revolution, but as an overthrow of power. My task here is not to analyse the arguments of winners and losers, which are mostly based on differing value systems. More important is the fact that, despite diametrically opposite evaluations and names, we may still talk about a common ideology of progress.

The notion of ‘progress’ has its roots in the Christian conception of history as a steady and purposeful movement of time, which started with the divine act of Creation and will be concluded with the Final Judgement Day. During the modern age, this notion has been rationally re-interpreted. Marxism in particular presented the history of humanity in the form of a regular sequence of social and economic structures, with the highest and unavoidable stage being
The understanding of revolution as a qualitative leap in the progress of society has become widespread. Indeed, the positive meaning of the notion of progress as justified by religious faith has been transferred to apply to the understanding of revolutionary leaps – even though these may involve various ‘revolutionary excesses’, including violence or loss of life on both sides. If the notion of revolution has traditionally had positive connotations, the idea of overthrow has always had a connotation of something bad and incorrect, incongruous with the vector of progress.

But does the idea of progress, with its fixed conceptual device, correspond to reality in the case of modern-day Ukraine? I will argue that, in order to give a scholarly assessment of the events of 2004/2005 and a considered evaluation of their results, we would do well to employ some of the more precise methodological terms that are available in modern political analysis.

**Post-Soviet transitions: models and concepts**

In the first years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence, many Ukrainians believed that democracy, along with the high standards of living typical of mature democracies, would follow – if not today, than at least the day after. But the deep economic crisis in society, together with the growing and bitter realization that it was going to be impossible to go to bed in the evening as a communist and wake up in the morning as a mature democrat, served to bury the idea of a ‘leap from socialism to capitalism’.

This destruction of the illusions concerning a quick transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy was not very surprising. Political science is well aware that transitions are difficult and long-term – starting with liberalization, and moving on to the democratization and consolidation phases. The model of a more or less extended transition to democracy has appeared to be acceptable for the masses. However multi-stage and protracted this process might prove to be, we should consider it as inevitable and also see consolidated democracy as its final aim.

The first doubts about the universal applicability of the transition model with its mandatory ‘happy end’ emerged with events in the newly independent countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, with their hereditary and perpetual ‘quasi-democracies’. Scepticism to the applicability of the transition model has been supported also by the experiences of Belarus and Russia, and here we may note...
how the Russian scholar Tatyana Zaslavskaya has provided some perspectives for reviewing the post-authoritarian transition of our Northern neighbour.

At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, a democratic revolution directed against the authoritarian power of the CPSU party nomenclature took off in the country. But the forces of social protest were not mature enough to take power in their own hands and to carry out democratic reforms for the sake of the majority of the population. Revolutionary enthusiasm quickly came to naught and power was transferred into the hands of a slightly reformed nomenclature preoccupied first of all with defending private interests […] One can hardly expect that new social forces will emerge in Russia within the next few years, and that these forces will be able to push Russia out of its current trajectory […] In the course of time the inadmissibility of the situation will become evident, however, and not only for scientists and politicians. The necessity of a new course will be realized if not by all, so at least by a majority of Russians. It’s important that the relative indifferent attitude of the elite to the current events passes quickly before the patience of the masses is exhausted. Everything depends on whether Russia will leave the deadlock and embark on new reforms supported by society or once again pass through sharp social cataclysms with unexpected results. (Zaslavskaya, 2003, pp. 174–78, 177–78)

Besides providing a frank evaluation of the situation in the country, her analysis makes a conceptually important point: it does not operate on the assumption that transition is inevitable and in full correspondence with an idea of progress. Although the idea of gradual advancement toward democracy is not rejected as such, it may be only one of several qualitatively different ‘trajectories’. Transitions without a clearly defined end-point are what Zaslavskaya terms crises in the transformation of society.

If we consider Zaslavskaya’s concept from a synergetic point of view, it appears justified. It operates with the notion of an initial disorganized stage; it sees structures as depending not only on internal, but also on external influences; it takes into account the possibility that qualitatively new structures may emerge as a result of comparatively minor fluctuations in these influences; and finally, it does not assume the existence of some iron-clad law of history and development, with a pre-defined end-point.

A system of this kind is not encapsulated by the above-mentioned notions of progress and ‘revolution’. Under circumstances of post-revolutionary instability, a leap to a more perfect social system will not necessarily take place. If we interpret progress as one of
many consecutive bifurcations, its end-result will depend on an entire series of consecutive bifurcations, including those provoked by occasional and seemingly insignificant influences, such as the actions of a small group, or even one individual.

This might be dismissed as a theoretical exercise that is far from the realities of political life. But let us remember the words of President Victor Yushchenko on his inauguration day, which can be considered as the final stage of the Orange Revolution: ‘Together we made an irreversible step toward democracy’. It is clear that the categorical modality of this judgment can be interpreted as normative, which is quite common for messages of this kind. But, on the other hand, if we were to look for its authentic interpretation, we should not overlook the sincerity of Victor Yushchenko. At any rate, an unconditional perception of spoken words can lead to excessive theoretical simplifications, as well as to miscalculations in practical policy.

Ukraine after the Orange Revolution

Seven months after the Orange Revolution, the social situation in Ukraine had not stabilized. Against this background, the next bifurcation came in early September 2005, with the crisis in executive power directly provoked by the resignation of State Secretary Oleksander Zinchenko and his accusations of widespread corruption among top-level officials. It resulted in the resignation of the cabinet, of the secretary of the Council of National Security and Defence, Pyotr Poroshenko and the dismissal of other influential officials. It divided the ‘orange’ camp: there were the followers of Yushchenko, the followers of Tymoshenko – as well as those who had lost confidence in both.

One immediate result of the attempts of the ruling political groups to prevent undesirable ‘trajectories’ provoked by this bifurcation was the 13 September ‘Declaration of Unity and Cooperation for the Sake of the Future’, supported by a wide circle of leading political actors. A new ‘pragmatic cabinet’ was formed under the leadership of Yuriy Yekhanurov – ‘the President’s man’. This was followed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the acting authority and the opposition, signed by Yekhanurov, Yanukovych and Yushchenko on 22 September 2005. In order to understand the events that have ensued, we should bear in mind that some of the most essential factors of instability were not removed, despite the energetic actions of the President, the Verhovna Rada, and party
leaders in the centre and in the regions.

First of all, an independent and transparent executive branch of power independent of business interests has not been established. Even if the newly appointed Cabinet of Ministers led by Yuriy Yekhanurov has reformed the Council of National Security and Defence (CNSD) and increased expectations that the Council would be better than its predecessor, officially retired members of the President’s team – Pyotr Poroshenko, O. Tretyakov and others – may still exert powerful influence behind the political scenes.

Secondly, the economic situation in Ukraine is very contradictory, and in general negative. An external source of threat is pressure from Russia, connected with rising prices for world energy resources without the economic-political compensation granted during the Kuchma era. The positive effect of social programmes enacted by the authorities (minimum wage standards, higher pensions and state maternal support) is often levelled out by hikes in prices, subsequent high inflation, and fears about price rises in energy during the winter heating season, etc.

Thirdly, the cultural division of the Ukrainian political nation remains an essential factor of instability. The confrontation between the ‘orange’ and ‘white-blue’ camps, which peaked in December 2004, has still not been surmounted, at the level of political top officials or among ordinary citizens. Only its form has changed. Undisguised aggressiveness has been emanating mostly from the side of the ‘white-blues’, becoming transformed into deep distrust and an irrational rejection also of rational decisions made by the authorities. The attempts by Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yushchenko in September 2005 to ‘build bridges’ with Victor Yanukovych have appeared to be an ad-hoc political gambit. Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding between the current authorities and the opposition has been criticized by ‘true believers’ on both sides, with some seeing it as a betrayal of ‘the ideals of the Maidan’

1 We should recall that on 26 December 2004, Victor Yushchenko secured about 15 million votes (51.99%), and his rival Victor Yanukovych about 13 million (44.20%). This splitting of the electorate into almost two equal parts was reinforced by its exact geographic division – ‘orange’ in the Western, Central and Northern regions and ‘white-blue’ in the Eastern and Southern regions. This entailed a dangerous situation after the second round of presidential elections. On 28 November 2004 a congress of deputies and officials of various levels from the eastern, southern and some other regions was held in Severodonetsk-Lugask region with the assistance of Victor Yanukovych. At the congress, sovereignty appeals were made, protesting the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, in particular the establishment of south-eastern autonomy on Ukrainian territory. ‘Na zisd separatistiv ne priikhali deputati’, at: www.pravda.com.ua, 4 December, 2004.
– in particular one of the Maidan’s most frequent slogans: ‘Bandits should be imprisoned!’

The September events have not managed to disrupt the trajectory of Ukraine’s democratic transition, but they do confirm the presence of possible challenges. Given a worsening of external circumstances, or due to internal failures, they might be able to revive an oligarchic variant of state rule in Ukraine. Here we should note that there have been changes in public opinion, with confidence ratings in Victor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko decreasing at the end of September.² Subsequently, people have appeared who are disappointed not only with the leaders, but with Orange Revolution itself.

At the end of March 2006, Ukraine will face a new test in the parliamentary elections. If nothing extraordinary happens, the elections will mark a next stage – one that may be able not only to change further processes in the country, but also to provoke a re-evaluation of previous events.

What can be done?

*Premonitus premunitus*, or ‘forewarned is forearmed’, the old Latin saying goes. Recognizing the limited validity of the ideology of progress and being alert to potential non-democratic ‘trajectories’ of social transformation is not a manifestation of pessimism or disbelief, but an informed realism. And hence a more urgent question: ‘What can be done to maintain the democratic-oriented transformations in Ukraine?’

There is no plain or straightforward answer to that question. Answers should be sought in the sphere of politics and economics, law and ethics, faith and rationality, ideology and psychology. I will confine myself to one of the components of social transformation, because under conditions of instability the future is not easily fore-

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² The September crisis in Ukraine lowered the ratings of both ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President Victor Yushchenko, as shown by the results from ‘Ukrainian Barometer’ service from 15 September to 25 September 2005. According to public opinion polls, confidence in the Orange Revolution leaders Yushchenko and Tymoshenko was enormous in the period between February and April 2005, but then started to decline gradually. After the September crisis, this process was accelerated. Thus, the level of confidence in Yushchenko sank by 10% in the three summer months, and by an additional 8% in two weeks of September. By the second part of September Yushchenko had the trust of 38%, and was mistrusted by 43.2%. The rating of ex-Prime Minister Tymoshenko sank by 11% in the summer months, and by an additional 9% during two weeks in September. ‘U Timoshenko i Yushchenka upav balans’, at: www.pravda.com.ua, 3 October 2005 and ‘Yushchenko i Timoshenko dokotilisya do rivnya Yanukovicha’, at: www.pravda.com.ua, 23 September 2005.
seen, and may even be affected by the smallest of influences. Every one of us must take responsibility for the future of our country, and making every effort to make it a good one.

This – in terms of theory – almost trivial statement is not easy to realize in the practical sphere. Throughout the long years of authoritarianism, most of our mature citizens became accustomed to ceding their social responsibilities to someone else – their boss at work, the ‘father of nations’, the ‘collective mind’ of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, or to the inexorable natural laws that would lead to a ‘radiant future for all humanity’. Today, we should not only reject this tradition, but show a responsible and practical initiative. One interesting example can be found in the concrete activity of a small group of scholars and teachers at one of our academies – the National University of Internal Affairs in Kharkiv.

The democratization of the National Militia has become a strategic necessity. Delaying this will have a negative influence not only on law-enforcement activities, which are already in a poor state, but also on the process of democratization in the country in general. The distinguishing feature of a modern democracy is respect for human rights. But we know that the national internal affairs officials have not only refrained from performing their main mission of ensuring human rights – they have also violated them. Why is this so? One source of these infringements is the poor level of knowledge among the staff at Internal Affairs and other related institutions in Ukraine. Providing better education in the sphere of democracy and human rights may not be a sufficient condition for the democratization of law-enforcement institutions – but it is an absolutely necessary one.

To this end, in recent years a programme for departmental education has been elaborated and tested in practice in many subdivisions of the Ukrainian militia – including basic training, higher education, retraining and raising the level of skills of the staff of Internal Affairs institutions. The suggested method consists in systematic inculcation of democratic values and norms of behaviour for law enforcement officials – both future specialists and those who are already in service. The educational course Essentials of Democracy has been adapted to different audiences.

The elaboration, practical testing and experimental introduction of these courses in democracy and human rights was carried out by a group of professionals from the National University of Internal Affairs (NUIA) within the framework of the Canadian-Ukrainian projects ‘Democratic Education’ (2000–2004) and ‘Democracy
Construction’ (March 2004–). They were supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science and Ministry of Internal Affairs. During this time:

- Educational modules were created for the course ‘Essentials of Democracy’ for departmental institutions of higher education (BH3), and for the course ‘Securing Human Rights in Periods of Transition’ including basic training of private and junior rank candidates of Ukrainian internal affairs institutions staff.
- The course ‘Essentials of Democracy’ was conducted by the National Internal Affairs Administration (NIAA) at the Kirovograd Department of NIAA, the NIAA Crimea Law Institute, the NIAA Odessa Law Institute, the NIAA Kherson Law Institute, and at the Dnipropetrovsk Academy of Law, the Zaporizhzhya Institute of Law, and the Lviv Institute of Law. The results were discussed and then distributed to several departmental institutions of higher education at the scientific-practical conference in Ivano-Frankivsk in spring 2003 on ‘The Problems of Humanitarian Training of Internal Affairs Institutions Staff under the Circumstances of European Integration’.
- The course ‘Securing Human Rights in Periods of Transition’ was held at the Institute of Re-education, as well as at the Kherson Institute of Law and at the Kirovograd Institute of Law.
- The course ‘Essentials of Democracy’ was included in the list of subjects recommended by Ukrainian higher education institutions of internal affairs – according to an official letter of the Head of the Ukrainian Internal Affairs Department (June 2004, № 6/7-2270).
- The educational-methodological package ‘Securing Human Rights in Periods of Transition’ was created, published and disseminated; it includes a manual, a reading-book and a collection of methodology materials.
- Staff members were trained to teach the above-mentioned courses, by means of conducting three training seminars for 24 teachers of higher education institutions (29 September–6 October 2002, in Pushcha-Vodytsya), and by providing primary

3 In early 2005, pursuant to the instructions of Minister of Internal Affairs Yuriy Lutsenko, an Action Plan was elaborated and approved for introducing the courses Essentials of Democracy and Human Rights into the departmental system of education of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Letter DRP MVS №6/7-1299, 19 March 2005.
4 See Tyaglo (2005).
training for 45 teachers of other educational institutions (21–23 October 2004 and 28 September–1 October 2005 in Pushcha-Vodytsya).

This demonstrates how the activity of a small group, with positive support from the outside, was disseminated to about one hundred teachers, and through them to over thousands of cadets, students, and readers in the educational system as well as among active Ukrainian internal affairs institutions staff. This initiative demonstrates that, despite the current difficulties and problems, it is possible to assist the law-enforcement bodies in meeting today’s requirements and demands in the context of a democratic-oriented social transformation of the whole country.
Contradictions in the Development of Civil Society in Ukraine

How to Surmount Them

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Introduction

Ukrainian independence, under the slogan of civil society restructuring and the transition to a social, legal and democratic state, has entered into the second decade of its history. However, these achievements have yet to achieve the firm social-economic, ideological and political basis necessary in order to overcome the contradictions that have accumulated. Political decision-makers will have to take decisive action to make terms like ‘civil society’, ‘public opinion’ and ‘modern democratic state’ a reality and to lead the country into a stable stage of development. This requires identifying these dilemmas, and then identifying the ways to overcome them – ways appropriate to the current political and social-economic situation. A general outline of such work should be:

- to develop a pragmatic attitude to the nature of civil society and its functions in political consciousness and public opinion, keeping in mind the national interests of Ukraine;
- improving the potential of NGOs in the sphere of democratization and social integration as well as in human rights protection and the protection of individual freedoms;
- optimalizing the relationship between civil society and the state to enrich the tools of inter-state communication and improve the international image of Ukraine.

If this is done, we can expect that characteristic features of civil society may become established also in Ukraine – such as trust, mutual aid, tolerance, cooperative actions, citizens’ belief in their own strength, community cause orientation, and a sense of responsibility.
Sources of the contradictions

Ukraine’s totalitarian heritage still exerts a great influence in perpetuating the old dilemmas of Soviet times, even though there has been a slight modernization based on the actions and choices of post-communist political leaders. However, the Soviet-era contradictions will die off slowly, so it seems better not to focus on Soviet ‘birthmarks’ of the past, but to direct attention to six main contradictions that have been generated in state–society relationships since Ukrainian independence:

1. In contrast to the natural process of self-organization of population groups, most people still rely not on their own strengths and resources, but appeal to the state structures for help. This notion of paternalistic expectations, artificially prolonged by the previous authorities, has resulted in the internal and external accumulation of dependencies (lack of political culture and the voluntarism of authority representatives), coupled with fewer possibilities for legally motivating the relevant structures to fulfil their duties toward the people. Hence it has boosted both officials’ voluntarism and the state-dependence of social elements.

2. Ukraine today is facing many challenges, among them a) choosing the quickest possible way of reconstruction of civil society under conditions of inadequate state resources for social programmes and the prevalence of poverty, together with the lack of a competent middle class, which reduces the possibilities of intensive development of civil institutions; b) vagueness and ambiguities between official proclamations and the real execution of constitutional requirements, because of the lack of effective legal mechanisms that can fully guarantee the proclaimed rights and freedoms of citizens; c) taking the first steps towards rooting broad-based perceptions of the concept of a legal order and such basic notions of civil society as democracy, human rights, the primacy of law, division of powers, the limited authority of the state, multi-confessionalism and respect for national minorities.

3. Ukraine finds itself in an abiding state of possible political dissolution – as evidenced by such diverse NGO orientations as those favouring a democratic state with mostly European orientation and those favouring a Eurasian and primarily pro-Russian orientation; a socialist/communist state favouring a mostly Eurasian orientation; and indifferent or multi-vector foreign policy
attitudes conflating in the idea of using market economics and private property as the main instrument for rebuilding society.

4. Until recently, the influence of foreign donors upon development and NGO activities has been dominant, thus forming a corrective mechanism to the state’s ‘third sector’ in a direction favourable for donors and, subsequently, somewhat contradictory feedback from NGOs to authorities. As a result, cultural projects have received poor financing; there has been almost no funding to the scientific-technical sector or encouragement to scientific communities; and mass-media grants have decreased substantially. To be sure, grants secure NGO independence from Ukrainian authorities, and stimulate public activity, but they also make NGOs dependent on their sponsors and can indirectly foster a negative image of the authorities. All of this is taking place as a result of inadequate development of financial support for NGOs due to internal corporative sources and preferential taxing.

5. When NGOs lack autonomy from political manipulations and also sufficient possibilities of constructive dialogue with the authorities, they may become a relevant instrument in the power struggle. From this it follows that many NGOs view the authorities as their enemy, or at least a non-benevolent opponent that it is necessary to struggle against and impossible to cooperate with. At the same time, the authorities interpret opposition institutions as a destructive force, without taking into consideration the constructive proposals of the ‘third sector’. This results in a vicious circle, where the parties do not heed each other’s views.

6. The quality of NGO services remains low. There are egoistic and mercantile interests among them, as well as inexperience, because the process of their professionalism is still far from optimal, and this, in turn, discredits ‘the third sector’, in public opinion and with the authorities. This leads to a situation where state institutions consider NGOs to be controversial suppliants or, at best, only secondary partners.

Among the consequences of these contradictions we find:

- Ukrainian civil society today is neither a balanced counterweight to the authorities, nor a centre of influence heeded by the authorities.
• The various segments of the NGO sphere do not identify themselves as partners in interaction with the state.
• The mass media remain authority-oriented, ignoring the real interests of civil society.
• There is a low level of legal awareness in all matters of societal relationships.
• The over-politicized and ‘governmentalized’ character of trade union activities as components of civil society has resulted in the absence of social partnership on the basis of parity.
• The legal administration lacks legitimacy and is isolated from public oversight and control.
• Political parties do not perform the structural functions as mediators between public and the state, and are disassociated from these functions.
• State authority is in a permanent legitimacy crisis, as a considerable part of the population does not trust it, cannot do so, and is afraid to hold it accountable.
• The religious split in society does not support cultural integration, and religious-cultural integration cannot become a strategic priority of social development.

The peculiarities of the cultural-historical character of the Ukrainian nation’s development complicate the process of effective formation of civil society. Long periods of foreign domination have given rise to a lasting aversion to the authorities in the popular mass consciousness, as well as a sense of resistance to authorities and a wish to get rid of them. The latter fact has fostered a confrontational brand of political culture that in turn undermines any basis for social support of politics. At the same time, the principle ‘My home is my castle’ (in the sense that ‘this does not concern me’) is deeply rooted in Ukrainian political behaviour, as well as attempts to solve private problems first of all by ‘doing business’ or giving and taking bribes, while societal problems are considered to be a matter for the authorities.

**Methods for overcoming the contradictions**

During modernization, essential priorities include securing an appropriate legal and institutional basis of civil society, state support to NGOs defending democratic values in society, and coordinating the institutional activities of local authorities in NGO cooperation. The problem of adopting a legal framework to regulate coop-
Coordination between NGOs and state institutions has become increasingly important. In order for social subjects to realize the need for strengthening civil society, we need to move from discussing the normative-theoretical level to the real mechanisms for implementing civil society in practice, taking into account the specifics of historical and cultural development. On this background, top priorities should be:

- Regulation of public discussions as a necessary condition for securing confidence in state institutions. Here it is vital to adhere to the principle of parity and mutual responsibility of civil society and authorities;
- The formation of a ‘participatory democracy’: cooperation between state institutions and public institutions through informing the people about state actions and encouraging widespread popular participation in decision-making at all levels;
- Inculcation of regional cooperation in various spheres of activity at the level of local self-government and the creation of cooperation bodies with representatives of both parties (roundtables, joint commissions);
- Upgrading the legal and civil education of officials (to alter the stereotyped attitude that public activity manifestations are not worthy of respect) and of the population in general.

As to specific ways of overcoming these dilemmas, here are some suggestions:

Firstly, the state should support and encourage NGO representatives in their cooperation with the authorities, through public hearings. Ukrainian national and local public hearings can contribute to keeping checks and balances on the work of executive bodies, and intensify a constructive dialogue between the authorities and the citizenry. In the course of time, these measures may very well become an additional mechanism for the legitimization of political decisions. In order to secure such measures of transparency and impartial feedback between the parties, it is relevant to attract a wider range of political forces and to establish public councils (collegiums) that can function as advisory bodies. They must include representatives from NGOs, the mass media, and the bodies of executive power, in an equal ratio.

Secondly, in order to overcome the lack of developed horizontal connections between NGOs (information exchange, conducting of mutual events) and raising the level of coordination between them,
their influence on authorities and the international image of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the authorities should – together with all concerned departments and institutions – in the immediate future organize a Ukrainian national congress of NGOs, with a permanent administration. This would serve to enhance NGO control over the authorities’ actions, remove their inter-regional isolation as well as strengthen the sense of nationhood among the populace.

One agenda item for the first meeting of such an organization could be to discuss a national concept of civil society development in Ukraine, taking into account national peculiarities and the features of Western analogues as well as the interests of first- and second-society sectors. A democratic society can be formed only in active cooperation with the Ukrainian state, including its commercial and public sectors. Support from foreign donor-organizations should play a secondary role.

Thirdly, given the low influence of NGOs in preparing, following up and implementing the decisions of the government and local authorities, the guidelines must include the following: adopt standards for project examination concerning the potential harm connected to development support to civil society; provide legal education for the public; secure partnership and exchange of experience among NGOs; uphold the principles of anonymity and confidentiality in the sphere of information; strengthen the feeling of national identity; elaborate and realize support mechanisms for open and transparent decision processes among authorities, and mechanisms for involving the public in decision-making; implement a policy of public consolidation in solving important social problems – such as minimizing poverty and forming a strong middle class as a stabilizing element of the social structure; improve existing forms of social partnership and elaborate new ones; and create effective mechanisms for supporting NGO activities in the realization of social programmes.

Fourthly, although NGOs do not really have local financial sources for their activities and support from local business companies is inconceivable, this is still compensated by foreign private funds and governmental programmes of democracy support. According to the Ukrainian law ‘On Public Associations’, these organizations cannot, however, develop an economic base for their activities, since a special economic structure would have to be established that would require that property costs to be included in the statute fund. There are two ways out of this vicious circle. The first is to transform the legal basis for NGO activity, lowering the tax
burden, encouraging charity funds and state protection of them, as well as guaranteeing the freedom to criticize the authorities freely. The second way is to create financially favourable conditions for some select NGOs and to provide money for their budgets. The effectiveness of independent NGO financing can increase if two conditions are met – volunteers should be recruited, and the NGOs should fulfil some extraordinary and urgent tasks.

Fifth, in order to correspond with the principles of civil society, the administration and social workers must actively support NGOs and social action and self-aid groups. Socially vulnerable groups must have the possibility to learn how to get access to social and political decision-making processes in order to protect their own interests effectively through consulting, mobilization and coordination. But the situation becomes more complicated for local administrations when they find themselves dealing with citizen interest groups protesting against political or administrative decisions that involve their own interests. This can create an ethical and tactical dilemma, for the social service administration and for social workers as well. From an ethical point of view, the question is whether the administration or its officials could make common cause with their clients. From a tactical point of view, refusal to support such actions could open the door to conflict.

**Conclusion**

In order to understand the complexity of the tasks that have emerged in the process of developing civil society, we need to identify some major principles. Securing and developing an effective civil society requires an advanced social structure capable of reflecting different forms of property, and the various interests of people, groups and sectors of society. The horizontal relations between them should be developed. Moreover, civil society is characterized by a high level of individual development in the social, intellectual and psychological sphere. The individual should have a sense of freedom and the ability to participate actively in different spheres of activities. In the economic sphere, one characteristic of a developed civil society is the existence of various non-governmental enterprises funded either by private contributors or collective ones and established on the basis of initiative. In the realm of society, these characteristics include the existence of non-governmental mass media as well as mechanisms for the expression of public opinion for solving conflicts, and advanced forms of self-government, social organizations
and movements. In the political sphere, different social-political unions, parties and movements oriented toward the protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms and the basic principles of democracy are driving forces in the development of civil society. Finally, in the spiritual sphere, a developed civil society is characterized by freedom of thought and speech, liberty of conscience and the existence of mechanisms to ensure personal self-expression and spiritual development, including independent associations to promote and inspire science, culture and creativity.
Part II  Euro-Integration and Foreign Policies: Regional Issues
**Introduction**

Any physician needs to know the hereditary and environmental influences on his patient’s health in order to formulate an appropriate diagnosis and prescribe a remedy. Similarly, the true scholar must take into account past preconditions and influences as well as the surroundings of a nation in order to reach adequate conclusions on the current situation of that nation and its prospects for development.

In the case of Ukraine, one widespread misunderstanding has been to regard the country as a kind of twin-sister to Russia. Traditionally it used to be dated from the days of ancient Kyiv (Kiev), or at least from the so-called re-unification of the 17th century. However, the medieval mixture of Slavs with Turkic and Ugric tribes on the territories of Belarus, most of Ukraine and on a narrow western strip of what would become Russia bore little resemblance to a modern state. Moscow adopted the name of the Russian Empire and obtained its recognition after subordinating Kiev and suppressing resistance. Although most of Ukraine had been annexed by the end of the 18th century, Galicia and Western Ukraine as a whole had never been under Russian domination until the Soviets subjugated them in the mid-20th century.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union there emerged an equally fallacious tendency to regard Ukraine as an artificial construct, because of the undoubted differences between its regions. Only the nation’s core lands had an identity of their own. For centuries, the Ukrainian South had developed within the ambit of Mediterranean civilization, albeit with no natural boundaries to withstand
pressure from Eurasia. The Ukrainian West shared the destinies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Yet, all ethnologists in the late 19th century agreed that Carpathian Ruthenians and the so-called Little Russians are linguistically and culturally the same people. As to the shifting political overlays, let us recollect that not so long ago one could hardly imagine that the Dutch/Swedish Atlantic and the Spanish Pacific coasts of what is today the USA would belong to the same English-speaking nation. Anyway, now perhaps everyone except marginal hard-liners of imperial nostalgia can have no doubt that Ukraine does and will exist. The problem is just of what kind of a nation it will be – a sovereign member of the European family, or a miserable appendix to some post-Soviet conglomerate in an uncertain Grey Zone between the most dynamic and the most archaic regions of the contemporary world.

Emerging from the past: Cross-cultural and contemporary Ukraine

Fortunately, Ukraine has neither the prerequisites nor the ambitions to be a Great Power. This was proven when it voluntarily abandoned its nuclear weapons, the third largest arsenal in the world after the USA and Russia. Only shortsighted politicians now sporadically put forward naive and indeed laughable dreams of a regional leadership, which are not to be taken seriously. On the other hand, there is no denying that Ukraine is one of the five largest totally European nations – in terms of the size of its territory and its population, as well as its traditions of responsible government and strategic significance. In our inter-dependent world, any large country always belongs to more than one region. The United States is now the only superpower, but with each passing year, Japan and China are playing an increasingly significant global role. Russia pretends to dominate Northern Eurasia or the post-Soviet area within the progressively decaying CIS, while Britain, France and Spain seek to hold on to their post-colonial connections with Asia, Africa and Latin America. Germany is today the leading force of both West and Central Europe. Ukraine cannot be compared to them of course, but the country also belongs, part and parcel, to several important geopolitical spheres situated at the crucial crossroads of different civilizations.

Ukraine is not going to break off its ties with the rest of Eastern Europe, which includes the Baltic nations, Belarus and part of Russia. On the other hand, Kiev has no other interests, other than purely
economic and humanitarian ones, beyond the Urals – as indeed anywhere. Ukrainians have remained quite indifferent to demagogic neo-Pan-Slavic calls from Moscow and Minsk, with their echoes of such outdated slogans as Pan-Germanic or Latin racial unity. They have not supported the concept of the ‘near abroad’\(^1\) or similar efforts to galvanize the recent common Soviet past. The image of a Former Soviet Union from Estonia to Turkmenistan is as meaningless as a Former Roman Empire from Britain to Syria. True, history knows precedents of political regimes that have been restored – temporarily. But any attempt aimed at revitalizing a multinational empire after its collapse is inevitably destined to fail. We should remain watchful about these attempts, but there is no point in exaggerating the danger in a long-term perspective. That might act to hinder and make more costly the transformation of today’s quasi-Weimar Russia from a permanent military threat into a normal nation. The only possible alternative could be the final and total disintegration of Russia, with unpredictable consequences.

Without breaking its mutually profitable ties with Russia, Ukraine is at the same time regaining its traditional role in the Mediterranean realm. Here the reader might recall the history of Scythian, Byzantine and Viking, Greek and Bulgarian settlements all over the country; its Armenian communities, the Genoa possessions in the Crimea, and the centuries-long co-existence with the Ottomans and their clients, old Moldova and the Tartar Khanate. More relevant, however, is contemporary Ukraine’s need for modern export markets, as well as alternative sources of crude oil, gas and other energy supplies. The plans and construction of pipelines and other communications from the Black Sea to the Baltic should remind us that Gdansk served as the main port for Ukrainian grain exports in the 17th and 18th centuries, while Odessa played a similar role for Russian-dominated Poland in the 19th century. As to political mentality, it is worth mentioning that the imaginary dividing line at the map between both candidates at the presidential elections in 2004 coincides exactly, and not coincidentally, with the former border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth against the Wild Field, the *Loca Deserta*, of 1648, on the eve of the unfinished war of liberation and the subsequent crucial changes throughout Europe.

Along with the Eastern and Southern vectors, Ukraine is gradually reassuming its natural place in East-Central Europe. Here, we have in mind the key region of closely coherent, co-measurable

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\(^1\) This concept is frequently used in Russia to designate the post-Soviet space as a sphere of vital interests for Russia. [eds remark]
and mutually inter-connected nations situated between Germany and Russia, the Baltic states and the Balkans. This region is the cradle of all but one of the Slavic peoples, together with substantial Ugric, Romanian, Turkic and other ingredients. It was the basic territory of the German and Jewish settlements network outside their initial homelands, and was also a part of Poland-Lithuania and Austria-Hungary with all their successors. It has remained a unique cross-cultural meeting point of Orthodoxy, Roman and Greek Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam and Judaism. Let us recall also that Kiev had adopted Christianity long before the Church schism. Since the Reformation in the 16th century until the present day, Baptism, Lutheranism and other Protestant denominations have not been alien elements either. Even the current regrettable conflict between the Russian and Ukrainian Churches reflects this pluralism to a degree that makes it comparable to past analogues elsewhere, e.g. between the mighty ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the national Churches in the reborn Balkan states in the 19th century.

And finally, East-Central Europe shared a tragic common page in its history under the Nazi and long-lasting Soviet totalitarian dictatorships. Ukraine suffered perhaps most of all, having lost every second man and every fourth woman in the course of political purges, human-induced famines, mass deportations, executions and murders during the ‘peace’ of the 1930s. This was the time when the gap between Ukraine and the rest of the region appeared for the first time. Before then, there had been no more of a substantial difference between Russian Warsaw and Kiev than between, say, Austrian Krakow and Lvov. After the Second World War as well, one could see no difference in the United Nations between the pseudo-sovereignty of the Soviet republics and the Warsaw Pact states. Yet, in Ukraine the Soviet authorities regarded even the spoken native language as an evidence of a notorious ‘bourgeois nationalism’. When the moment of proclaiming independence came, the democrats and patriots proved weaker than the cynical ex-Communist functionaries. That is why the descendants of many former torturers are doing their best to speak in the name of their silenced victims. To some extent this can explain, though not justify, the current hesitations, indecision and lack of consistency in Kiev.

Nevertheless, the general trend of returning to Europe is just a matter of time, because national suicide would be the only other alternative. This was symbolically and persuasively demonstrated by the recent nuclear plant disaster and other widely known dis-
asters produced by the criminal policy of the former regimes. No wonder their heirs now prefer to avoid all unpleasant reminiscences, instead emphasizing the social stability of Soviet times – without mentioning the bloody price paid for that stagnation. The Poles, Czechs, Latvians, Lithuanians and other East-Central Europeans have come to regard Communist rule as a time of foreign occupation and traitorous collaboration. The only exception is Belarus, where Europe’s last dictator still glorifies that Soviet past. In Ukraine, officials have been trying to find an impossible middle way, claiming theoretical adherence to the national ideal, while de facto pledging allegiance to the accustomed post-Soviet legacy. The country looks like a centaur with a human face turned toward Europe, but with his horse feet stuck in the mud. However, a creature like that can exist only in mythology. Real life requires that a nation make clear choices, well founded in domestic and international developmental tendencies.

Where is Ukraine headed?

An attempt to predict eventual developments necessitates taking into account all important factors, including the demographic situation and its evolution. The Soviet cultural ethnocide, its environmental crimes, and economic crisis all acted to push mortality higher than the birth rate. Over the past decade, Ukraine’s population has declined from 51 to 47 millions. Unemployment has pressed many people to look for work in Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Greece, Turkey and elsewhere, where they risk falling into the clutches of ruthless gangs who blackmail and exploit them. At the same time, many Asians have travelled westward via Ukraine. To date, Kiev has no repatriation agreement with Russia. So the border-guard stops illegal migrants on the only protected frontier – on the west – and they try to stay behind in Ukraine. Some parts of Ukraine’s capital and other big cities have become dominated by Afghan, Korean, Vietnamese, and Tajik infiltration. If the local authorities do not care about infrastructure and pretend not to notice such processes, the result can be substantial problems of criminality, drug trafficking, etc. Similar phenomena are imminent for the whole of Europe, but their consequences may be more destructive in a transition country like Ukraine.

The Ukrainian population is dispersed, and demographic tendencies have had varying manifestations, their allocation depending on historical differences. The country’s South-East has been
devastated by Soviet-style industrialization with its emphasis on the military and almost complete neglect of social needs. The ill-managed plants and mines are too often situated in dangerous proximity to major towns, and their antiquated equipment causes accidents. For decades, chemical and heavy-metal pollution have been poisoning the air. The cosmopolitan mixture of newcomers and their offspring feel little cultural and religious identity with the country. Alcoholism is flourishing, with fatal results for physical and mental health. Mortality in these areas is three times higher than the birth-rate. Local authorities intermingled with criminal bosses have done their best to isolate the people from the impact of the any outside world other than neighbouring Russia. No wonder, then, that the populace is vulnerable, receptive to primitive anti-Western and anti-democratic propaganda. It could become a kind of Ukrainian Vendee manipulated from the ‘near abroad’ and blocking all modernization trends. As such, it has no future except that of a gradual and painful return to realities.

The country’s central regions on both sides of the Dnepr River hold memories from the Golden Ages of Kiev’s medieval statehood and Cossack glory. Tsarist ideologists and their Soviet heirs did their best to usurp and adopt such legends for the needs of imperial unification. Ukraine was the first test stage for the assimilation of non-Russian peoples. Its intellectual elites were ruthlessly suppressed, exterminated, or partly forced to emigrate. All these persecutions and migrations have changed the ethnic composition of many areas, while the native survivors are sceptical and mistrustful of the attractive slogans misused by their enemies, who quickly managed to change colour. The wish to avoid violence almost at any price has also made recovery slow and costly. Mortality in these regions is still twice as high as the birth rate, yet clear signs of improvement are emerging. For the first time, the capital city is actually facing a baby-boom. Despite the sharp social contrasts between nouveaux-riches and the impoverished majority, the average level and standards of living are now rising. With no danger of foreign invasion, the rich black soils of Ukraine are now able to feed its hard-working people.

Western Ukraine was a constituent part of Austria-Hungary. Sometimes it lacked consistency in applying liberal principles like the rest of Europe, but it went through a good school. The Ruthenians-Ukrainians suffered from social ills, here as everywhere else. On the other hand, they had their own national Greek Catholic Church; they had schools, books and periodicals in their native lan-
There was an active public life, with trade unions, sport and cultural societies, elections and political parties represented in both the regional Diet and Parliament in Vienna. The trans-Carpathian region enjoyed the benefits of the first Czechoslovak republic in the inter-war period, while Bukovina suffered from poverty under Romanian rule. The Ukrainians of Galicia and Volhynia formally had constitutional guarantees of minority rights in the Second Polish Republic, but they could not forget how the West Ukrainian republic had been defeated and crushed by force. Deep-rooted tensions and sharp repressive measures applied by the Polish authorities led to sporadic outbursts of nationalist insurgency. The German Nazis and Russian Communists misused these contradictions to destabilize Poland until its final, disastrously forced partition at the beginning of the Second World War.

As is the case with so many countries, Ukraine is poly-ethnic, but it is not a multinational entity. There exists no clearly defined enclave of a foreign population within its borders, unlike the ill-fated Russian autonomies in the Caucasus, the Volga regions and elsewhere. What then of the Crimea? Geographically and historically connected with the rest of Ukraine, it was re-united with this republic during Soviet times, since the Russian Federation had no wish to carry the economic burden of the peninsula, which was devastated by the forcible deportations of the Crimean Tartars to Asia. Half of this native people fell victim to brutal and undeserved persecutions. When the Tartars were permitted to repatriate, the Soviet colonists and their offspring threw spanners in the wheels. Forming a minority in their only homeland, today’s Tartars cannot claim independence, but prefer autonomy within Ukraine. Tension is sporadically provoked not by native separatism, but by the presence of the Russian naval base and subversive propaganda stimulated by chauvinists from Moscow. They hypocritically complain about Russian identity, yet in practice discriminate the Ukrainian and Tartar languages in schools, media and other cultural infrastructures on the Crimea.

Unfortunately, the world has so far not recognized Soviet policy towards Ukraine as the genocide that it was. The ethnic and social structure of many regions was changed, and newcomers from elsewhere replaced the original population. Yet, as time passes, gradually the patriotism of the nation inevitably prevails over folk patriotism. The hopeless armed resistance and the desperate guerilla war of the native Ukrainians remained suppressed for some years after the Second World War. But some decades later, when the
situation changed, local functionaries were to prove less reliable towards Moscow. To some extent, this has echoes of the Americas, where a few hundred years ago certain British and Spanish officers had become resolute and militant leaders of ex-English settlers and creoles in their national liberation struggle, while less flexible elites continued as unthinking loyalists. Historical analogues can be useful, while of course inevitably relative and premature. It may seem heretical to compare the dirty calculations of modern local politicians with the noble ideals of the Founding Fathers in the New World, yet we do not know how history will judge them in the remote future. Ukraine is still lagging behind, but with strong will and good teachers the nation can make up for lost time.

Ukraine’s neighbours
Russia has a long history of invoking charismatic status – under a Great Khan, Tsar, Secretary General, President or other semi-divine, personified leader. The rural community there had been based on collective ownership, and periodical repartitions of the land plots under collective responsibility. After this rural society had been destroyed by brutal policies of collectivization and ineffective militarized industrialization, Russia proved unprepared for normalization. The police state has been petrified by an archaic mythological mishmash of messianic chauvinism, monarchism, post-Communist nostalgia, and fundamentalist Orthodoxy. Its economy today is dependent on oil and gas exports, which may have a short-lived boom effect, but less positive long-term prospects. Popular mentality has been paralysed by the shock of the ingratitude and rapid desertion of all Soviet and Warsaw Pact clients. The widespread complex of inferiority and suspicions against the imperialist West, supposedly dreaming of humiliating and subjugating Russia, has been inherited from the paranoia of being a besieged camp. Today’s Russian oligarchy and bureaucratic government hardly share these fears, but they exploit them to hold on to their possessions. Attempts to destabilize and somehow re-incorporate Ukraine are a part of this mentality.

Poland is less familiar neighbour, and yet a natural one. The Poles were spared the Ukrainian inter-war horrors. Even as a Soviet satellite with a limited sovereignty, they managed to preserve their privatized agriculture, respect for intellectuals, historical memory, religious morality, and semi-legal ties with emigrants in the West. This helped Solidarity triumph, as well as sparking the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, the ‘singing revolutions’ in
the Baltic lands and other peaceful yet radical democratic transformations in East-Central Europe. Unlike Russia, but similar to Poland, Ukraine had traditions of rural and urban communities based on private property, the estate democracy of the nobles and a Cossack, individualist mentality based on mutual responsibility of the rulers and subjects, the balance of rights and duties, and elective authorities from the local up to the highest level of kings and hetmans. Ukrainian constitutional drafts from the early 18th century envisaged the separation of powers into the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Ukraine had a short-lived statehood and fierce guerilla fights in the 20th century. It is symptomatic that Ukraine’s adversaries have been trying to spoil the image of Poland and to complicate exchanges at the inter-personal level.

After the Second World War, France managed to overcome old prejudices and helped Germany to return to Europe. Germany did the same for Poland after the Cold War. Today, Poland is both able and inclined to play such role concerning Ukraine. Together the two nations could become a mighty stronghold of stability in East-Central Europe. Unlike Russian-dominated Belarus, they are not landlocked but have access to the seas, and they share a common Central European experience of the past. Ukraine adheres to the generally recognized postulates of liberal democracy and norms of behaviour in international relations. The country is eager and has all preconditions for meeting the requirements of European integration. There is no wish to recreate the super-national structures in the post-Soviet area. What can be expected is a responsible attitude, including contributions to collective peace-making and peace-keeping efforts. Today’s Ukraine is ready to take part in such actions under the aegis of the UN, NATO or other internationally recognized bodies, provided that national sovereignty is preserved in decision-making. Here, however, it should be noted that not all forces in the country’s political spectrum are equally sincere in their declared consensus about Europe. For one thing, some try to prevent the distribution of accurate information about the Euro-Atlantic community among the people.

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2 Russia did have a brief constitutional experimental period from the 1890s and to 1917 [eds Remark]
Conclusion
Fifteen years ago, Ukrainian patriots, striving for freedom, had for a while joined forces with the Communists who feared an apparently more democratized Russia. Paradoxically, this resulted in their unanimous vote in favour of independence. Today, we see that a smaller circle of hard-liners has joined mafia comprador clans and their paid or deceived supporters. On the other hand, pragmatic managers, the newly-emerging and still not strong middle class of owners and manufacturers have subconsciously felt that their profit lies in a Western-oriented and legally protected free entrepreneurship.

This was the base of the bourgeois-democratic Orange Revolution. Its driving forces proved to be small businesses, townspeople, intellectuals, students, and the most dynamic and educated strata of society. In order to comprehend its implications, we should clearly distinguish between the competition of two candidates for presidency, and the struggle for honest, non-falsified elections. The personal rivalries and quarrels – evidently provoked from abroad – may lead to regrettable retreats and public disappointment. That is why coordinated efforts from within and outside the country are necessary, now more than ever, so that Ukraine may successfully complete its unfinished revolution of liberty, dignity and property rights.
Great political transformations have taken place in Ukraine after the last presidential elections. A new Europe-oriented political elite has attained state power. As result, a new and vigorous stage in the development of Ukrainian foreign policy has started. The overall foreign policy priorities proclaimed at the time of President Kuchma have remained unchanged – European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Meanwhile, positive political perceptions of the new Ukrainian political elite in Western Europe and the USA have provided conditions favourable for the implementation of this political programme that unfortunately was not widely pursued by the previous authorities.

Under these conditions, a re-adaptation of the general foreign policy activities is in progress. This trend has been declared in official reports from the state leadership and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Recent foreign policy declarations of the Ukrainian state leadership include mention of such strategic directions in foreign policy activity as intra-state reforms connected with the democratization of society and the state, the supremacy of law, market economy, economic development, and raising the standards of living of the people. Similarly, the new authorities are seeking to enhance stability and security in the region where Ukraine is located.

The fulfilment of these tasks is a decisive factor for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic bodies. That is why it is crucial for the Ukrainian state and the life of its society to conform to the norms and standards of the European Union and NATO. Today, entry into the WTO and the creation of a Free Trade Zone with the European Union are the priorities of Ukrainian foreign
policy, because they will serve to increase the role and presence of the country in the international sphere.

The most dynamic direction of Ukrainian post-revolutionary foreign policy is its regional policy at the international level. During the first few post-revolutionary months, the country’s president, its former prime minister, and its minister of foreign affairs proclaimed that the overall goal of Ukrainian activities in the Baltic–Black Sea–Caspian region would be the creation of a ‘homogeneous space of stability, democracy, and security with the EU from Vytebsk to Baku’. That these declarations were meant seriously has been shown by the decision to renew the organizational and functional structure of GUAM\(^1\) as the main instrument for realizing the overall tasks of Ukrainian foreign regional policy. These tasks are also dedicated to confirming the European identity of the region.

The above-mentioned issues were proclaimed in the Chisinau declaration on ‘democracy, stability, and security’ that was adopted at the GUAM Summit in the Moldovan capital in April 2005. At the summit, the member-states decided to transform this forum into a fully fledged regional organization with concrete goals, authorities and structures. The functional structure of this organization should be based on democracy, economic development and security. GUAM should become a coalition of states capable of guaranteeing democratization and stability in the Black Sea–Caspian Region.

A predominant feature of GUAM is the priority given to European and Euro-Atlantic integration in the foreign policy doctrine of its members. Thus, the goal of regional cooperation for peace, security and stability under the current leadership of Ukraine is correlated with orientation towards the EU and NATO. A further important priority in GUAM’s activities is regulation of ‘frozen conflicts’. The elaboration of a plan for the regulation of the Transdniestrian conflict (the ‘Yushchenko Plan’) means that Kiev should assume greater responsibility in regulating not only that regional conflict, but also conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and probably in Nagorny Karabakh, as well, thereby facilitating the reintegration of self-proclaimed republics under the jurisdiction of Chisinau, Tbilisi and Baku respectively.

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Negotiations about Ukrainian membership in the EU are very difficult, despite the positive attitude to the new state power in Ukraine shown by EU officials and the leaders of its member-states. In fact, a traditional diplomatic auction is in progress in EU–Ukrainian relationships. Ukraine is asking for more than it expects to get, while the EU has been agreeing to take only limited and gradual steps towards expanding the EU–Ukrainian cooperation. The final result of such negotiations may well be a compromise agreement on the basis of the Ukraine–EU Action Plan currently in force. The internal instability in the EU connected with ratification of the European Constitution has meant a great obstacle to granting Associative Membership status to Ukraine, so it is likely that the EU will opt to back some kind of in-between arrangement. Successful implementation of this agreement should form the basis for a Treaty on Associative Membership for Ukraine.
On the other hand, despite the numerous critical comments about Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukrainian society, this integration has made constant progress within the Treaty on Intensified Dialogue about Membership and Reforms, signed between NATO and Ukraine in spring 2005. NATO has assessed Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic activities quite positively, and this can provide a good backdrop for starting negotiations about membership in the near future. On the other hand, Ukrainian parliamentary elections may interrupt this process. The election results of March 2006 can be expected to have considerable influence on the country’s negotiations with both the EU and NATO.

After the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian foreign policy has several special features. Without doubt, the main strategic goal is a gradual and cautious movement toward the realization of Ukrainian expectations connected with European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Moving towards full membership is necessarily a long-term process. The current level of cooperation with NATO would seem to indicate that membership in NATO is a more realistic achievement for the immediate future.

Ukraine’s foreign regional policy is the predominant direction that can and should be expected to yield concrete positive results in a short time. Ukraine has pledged itself to achieve such results. Under the current geopolitical conditions, Ukraine is able to head the renewed regional integration processes in the Black Sea–Caspian Region. These processes should be based on the orientation of the actors in the region toward membership in the European and Euro-Atlantic bodies, and on a re-distribution of roles different from that in the Post-Soviet Area. There can be no leaders and no satellites in regional cooperative integration processes. Instead, what is needed is an ‘effective manager’ in a situation where all actors enjoy equal rights.

Taking into account these ambitious goals, Ukraine is obliged to prepare for a new role as *primus inter pares*. Ukraine must also realize all plans connected with improving GUAM along the ambitious lines declared in 2005. These plans include a strengthening of GUAM’s role for Europe in transport, energy projects, regional security, effective realization of the Community of Democratic Choice, and in the regulation of such ‘frozen conflicts’ as the Transdnestrian issue as an example for solution of problems connected with other self-proclaimed republics.

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In conclusion, we should agree that Ukraine will need to be diplomatically flexible – in order to avoid a worsening of relations with Russia, to increase EU and US assistance in domestically initiated regional foreign policy projects and activities connected with conflict regulation, and to secure the institutionalization of a Europe-oriented integration process in the Black Sea–Caspian Region.
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Introduction

The Orange Revolution may be analysed in various contexts: in the light of the theories and practices of world revolutions of the 18th to 20th centuries, or the transformations of the post-Communist area, such as the experience of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps one even more proximate in time – Georgia’s Rose Revolution. The revolutionary transformation of society is always a very painful process, and that is why we should consider historical cases – in order to avoid the pain. Here we would like to draw attention to an example unknown to most Ukrainians – the Quiet Revolution. It took place in the 1960s in Quebec and started a new epoch in the life of this Canadian province.

Why should we look to this experience now, when analysing Orange events in Ukraine? It is important to follow how society and its progressive elite have stepped up their struggle against nepotism, corruption, and the falsification of elections. How, in Canada, was it possible to reach consensus? And how did they conduct the major social reforms that have changed Quebec so much, the reforms that have passed into history under the name of the Quiet Revolution? Comparative analysis is not the goal of this research – every comparison is in some sense weak. More important is to find out exactly what happened in Quebec during the Quiet Revolution. How did society survive the transition period and turn to the rule of law? This question is of high relevance in today’s Ukraine. We should ask ourselves what needs to be done in order to become something more in the world’s historic memory than a bright orange flash.
Quebec: the backdrop

Canada is a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary democracy and a federal state. With its population of 7.5 million, Quebec is the largest of Canada’s 10 provinces. First it was a French colony, then a British one. Louis XV felt that he did not need this ‘glacier’. When the British proposed that France take back the Canadian colonies, in exchange for several Caribbean islands, the king cried: ‘leave them to themselves’ – and the People of Quebec have still not forgiven him. In 1774 the British Parliament adopted the Quebec Law, and then in 1867 Quebec became a part of the newly created Canadian confederation. The basic factors forming Quebec’s identity, and ones very different from the other Canadian provinces, were French language, Catholicism and its system of civil law.

Let us take a closer look at Quebec’s history prior to the Quiet Revolution. After the Second World War, Quebec, like the other provinces of Canada, went through modernization and industrialization – but there were differences compared with the rest of the country. The dominant role of the Catholic Church did not allow the province to develop quickly, and, in fact, the influence of this institution was to prove decisive for Quebec. On the territory of English-speaking Canada and the USA, various forms of Protestantism prevailed, while in Quebec, the Catholic Church was following and jealously controlling its parishioners.

Let us take a step backward in time. At the threshold of the 20th century, cinema is conquering the world, and new dances like the step and foxtrot are appearing. The dawn of television is approaching, and soon every household will have a TV set. What does the Catholic Church do in order to restrict freedom, all the while being unable to limit its appeal? Cinema is forbidden on the weekends. Dances are forbidden as well – and not only on the weekends. Television is heavily censored, so that the citizens of Quebec cannot watch any programmes from the USA, films with Marilyn Monroe and all the rest. Families are large – six to ten children – and women stay at home. There is practically no talk about education for all. The Church controls education and health systems, but urbanization and the baby boom have raised the people’s demands and expectations in education and health protection. The world is changing – but not the educational system in Quebec. There is a lack of qualified French-speaking experts, and all high positions are taken by Anglophones. Thus, by the early 1960s Quebec is lagging behind all the other Canadian provinces in such important areas as education and health care. The Queen’s Commission reports that
French-speaking Canadians have the lowest level of education in Canada; they earn less and are not appointed to leading positions.

There is a business boom in North America, but Quebec’s business level is very low. Most of the province’s French-speaking population are working in agriculture. Quebec is a Francophone island in the Anglophone ocean of North America. But even a Frenchman from France cannot always understand the Québécois, who have preserved the Norman pronunciation of the 17th century – from the time the first colonists came from Normandy. This, then, is a closed, conservative society, not well-educated, speaking a language that outsiders cannot understand. It is an ideal society to rule – and Maurice Duplessis, Quebec’s Prime Minister, understands this perfectly.

**The Boss of Quebec**

Maurice Duplessis is a highly ambiguous figure. (See e.g. Lorti, 2004, p. 233.) He has come to power in Quebec twice: first from 1936 to 1939, then returning as Prime Minister in 1944. He dies at his workplace 15 years later, burnt out at work and left to himself, with personal debts, a collection of paintings that is bequeathed to a museum, many followers, even more critics, and the whole epoch of the *Grande Noirceur* (the Great Darkness) on his shoulders. Financially, Duplessis does not gain much from holding power – this fact has been proven. Nor is he is unique in history – it is well known that the drug of absolute power is much stronger than money and material goods. But Duplessis’ circle could thank ‘the Boss’ for everything or almost everything. This is how he was known in Quebec.

From 1944 to 1959 Maurice Duplessis retains absolute power in the National Union – the party created by him. Known for his sometimes brutal treatment of workers’ unions, Quebec’s Prime Minister periodically violates social rights and liberties. Political protectionism is flourishing in the province, and political campaigns receive enormous sums from the budget. He abuses his political power and people’s trust by distributing money and working places among his partisans. Nepotism becomes a signature of this era. For instance, the budget deficit in 1948 is USD 31 million, and in 1952/53, USD 52 million. Both times this is due to expenses for road construction – and both times this occurs in election years. The conclusions are simple to draw, and classic.

Duplessis’ party, the National Union, uses nepotism at all levels.
Provincial orders are passed without any competition, and only by the government’s subjective decision. Politicians who are in business are generally welcomed for the cooperation. And they get all government orders at prices far higher than the market norm. Individual nepotism is rampant in the villages, where it is easy to control the votes of each villager. Even the Church starts to be dependent on the government. For it is well known that priests can influence their parishioners. Pastoral advice on whom to vote during the elections is no longer a surprise to anyone. Sometimes the advice remains opinions, but in other cases priests force people to adhere to this opinion. Duplessis is very well aware of the importance and influence of the Catholic Church in Quebec, and the National Union becomes a social reflection of the Church, with a similar structure and functioning.

All possible and necessary funds and facilities are employed to win the elections, and the National Union uses the legislature for its own benefits. Buying votes, threats of repression, and corruption among functionaries involved in election campaigns become a normal practice. Duplessis easily breaks the law to obtain his needs, nor does he refrain from resorting to light public blackmail. For example, in a city which greatly needs to finish a bridge construction, Duplessis threatens that the bridge will not be finished if the candidate of the Liberal opposition party wins the ballot. The candidate does win, and the bridge is never finished as long as Duplessis lives. In another district, it was said that those voting for the candidate from the Liberal party would lose their pensions and other social benefits. And so they do. On the other hand, Duplessis is known for making social payments out of pity – after having received a written request. This increases the number of his partisans.

Universities are also subsidized at the will of the Prime Minister. There is no talk of freedom of expression – that is controlled very strictly. If a student or a professor expresses his displeasure at the regime, the university might not get financial assistance. A propaganda system is effectively set up. All means are employed: radio stations, neon advertising hoardings, even an airplane that flies above the city so everyone can hear from its loud-speakers – Duplessis, Duplessis, Duplessis. Finally, public organizations are given monetary ‘gifts’. Separate individuals might receive material support like potatoes, flour, a pair of shoes, etc. Automobile owners are given USD 25 for participation in demonstrations. There exists a system of special numbers for vehicle licence plates. Their owners can ignore traffic rules and not worry about the road police. It
is quite simple: the numbers from 1 to 2000 are given to the most active party members. (Laporte, 1960, pp. 50–51)

The party does not refrain from using strong drink during the election campaigns: barrels of beer are rolled out in the villages; and in the cities, party representatives comb the bars, looking for new recruits. The alcohol license is, in general, the strong argument of ‘the Boss’. A classic example is the story of one Party conference. Duplessis wants everyone to gather at the Chateau Frontenac – the most exclusive tourist hotel in Montreal. It is September, a month when visitors flock to Canada to admire the changing colours of the maple trees. All the rooms in that hotel have been booked a month in advance. When Duplessis is informed that it will be impossible for his party to hold their conference at the Chateau Frontenac, his response is straightforward: then we’ll take away the hotel’s alcohol license. Needless to say, the congress takes place there.

But time never stands still. Nepotism, corruption, abolition of moral norms, falsifications of elections, closure and censorship of society, and general backwardness compared to the neighbours – all these are increasingly coming under criticism. The journal *Cité Libre* takes a leading position in this. This journal, edited by the young Montreal lawyer Pierre-Eliot Trudeau together with journalist Gerard Pelletier, is widely read among intellectuals and contains sharp criticism of the regime together with new projects for developing society.

Duplessis has a conservative, traditional vision of society. He sees Quebec as being an agricultural society, and so has sought the support of village elites. But in 1959 Duplessis dies in his office, and his party loses next elections. This means the end of one epoch, and the beginning of another.

**Beginning reforms: the Quiet Revolution**

In the early 1960s Quebec is quickly changing its political habits. The new government tries to put an end to dishonest election practices, and implements a reform on the financing of political parties. Moreover, a Commission on the ethics of government spending (Commission sur la moralité dans les dépenses publiques) is created, and a serious fight against nepotism is started. Revolutionary changes take place. The term ‘Quiet Revolution’ is invented by a

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2 See Pelletier, 1983.
Toronto daily, *The Globe and Mail.* It catches on immediately, and everyone accepts it. The Quiet Revolution denotes the structural changes and reforms that Quebec society had to undergo.

The word ‘revolution’ implies quick changes, a break with the legitimacy of the past and an attempt to create something fundamentally new: a new form of legitimacy, for instance. Revolutionary processes often pass through periods of violence or wars. By contrast, ‘reforms’ imply slower changes that do not overturn the legitimacy of existing order and that aim at changing things for the better (from the reformers’ point of view, of course).

Reformatory and revolutionary consequences must be consolidated in the legislature. Revolutions often replace one legislature with another, an existing constitution with a completely new one, creating a new level of citizen/government relations. It is different with reforms: they are introduced and passed within the framework of an existing legislature and bring necessary changes to it. But both reforms and revolutions are aimed at the future. They are based on the project of progress, and not on any idea of regression, or return to the past. Therefore, revolutions and reforms start from criticizing the existing state of things, and hold as their ultimate goal a new social contract (Rocher, 2002, p. 31)

Reforms and revolutions have many creators: somebody plans them, somebody propagates the ideas, and somebody brings them to life. But historic memory tends to focus only on the names of the charismatic leaders. Jean Lesage, Quebec’s Premier from July 1960 to August 1966, is seen as the main architect of the Quiet Revolution. This leader of the Liberal Party of Quebec was a very conservative politician who often disagreed with the ideas of his inner circle. An example of this is the nationalization of Quebec’s electricity system, which became one the symbols of the Quiet Revolution. But Lesage was an intelligent and experienced politician who was able to unite people in such a complicated process as the reform of the province, where the most important issue was making use of the positive experience of the past.

The new government found itself confronted with the serious and complicated task of creating a new social project for a young society. Young in the literal sense of the word: this society basically consisted of the off-spring of the baby-boom, people born after the

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3 See [www.theglobeandmail.com/](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/)

Second World War – young, energetic and far from being highly educated. Hence, the Quiet Revolution can be seen as a complex of social reforms, with reform of the educational system in first place. It brought serious and long-term changes to Quebec life and changed it from above – not just the educational system, but the social substance of the province as well.

Reform of the system of education was not just a main theme; it was also one of the symbols of the Quiet Revolution. ‘The question of education is a question of life or death’ – the writer Jacques Brillant constantly repeated (Brillant, 1968, p. 32). And he continued: ‘do not reduce the government’s role of a supervisor. The first obligation of a 20th century state is to inform, lead, and develop, in other words: to give without taking’ (ibid., p. 135). As a result, this sector, so important for modernization and for the province’s future, passed from the control of the Church to State control. The slogan ‘those who are educated will prosper’ (Qui s’instruit s’enrichit) became increasingly popular. The aim of the reforms was secularization of education and opening it for the poorest of the population and for women. In practice, this meant French Canadians – since they were the poorest. All levels of education were reformed, the secondary schools in particular. The government created a system of colleges, and the universities also flourished. Université du Québec – the State University of Quebec – was established; with branches in seven of the big cities in the province it was to become a main centre of innovation. From 1960 to 1970, the number of students in Quebec grew from 22,000 to 72,000, and budgetary expenses for education were raised from 181 million to 1 thousand million Canadian dollars.

Sharp criticism of the past and the desire to find new identities in a new era even brought about a name change – French Canadians become Québécois (notice that even this word is written and pronounced à la française). The slogan ‘We can’ (On est capable) was indeed a cry from the soul: a desire to believe that new generation of Québécois were capable of achievements.

Our understanding of the Quiet Revolution cannot be complete without taking into account the strong influence of the state – a normal phenomenon in the 1960s. The reform of the Quebec economy, in particular the nationalization of the company Hydro-Quebec (responsible for the production and distribution of gas and electricity in the province), became a manifestation of the politico-economic projects ‘Masters in our own homes’ (Maîtres chez nous) and ‘a

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5 CÉGEPs: Collège d’éducation générale et professionnelle
Strong Quebec’ (*Québec fort*). These were projects of economic nationalism – the government that created the Quiet Revolution was not just reformist, but also nationalist. At this stage, Quebec established several important state financial institutions. At that time, we should recall, there was widespread social consensus that state intervention was a necessary step in modernization and an answer to the demands of modern times. Planning and state interventions were not unique to Quebec.

The women of Quebec became equal members of society, and took up university studies. The practices of the Quiet Revolution led the way, and legislation followed. The first female parliamentarian was elected to the National Assembly of Quebec in 1961, but she did not have the right to lease an apartment (See Kirkland-Casgrain, 1976, pp. 47 and 99–103). This right was accorded only in 1964, when the necessary law was adopted, putting an end to juridical inequality between men and unmarried women, and giving married women the right to hold property and to make their own testaments.

Reforming the social services took more time, but gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s. With the reform of the health system, the provincial government took on many new functions that neither the Catholic Church nor the federal government had previously had. State services were reformed as well. Young university graduates were selected to government work on the basis of merit and competition, and effective bureaucracy replaced paternalistic relations, under the new criteria of professionalism, democracy and transparency.

The reform of Quebec’s professional system also got underway. A special State Commission had studied the situation and advised reform in all sectors. In 1974, the National Assembly of Quebec adopted the Professional Code and initiated the emergence of a modern, professional system. The Professional Code is a law that regulates professional activities, government competence, and autonomy of the professions, self-government, and most importantly – its de-ontological status. The Office of Professions — a state supervisory organism was created at the same time. Under this new system, the State ratifies professional orders – of advocates, notaries, physicians, translators and so on – and delegates to them public protection7 as the main mandate. Professional orders regulate

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6 Office des professions du Québec, at: http://www.opq.gouv.qc.ca/index.html#  
their members’ actions and observe these actions, while maintaining responsibility for the quality of services rendered. This implies that the responsibility for the actions of each professional is put on the whole legal order – and this commits the members of these orders not to violate their professional prerogatives. Thus, for example, the Order of Physicians protects the people, and not the physicians themselves, from the unprofessional deeds of its members. The public is protected from bad and inept doctors, lawyers, etc.

The protection of the population as the main mandate of Quebec’s professional system is based on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. More precisely: ‘all human beings are equal in worth and dignity, and are entitled to equal protection of the law; respect for the dignity of the human being and recognition of his rights and freedoms constitute the foundation of justice and peace’.8

The rapid socio-economic modernization of Quebec was followed by constant dialogue with the federal centre in Ottawa. Representative offices of Quebecois abroad are created. In 1967 an international exhibition – ‘Expo-67’ – was held in Montreal, and the world learned about Quebec and Montreal. Quebec, in turn, learned about the world. (One newspaper headline from that time: ‘Montreal Is the Capital of the World’.) Preparations for the exhibition involved creating thousands of workplaces, and thousands of tourists and visitors were attracted. The new era required new means of communications, so television became another symbol of the modernization of Quebec.

Conclusion

Even this short summary of the reforms of the Quiet Revolution is impressive. However, all reforms are costly: in six years, Quebec – the province with the lowest debt and the lowest taxes in Canada – became the province with the largest debt and the highest taxes.9 Some researches even say that reforms were possible due to the strained provincial budget left after the widely criticized Duplessis. But does that diminish the value of transformations, and is this the price of Quebec’s modernization? Was the baby thrown out

with the bathwater in this fight against the pressure of the Catholic Church? There is no more pressure, churches are empty – but has the new worldly society with its new moral norms become less hypocritical?

The talented Canadian cinema director Denis Arcan examines these problematic social questions in all his works. He could be called the engaged chronicler of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution. Arcan entered the scene in 1963 with documental films on the province of Quebec and Montreal, and made movies about the Duplessis époque and the referendum of 1981. He gained fame through his trilogy of feature films on the change of social orientations, social roles and moral values after the Quiet Revolution. And when the offspring of the baby-boom, the Revolution’s most active participants, started retreating, Arcan filmed an ironic comedy, the ‘Barbarian invasions’. The ‘Barbarians’ are the children of Quiet Revolutionaries, and this is a story of what are they doing in a transformed society. They perceive the world through the monitor’s screen; they use their parents’ acquisitions and suffer from their mistakes. They are different, with different views, social and moral orientations. And they are ready to change the world once again – in line with a new model.

Disputes on the Quiet Revolution persist, even today. But one fact is beyond doubt – this revolution proved that consensus between the elite and society is possible, and can lead to results. Clearly, consensus is the most productive basis for reforms. In the case of Quebec, effective instruments were created for anti-corruption processes, the public level of understanding of the social processes was enhanced, and a basis for civil society was formed.

Does Ukraine need this experience – a tale of progressive achievements and inescapable mistakes? The question is a rhetorical one, of course. What Ukraine definitely needs is a clear project for social development and its mechanisms. And, importantly, Ukraine also needs a consensus between elite and society, if it is to be able to realize its Orange aspirations and hopes

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11 ‘Quebec: Duplessis et apres’, 1971
Introduction

After the most recent round of EU enlargement to the East, challenges of European integration have ceased to be a topic of mainly abstract and theoretical debate and partisan/ideological controversies in Ukraine. For the first time in its modern history, our country has this powerful structure as its neighbour, but this status of merely being a neighbour does not satisfy the European aspirations and geopolitical ambitions of Ukraine: now the aim is full integration into the European Union. However, the new wave of enlargement has revealed contradictions and tensions within the EU. Indeed, the price seemed too high for many citizens of ‘Old Europe’, which thwarted ratification of the EU Constitution.

The Orange Revolution has changed the predominantly supercilious and indifferent attitude of Western Europeans to Ukraine, and aroused interest in the civil and political transformations under way in our country. However, this changed attitude may prove situational and ephemeral if the democratic intentions of the new government fail, and if Ukraine’s foreign policy initiatives find no active support on the part of the international community and European structures. Despite the ‘warmer’ rhetoric presented by Eurocrats and leaders of EU member-states, Ukraine’s claims for EU accession have not been recognized by Brussels at the official level. Of all the coordinating bodies of the EU, only the European Parliament has indicated that Ukraine might possibly advance to EU membership at the beginning of 2005.

Despite the signing in February 2005 of an updated version of
the Ukraine–EU Action Plan for 2005-2007,¹ bilateral relations continue to be grounded on the new neighbourhood policy, in accordance with the concept of ‘Wider Europe’.² One of the premises of this concept is that the perspective of membership for neighbour states of the EU lies beyond the scope of this policy.

However, even in the absence of clear signals from Brussels, the factor of neighbourhood with the EU has influenced the further development of our country, first and foremost its border areas. In particular the regions of Western Ukraine have become aware of both the advantages and the challenges of this neighbourhood.

Precisely these regions are distinguished by certain socio-political and in some cases ethno-cultural peculiarities. These features are deeply rooted in history and have had a significant influence on public opinion in Western Ukraine as far as perspectives on Ukraine’s European integration are concerned. Moreover, as national and regional sociological surveys have revealed, there has been a clear tendency for highest support for the EU and NATO, as well as for European and Euro-Atlantic values, among Western Ukrainians. This region is the most pro-European in the country, and its citizens see Ukraine as an inalienable part of Europe. Therefore, and since this historical region was an ideological centre of the state-building efforts of Ukrainians, it would be logical to expect these regions to provide a guiding moral and political stance regarding Ukraine’s closer cooperation with and later accession to the EU.

In this article, I would like to focus on the civil position of Western Ukrainians on some important issues of the country’s geopolitical choices, and their attitudes to Ukraine’s integration into the EU. We will also touch upon problems concerning the popular understanding of the complicated and comprehensive tasks that will need to be solved by the citizenry and public institutions if the goal of EU accession is to be achieved.

Ukraine’s Western Regions: The idea of Europe
The European orientation of Western Ukrainians is deeply rooted in history. Deprived for centuries of their own state, these territories for a long time belonged to countries that were part of Europe not only in geographical but also in political, religious, cultural and civilizational terms. At various times, these ethnic Ukrainian territories belonged to the Hungarian and Polish states, and later to the Habsburg Empire, etc. This protracted historical experience resulted in close cooperation between these territories and other European regions and countries, and assured the local residents of their European descent and European identity.

This experience not only influenced the mindset of Western Ukrainians, it also resulted in a higher level of political culture as compared with other Ukrainians, who belonged for a long time to the Russian Empire and the USSR. Its manifestations included active participation in such institutions of civil society as political parties and ethno-cultural associations, as well as certain elements of parliamentary democracy and traditions of political pluralism which could not be totally uprooted during the Soviet era. The viability of these patterns was confirmed by their revival on the regional level during the late ‘Gorbachev era’ and even more so after Ukraine gained independence in 1991.

The regional, national and other forms of identity of the local population, especially Ukrainian intellectuals, included a European component which survived the historically negligible Soviet period. Since then, most Ukrainians have cherished a national idea that has been inseparable from the European idea, and the future of Ukraine as an independent, democratic, just and social state has been conceived as a part of United Europe.

The political and economic transformations, national renaissance and democratic changes which rolled over the countries of the Socialist bloc in the late 1980s struck a chord with the population of Western Ukraine. This region became a hotbed for grassroots mass movements and later political parties – all striving for Ukrainian independence, which was seen as an important step towards accomplishing the goal of returning to Europe.

The geographical proximity of former socialist countries where democratic changes were well under way, and the familiarization with life experiences of neighbouring nations in the period of post-communist transformation through intensive cooperation, has served as an informal channel of acquiring knowledge about these countries’ preparation for integration into the EU. Mass la-
bour migration and private business initiatives have contributed to diffusion of knowledge. This exchange has enabled Western Ukrainians to compare Ukrainian and Central European realities and make inferences about the positive correlation of economic and social transformations and prospects for EU accession. At the same time, cooperation between Western Ukrainians and Central Europeans has helped the former to disseminate pro-European views and attitudes.

The difficulties experienced by the nascent Ukrainian state through the return of the nomenklatura and authoritarian tendencies of political development during Leonid Kuchma’s presidency reinforced the geopolitical and civilizational preferences of the local population in favour of integrating with Europe. Western Ukrainians felt encouraged by the examples of neighbouring Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and, later, Romania. These countries managed to overcome the social, economic and political crises of post-communist transformation, not least due to political consensus on the ‘European’ model of foreign and domestic policy. Western Ukrainians expressed solidarity with the path followed by these countries, and deemed it desirable for their own country. The accession of these countries to the EU on 1 May 2004 (despite some complaints and criticism by the citizens of the new member-states) further convinced Western Ukrainians that ‘Eurostandards’ were an attractive model for the social, economic, political and civilizational development of their country as well.

Sociological surveys have shown growing support by the citizens of Western Ukraine for the efforts of the Ukrainian state and certain political groups directed at Ukraine’s integration into the EU. For example, a survey conducted jointly by the Department of Political Science and Sociology of Yuri Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University and the Regional Centre for Professional Development of Civil Servants has revealed a positive dynamics in support of Ukrainian EU membership. In 2000, 54.5% of respondents supported this idea, whereas by 2004 the figure had increased to 70%. (Kurs Ukrainy..., 2002, p. 80).

Similar results have been found in other Western Ukrainian regions. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the overwhelming majority of Western Ukrainians have spoken in favour of Ukraine’s integration into the EU. To the question ‘If a referendum on Ukraine’s EU accession were held this Sunday, would you support it?’, 77.8% of those surveyed in Ternopil and 76.5% of those in Ivano-Frankivsk said ‘yes’. In comparison, support for
European integration was 53% in Kharkiv and 56% in Kherson. On the national level, the average figure was 54.1%. According to a similar survey conducted earlier, by the end of 2004, some 47.9% of all respondents in Ukraine supported EU accession (Ukrainske suspilstvo, 2004, p. 18).

**Tendencies after the Orange Revolution**

Subsequent to the victory of democratic forces in Ukraine, the policy of a ‘single vector’, and the numerous promises to accelerate Ukraine’s European integration made by President Victor Yushchenko served to incite hopes and reinforce the positions of Ukrainian ‘Euro-enthusiasts’. However, it remains to be seen whether these promises have been realistic and trustworthy. Taking into account the waning trust of the population in the new government, it is seems likely that there will be weakened support for European slogans as well. European aspirations have been increasingly perceived as declarative and without content, as happened before with Leonid Kuchma’s ‘Integration Path’, declared a strategic objective for Ukraine in 1999.

Among other benefits of possible integration with the EU, researchers have emphasized Ukrainians’ interest in free movement within the EU, development of democratic society, ensuring human rights, stability, and the economic and political security of Ukrainian citizens. The figures for Chernivtsi oblast indicate that only 37.1% of the respondents have a positive view on welfare growth in the region, while 42.06% are hesitant. At the same time, these respondents cherish hopes that EU integration will help Ukraine to attract foreign investors (56.17%), revive national industry (45.74%), promote human rights and establish the country as a European nation. Such a high level of normative and ideational expectations as contrasted with pragmatic and material interests cannot but encourage the researcher, as it testifies to the political maturity of Ukrainians.

However, the fact that many respondents could not express their

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position on possible consequences of Ukrainian EU membership, or could not formulate it even when offered choices, is alarming. To the question ‘How will your life change if Ukraine joins the EU?’, the majority of respondents replied that there would be no changes (35.32%) or could not answer (34.56%). Only 26.18% expected changes for the better; the lowest percentage of respondents were pessimistic and answered that life would get worse (3.81%) (Kurs Ukrainsy… 2002, pp. 80–81). To some extent, greater enthusiasm about the perspective of EU accession is caused by relatively new factors that have an impact on public opinion. Among these is the advancement of cross-border cooperation, in which many residents of the border areas are involved. Additional expectations derive from opportunities offered by the new Euro-regions which have recently emerged in Western Ukraine, such as ‘Upper Prut’, ‘Bug’ and ‘Lower Danube’.

Information about emerging Euro-regions circulated through mass media has been accompanied by assumptions that the border regions will benefit significantly from cross-border cooperation, while greater border transparency will contribute to intensify human contacts as well as increased business activity between cross-border partners. This dynamics leads to a revitalized economic development of the generally backward border territories, reducing unemployment and increasing people’s welfare. It is natural that such promises have nourished the hopes and expectations of citizens within the newly formed Euro-regions. The latter, even under quite unfavourable circumstance – mostly brought about by Ukrainian bureaucrats (see Fisano, 2004, pp. 380–385) – are still a reservoir of new European opportunities and a channel of diffusion of positive experience accumulated by EU member-states. The problem is that this useful resource has remained only a potential for development, and not an achievement of the Western Ukrainian border regions.

Mass labour migration is another factor that has convinced Western Ukrainians of the potential benefits from the European vector in Ukraine’s foreign policy. Unlike the Eastern and Southern parts of the country, which have also experienced mass cross-border labour migration, Western Ukrainians have been mostly oriented not toward Russia or some other CIS country, but toward various EU member-states. Western Ukrainian guest workers who have worked in EU countries for a long time help their fellow citizens to form positive attitudes to the perspective of integrating Ukraine into the EU. Besides their familiarity with the traditions and culture of Western European countries, guest workers also demonstrate the
advantages of EU membership to other Ukrainians through their wages, which contribute significantly to their families’ welfare. These payments have a greater impact on public consciousness than the counter-propaganda efforts of certain national political forces and mass media which actively employed anti-European and anti-Western rhetoric during the 2004 presidential campaign.

At the same time, the role of the ‘migrant factor’ should not be exaggerated. Many guest workers leave Ukraine because of hardships in their own country and experience numerous problems and difficulties when they arrive in their country of destination. What they learn about EU countries is often quite specific, as their illegal status does not enable them to become familiar with the normative and legal mechanisms of European integration, or understand the peculiarities of the Western lifestyle in a balanced way. In reality, they more often ‘learn’ to benefit from loopholes in the Western European legislation. Cases of their cooperation with European ‘shadow economy’ sectors and even criminal structures which eagerly reach out to cover illegal migrants are widespread (Kruglashov, 2005a, pp. 35–36). Therefore, the serious researcher should be selective and balanced in assessing the social and cultural contribution of Ukrainian labour migrants to forming views of the EU among their fellow citizens.

Despite such ambiguous trends, as well as a the long-term absence of centralized efforts on the part of both national and local authorities directed at disseminating information about the EU, its policies with regard to Ukraine, and Ukrainian policies with regard to the EU, Western Ukrainians have obstinately expressed positive views towards the EU and the objective of Ukraine’s accession. Moreover, they have demonstrated surprisingly high, even if somewhat futile, levels of expectations concerning for Ukraine’s prospects of joining the EU.

Along with such encouraging foreign-policy preferences of the local population, we should not overlook certain negative aspects as far as Western Ukrainians’ comprehension of the process of European integration in the region is concerned. In particular, many people are not well-informed concerning the general features and content of the integration process, the situation within the EU after the third wave of enlargement, and debates about the future of the organization. The majority of the Western Ukrainian population is totally unaware of the EU’s Eastern policies and Ukraine’s policies with regard to Europe. Between 60% and 80% of survey respondents from various parts of Western Ukraine realize and admit their
ignorance of EU activities and policies. This regrettable situation is somewhat counterbalanced by a high demand for such information. Respondents in Chernivtsi oblast replied that they wanted to know more about Ukraine–EU relations (69.25%), as well as the EU’s main objectives and activities (59.34%), etc. Over two-thirds of respondents said they would prefer to acquire this information from public mass media, and to a lesser extent from local television (12.58%) (Kurs Ukrainy..., 2002, p. 82).

Unfortunately, Ukrainian public officials have largely ignored not only the general principles of European integration, but also relevant decrees and other important documents signed by ex-President Kuchma, including the Decree on Circulation of Information about European Integration among the Ukrainian Population. Nor have there been any drastic changes in the level of ‘EU literacy’ among citizens of our country, including Western Ukrainians, after the presidential elections of 2004.

In the absence of up-to-date information about the EU, which Ukrainians expect to receive from central mass media and educational institutions, public attitudes to the EU and Ukraine’s integration prospects have been largely distorted and mythologized. This is not to say that the EU and our country’s integration aspirations have been completely misperceived. Most probably, ordinary Ukrainians intuitively understand that the EU has faced multiple challenges at the modern stage of its development, and especially after its 2004 enlargement. They equally realize Ukraine’s difficulties in implementing conditions before further negotiations on accession can be conducted. However, this understanding relies on episodic and fragmented knowledge that does not reflect the real dynamics of European integration. Against the post-communist backdrop, the EU is often imagined by the Ukrainian population as a ‘paradise on Earth’ or ‘a promised land’. Such misperceptions enable certain political actors who favour the European vector of Ukraine’s development to juggle with the image of United Europe in the system of popularized political myths.

At the same time, their opponents may question the population’s positive assessments of the EU and its policies, given their insufficient and superficial knowledge of the organization. This was precisely the case in 2004, when political campaigning on television and publications in Ukrainian newspapers were crammed with anti-EU slogans, negative evaluations of the third wave of enlargement and ‘natural’ deep frustrations about the outcomes of integration among the new member-states. (See Kruglashov, 2005b, p. 123).

The institutions of civil society have been not managed to fill up
the gaps either. Although most national and regional NGOs have declared their readiness to participate in the European integration processes, they have generally lacked the human and material resources for implementing this objective. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, many Western Ukrainian NGOs have organized civil associations (coalitions) of NGOs, anticipating Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Such associations have emerged in Rivne and Chernivtsi oblast, for instance. Praiseworthy as such initiatives may be, they are destined to a ‘muddling-through’ existence, as a result of insufficient funding (even in the case of large-scale cutting-edge initiatives) and lack of technical assistance from central and local authorities. This has made Western Ukrainian NGOs dependent on European foundations and structures. It is noteworthy that European funding of Ukrainian initiatives has increased recently, although it is obviously insufficient, in view of the growing demand for educational workshops and training sessions in the regions.

The new Ukrainian authorities in the capital as well as in the regions should be more attentive to the needs of regional ‘Euro-integrators’. That said, it is unrealistic to expect positive changes in this respect – even under favourable conditions – before the electoral cycle of 2004–2006 has finished. Unless the resource limitations experienced by Ukrainian NGOs can be overcome, and communication improved between government and civil society, it is difficult to imagine a consolidation of the Ukrainian people on the grounds of a common European identity and conscious support for the country’s European choice.

Another important aspect of European integration is its positive impact on the development of ethnic communities in some regions of Western Ukraine, in particular the Trans-Carpathian and Chernivtsi oblasts, although ethno-cultural diversity is characteristic of both Western Ukrainian regions and Ukraine in general. Some sociological surveys have indicated that the prospect of Ukraine’s integration into the EU has had a positive influence on hopes and expectations among leading ethnic communities in the region. The process of European integration has been positively assessed by both the Ukrainian and the Romanian communities, which are the two leading ethno-cultural groups in Chernivtsi oblast. Both ethnic

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Ukrainians and Romanians have supported Ukrainian EU accession, even if this will come later than Romania’s accession.

Conclusion
The stabilizing impact of joint European integration initiatives requires further empirical investigation. Nevertheless, the current available information is sufficient to argue that today, as the Ukrainian political nation is being forged, the European idea serves as a common denominator that promises a brighter and more decent future for Ukrainian citizens of diverse ethnic origins, and consolidates ethnic communities in the periphery and in Ukraine more generally. As such, this idea may facilitate the development of civil society in Ukraine, its further democratization, and accelerate internalization of the values and principles of United Europe by its various groups and strata.

Naturally, this observation concerns primarily those ethnic communities of Ukraine whose kin states have already become members of the EU or will join soon – Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanians who live in Ukraine. By contrast, representatives of the Russian community in Chernivtsi oblast have been more cautious or sceptical with regard to Ukraine’s EU integration. In this, they probably share the views of the population of the Russian Federation, fearing that Ukrainian EU membership would lead to their isolation from the ethnic motherland. Such fears should not be overlooked by public officials. At the same time, the many ethno-political aspects of Ukraine’s integration course require further investigation.

In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize that our society in general, and Western Ukrainians in particular, have increasingly realized not only the desirability but also the importance of implementing our country’s strategic objective of joining the European Union. Ukraine’s integration aspirations may be more constructive, and this dynamics depends on certain conditions. In particular, the Ukrainian government should be more consistent in its foreign and domestic policy concerning the goal of EU accession; it should introduce changes to national legislation in accordance with EU accession criteria; ensure genuine democratic decentralization of power and assistance to closer horizontal cooperation of Western Ukrainians and residents of other regions, including the implementation of joint Ukraine–EU initiatives. These improvements would then be followed by growing support of the government’s efforts on the part of the Ukrainian population.
Administrative-Territorial Reform in Ukraine
The Example of the Mykolyiv Region

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Introduction
Following the Orange Revolution and the inauguration of Victor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine, the reform process has intensified. Highest priority has been given to outlining an administrative-territorial reform, on the initiative of Vice Prime Minister Roman Bezsmertny. In April 2005, preparations for the reform process were initiated with a discussion of the bill ‘On the territorial organization of Ukraine’. This bill deals with the concepts and bases of the territorial organization of the country, the legal status of its administrative-territorial districts, as well as the system of decision-making between state authorities and organs of local self-government on matters concerning territorial organization.¹

In April and May 2005, regional discussions of the bill took place in Lugansk, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk and Vinnitsia, with the participation of Vice Prime Minister Bezsmertny. He made it clear that the purpose of reforming the state administration and the territorial organization is to enhance the quality and quantity of public services offered at all levels of administration. The main priority of the authorities must be to secure all the needs of the people, and the authorities will be granted the necessary powers for effective realization of the functions allotted to them.

In the course of the reform process, the country’s legislation will have to be changed in accordance with the European Charter on local self-government, which has been ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament. It is indicated in the Charter that the organs of local self-government provide effective administration close to the citizens,

and further ensure their involvement in state affairs – which is one of the fundamental democratic principles. The application of the Charter, together with a European standard of administrative-territorial state organization, is a necessary condition for Ukraine’s integration into the international community, in particular, membership of the European Union.²

During the discussions attention was paid to the fundamentals of administrative-territorial organization: a juridical system of state division, with state and local administrations fulfilling their functions according to this division.³ Further, experts held that the reformation of the administrative-territorial organization must be based on certain principles which can assist in bettering the quality of life, improving public services and developing local self-government. The reform should result in an administrative-territorial organization that is – in geographical terms – general, proportional, compact, available, successive, mutually supplemented, flexible, adaptive, and self-regulated.

Critical remarks to the new territorial organization

Political scientists have also pointed out some contradictions in the terminology of ‘administrative-territorial districts’. In accordance with article 133 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the administrative-territorial organization comprises the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as the regions, districts, cities, city districts, settlements and villages of the country.⁴ Comparing the provisions of the Constitution with actual implementation of the administrative-territorial organization, we notice some contradictions.

• First, city councils, village councils and settlement councils are not included in the list of administrative-territorial districts in the Constitution.
• Second, the list includes actual administrative-territorial districts (regions and districts), but also administrative-territorial districts that are in fact settlements (cities, towns and villages).

² Volya 2005, April, No 5–6; Material from the public discussions of the bill ‘Pro terytorialniy ustrij Ukrayiny’, Kiev, 2005, p. 29.
⁴ Material from the public discussions of the bill ‘Pro terytorialnyi ustrij Ukrayiny’, 2005, p. 29.
As a result, there is some confusion over the definitions of ‘an administrative-territorial district’ and ‘a settlement’.

- Third, there is no mentioned of the lowest level of administrative-territorial districts, so village councils and settlement councils in fact violate the principle of ‘general territories’. As a result, certain territories that lie beyond villages and settlements do not officially belong to any administrative-territorial district.

Actual implementation of the country’s administrative-territorial organization involves an unregulated hierarchical structure with four levels. The state provides each of the described administrative-territorial districts with proper plenary powers in the field of state administration, and the districts also execute certain functions of self-government. However, the system is rife with inaccuracies and contradictions. For example, an administrative-territorial district – like a city district, village council or a settlement council – can belong both to the third and the fourth level of the organizational hierarchy. The absence of the lowest level and the overlap between administrative-territorial districts of the third and fourth level in the organization horizontally complicate the administrative-territorial system. This problem is especially acute for city administrative-territorial districts which contain another administrative-territorial district within their boundaries that is not a single territorial community. Primarily, this is the case for 64 city regions which altogether have 202 other administrative-territorial districts on their territories, with their own organs of local self-government.

According to the initiators of the administrative reform, the current system constitutes the greatest obstacle to effective socio-economic transformations. It gives an imbalance to the financial sphere and hinders the development of effective public services. The present division of the administration does not follow the principles of financial expedience, and leads to substantial socio-economic and territorial imbalances.\(^5\)

Other imbalances have also been criticized, primarily related to the number of administrative-territorial districts at every level in the hierarchy and the population size of settlements of the same type. A new three-level system of administrative-territorial organization, based on the Polish model, has therefore been proposed, as shown in the figure (p. 162).

The proposed model of organization will create large admin-

\(^5\) Ibid.
istructive-territorial districts at the lowest level, according to the principle of general local self-government, providing a clear delimitation of the territory of communities. It will also enable implementation of a three-level territorial system of power (community–district–region) and a definition of the jurisdiction of the administrative-territorial districts at all levels. The implementation of such a model will dismantle the state administrations at the local and district levels, transferring their functions to the organs of local self-government – in accordance with the European Charter on local self-government. Further, such a system of administration will lead to changes in the distribution of plenary powers between the organs of the executive power and the organs of local self-government.

Advocates of such reforms argue that this new administrative-territorial organization will enable the structures at each level to fulfil their obligations of providing the necessary public services. Such an administrative-territorial reform should transform Ukraine from a centralized state to a decentralized European country consisting of self-governing communities. Such changes are planned in each region, including our case in point here: Mykolayiv region.

The Mykolayiv region: Territorial system
Mykolayiv region was established on 22 September 1937. It is situated in southern Ukraine, at the lower part of the Pivdennyi Buh River. It comprises 24,600 square km, and has a population of 1,229,500.

Some 557,900 persons live in 19 districts with

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6 Ibid.
7 Here the editors have used their formal prerogative to remove a rather large listing of various prerogatives to make the article more readable (eds remark).
8 These data and further statistical information about Mykolayiv region are taken from a booklet prepared by the Main regional office of statistics. Administratyvno-territorialnyj ustrij Mykolayivskoji oblasti, 2005, p. 2.
populations as follows:
• less than 40 thousand – 17 districts;
• 40–49 thousand – 1 district;
• 50 thousand and more – 1 district.

Zhovtnevy district has the largest population (53,200 inhabitants), while Ochakivsky district has the smallest population (16,500 inhabitants).

Some 728,700 persons live in nine cities, with populations as follows:

• less than 20 thousand – 5 cities;
• 20–49.9 thousand – 2 cities;
• 50–99.9 thousand – 1 city;
• 100 thousand or more – 1 city.

The city with the largest population is Mykolayiv (509,000 inhabitants), while Bashtanka has the smallest population (12,800 inhabitants).

Some 93,200 persons live in 17 urban-type settlements:

• less than 3 thousand – 3;
• 3–4.9 thousand – 4;
• 5–8.9 thousand – 9;
• 9.0 thousand or more – 1.

The largest urban-type settlement is Vradiivka (9,400 inhabitants), while as the smallest is Kudryavtsivka (2,100 inhabitants).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Territory (km²)</th>
<th>Present population (in thousand)</th>
<th>Density (pr km²)</th>
<th>Urban-type settlements</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mykolayiv</td>
<td>259.8</td>
<td>509.5</td>
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<td>40.0</td>
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<td>38.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ochakiv</td>
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<td>15.6</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbuzinsky</td>
<td>968.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashtansky</td>
<td>1,706.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berezensky</td>
<td>1,378.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berezneguvalsky</td>
<td>1,263.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As we can see, there are some disproportions between territorial indexes and the number of inhabitants in settlements. These imbalances were also pointed out by the vice-chairman of the Mykolayiv regional state administration in an interview with a local newspaper (Vojnalovych, 2005). In particular, he emphasized the disproportions concerning districts in Mykolayiv region. Vradiivsky and Krivoozersky districts have the lowest indexes, and Bashtansky and

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9 The average population of an urban-type settlement is 5,500.
Ochakivsky districts have the highest – in fact, Bashtansky district is more than twice as large as Vradiivsky district. These imbalances are also reflected in population size: for instance, the population of Zhovtnevy district is more than three times greater than that of Ochakivsky district.

The average size of the population under the administration of village councils and settlements councils also differs considerably: from 1,257.8 persons in Bratsky district to 2,536.4 persons in Novobuzsky district – more than twice as many. Nationwide, the average population in village councils is 1,800 persons.

There are also considerable differences in the number of administrative units in the districts of the region. For example, there are 22 administrative units in Pervomaisky, but only 11 in Ochakivsky district.

The district index of the number of various types of settlements is highly disproportionate, and indicates imperfections in the system of administrative-territorial divisions at the level of administrative

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10 According to the Population Census of Ukraine 05 December 2001. The average popula-
links. Kazankivsky district contains 73 settlements, while Krivoozersky contains only 27. The average number of settlements under the rule of village settlement councils also varies greatly: from 4.5 in Novobuzky and Domanivsky districts to 1.7 in Krivoozersky district. The average number of settlements under the administration of village councils is 2.5.

The distance from the district centre to the regional centre also varies from region to region: in Novoodesky district the distance is 44 km, while in Krivoozersky district it is a full 223 km.

**The three-level model for Mykolayiv**

Mykolayiv region has its special features, as does each region. According to the reform bill, it is necessary to merge a number of settlements into communities based on a new territorial organization, each with a population of no less than five thousand persons. By contrast, today there are 304 village councils and settlement councils in the region, but only 14 of them have a population greater than five thousand.\(^{11}\)

The same goes for districts. The reform bill sets the minimum population of districts and city-districts at 70 thousand. In the Mykolayiv region there exists no district of such a size, the closest being Pervomaysk, with a population of 68,700. It is therefore necessary to consider the features of the administrative-territorial organization in every district, such as population density, average number of settlements placed under a village council, and distance from the community to the administrative centre. If the figures are considerably higher or lower than the nationwide average, there is a need to reform the administrative-territorial units according to these indexes.

How did the Mykolayiv political and municipal management and the leaders of its regional, district, city and settlement organizations react to the reform bill? By order of the head of the regional state administration, a working group was created to prepare implementation of the administrative-territorial reform, and inform the population about the process.\(^{12}\) The working group consists of 24

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11 Among the remainder, there are four councils with a population between four and five thousand, ten councils with a population between 3.5 and 4 thousand, 19 councils with a population between 2.5 and 3 thousand, 34 councils with a population between 2 and 2.5 thousand, and 31 councils with a population between 1.5 to 2 thousand.

12 22 April 2005, № 108| ‘On the creation|making| of a working group for preparation of the implementation of administrative-territorial reform’. 

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persons, headed by V. Vojnalovych, vice-chairman of the regional state administration responsible for political, legal and humanitarian questions. Vice-chairman of the working group is L. Nechushkina, chief of the administration office responsible for internal policy of the regional state administration. Other members of the group include the director of the Mykolayiv Institute of Agriculture, the heads of the regional administration of land resources, of economy, of financial administration, of municipal economy, and of city planning and architecture, as well as researchers and representatives of the organs of local self-government.13

The members of the working group organized public discussions on administrative-territorial reform in Mykolayiv, and also participated actively in district and regional discussions conducted at business enterprises, in communities and organizations. Protocols from these public discussions testify that delegations from all districts and cities of the region took part in the events. A total of 766 persons were present, including them 89 representatives from the executive power, 450 from organs of local self-government, 24 from scientific organizations, 68 from political parties, 54 from NGOs, 35 from the mass media, and 46 from other organizations. There were held 22 public discussions in districts and cities, in which 4,032 persons took part. Among the participants there were 439 representatives of the executive power, 1,046 from organs of local self-government, 18 from scientific organizations, 310 from political parties, 295 from NGOs, 66 from the mass media, and 1,858 representatives from other organizations. As a result, 19 resolutions were adopted, 18 of which supported the administrative-territorial reform, and one rejected it. Resolutions were not adopted in three districts.14

In addition, members of the regional working group prepared materials for both specialists and the public. These materials deal with the conceptual bases for reforming the local self-government and territorial organization, the plenary powers of communities, district councils, regional councils and regional state administrations, improvement of budgetary legislation in the context of the reform, features of the administrative-territorial organization of Mykolayiv region, and so on.15 Public information campaigns were

13 www.mykolayiv-oda.ooa.ua (Web page on ‘Administrative-territorial reform’).
14 Information on the work of the Mykolayiv region working group concerning the preparation of implementation of the administrative-territorial reform. www.mykolayiv-oda.ooa.ua
also organized, aimed at spreading information about the administrative reform in Mykolayiv region. Members of the regional and district working groups addressed 257 collectives, establishments, organizations and educational establishments of region, and the information campaign is estimated to have reached 11,162 persons.

Members of the regional working group attracted the attention of representatives of the local mass media on problems of the administrative reform. On 1 July 2005, journalists from the Mykolayiv press club conducted a meeting where they discussed the substantive features, expedience and timeliness of the reform. As a result, over 180 articles on the subject of administrative reform were published in 26 communal and 12 other journals in the region, as well as nine reports on the TV channel ‘Mykolayiv’, and eight reports on the regional radio ‘Buzka Khvylya’. Furthermore, a 15-minute documentary film was prepared on discussions concerning the reform.\textsuperscript{16}

\section*{Conclusion}

Summing up the first months of discussions of the administrative reform, members of the regional working group formulated recommendations to the bill, addressed to President Victor Yushchenko and the initiator of this administrative-territorial reform, Vice Prime Minister Roman Bezsmertny.\textsuperscript{17} There were formulated general recommendations on the transformation of Ukraine from a super-centralized state to a country with maximal proximity between the authorities and the citizens, so that the populace would be guaranteed the proper scope of public services. Second, some critical remarks were presented on matters to be addressed in the process of changing the Constitution, specifying approximately four hundred laws and more than four thousand by-laws. Third, the working group stressed the necessity of supporting the transition to a three-level system of administrative-territorial organization and municipal management. Further, there were suggestions as to various ways of achieving higher standards of public services in education, health care, culture, physical education, sports, social security, etc. The regional working group also formulated preconditions for

\textsuperscript{16} Information on the work of the Mykolayiv region working group concerning the preparation of implementation of the administrative-territorial reform. www.mykolayiv-oda.ooa.ua

\textsuperscript{17} Suggestions on the bill ‘Pro terytorialnyi ustrij Ukrayiny’ from Mykolayiv region. www.mykolayiv-oda.ooa.ua
the financial support of local self-government, directed towards the central structures of power. One such suggestion involved developing a new method for calculating the normative financing of local communities, with the purpose of improving public services.\textsuperscript{18}

On the basis of experience in other countries, in particular the three-level system of territorial organization in Poland, and analysis of the political discussion on the reform in the centre and in the regions, preparations for a new administrative-territorial organization began in Mykolayiv in September 2005.\textsuperscript{19} New structures were designed for communities in such districts as Bashtansky, Veselinivsky, Domanivsky, Zhovtnevy, Novobuzsky, Mikolaivsky and Snihurivsky. Comparative analysis of the results of this new design has confirmed the possibility of merging communities, reducing the number of village councils and settlement councils, equalizing the number of inhabitants of communities and defining new community centres. However, as yet this work is merely schematic: the proposals are unclear, principles of merging communities not distinctly outlined, and economic indicators are not always used as a basis in the design.

Lack of similar experience and the differences in functioning of communities (as a result of historical, economic, geographical, ethnic and other factors) also impede realization of the administrative-territorial reform, as sociological polls have shown.\textsuperscript{20} And, although the citizens of Mykolayiv region express diverging opinions in such polls, the majority confirm the expedience of the administrative reform. Respondents believe that the reform process will finally be carried out in Ukraine, although they doubt that it can be implemented until after the Parliamentary elections of March 2006 and after the Constitutional reform has been implemented.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\ref{fn:18}] Suggestions of the regional working group on the implementation of the changes in the budgetary and tax laws. www.mykolayiv-oda.ooa.ua
\item[\ref{fn:20}] Vojnalovych, 2005.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Introduction
A worthwhile approach to studying Ukrainian realities after the Orange Revolution is investigating the practical adaptation of society towards strategic priorities, such as European integration and the development of civil society. The former authorities, while stating these ambitions at the level of propaganda slogans, had not engaged in their practical implementation. Concepts like European integration and the development of civil society were used to manipulate the public consciousness. Euro-integration was a myth designed to support the image of Ukraine as an actor on the international scene, rather than being a concrete action programme based on value systems and real priorities.

Why give the Orange Revolution credit for being a watershed? Its specificity as a social phenomenon required not simply effective social innovations, but also a more precise definition of the priorities for the further development of democratization and the introduction of the new democratic values defended on the Maidan.

The Orange Revolution is one of the several bloodless, silent revolutions in the socialist states and the former USSR. Such revolutions involve a powerful national protest against attempts of the previous authoritarian elite to falsify elections and replace processes of radical change by processes that would revive an updated model of authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Such a revolution can also create an opposition, which can become a national symbol of desires for change. As a result, the non-acceptance of the population expressed itself in mass meetings, rather than in powerful protests against specific instances of ignoring and falsifying the national will.
and attempts to fix clan-corporate relations ‘in the name of people’ as the dominant factor of development.

In the wake of these revolutions, new and oppositional leaders have received a real measure of trust from the population for implementing new strategies intended to transform slogans like ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, ‘pluralism’, ‘opposition’, ‘transparency in politics’, ‘civilized market relations’ and ‘system of social protection for the population’ into vibrant norms of public life. Moreover, these leaders have received mass recognition as symbols of future change, honest authority and new opportunities for development and success, not only at the level of state and regions, but also for specific groups and individuals. People have begun to see their own future as dependent on these leaders. For this reason, oppositional leaders and their closest circle of supporters have become, in the eyes of mass-meeting protesters, a personification of the irreversible movement from authoritarianism towards democracy, and guarantors of blocking the use of force from the old authorities and having international support for silent revolutions. By reaching a compromise and refusing to engage in political reprisals after coming to power, the opposition acts as a symbol for the integration of new democracies into the world community, first of all into the EU. The wave of national protest in the form of mass meetings has rapidly transforms oppositional leaders into national leaders who are expected to enhance development, introduce programmes for real change, and solve the many problems that have accumulated in society.

**Elite change**

A crucial component in transforming the oppositional elite into a new brand of authoritative elite is that it actively distances itself from its predecessor. It must be willing to incorporate universal ethical norms into the activity of the authorities, business and society as a whole, thereby introducing a moral criterion for the assessment of its own and its predecessor’s activities.

The risks of a new authority are often connected with the fact that its leaders have not outlined any real national and regional programmes of modernizations and innovations that can be transformed into a chain of direct results within a given time-span. Realities force them to adapt the expectations of the population into more specific programmes of action and a new propaganda strategy to assist the transition from emotional, intuitive expectations of change
to understanding the complexity of reform processes. This involves tangible time-frames and the importance of actively involving all participants of the revolutionary events in work to put the new strategy into practice and to maintain social consensus.

One of the main indicators of the success of a new authoritative leadership is its ability quickly to transform revolutionary slogans into real programmes of change, and then adhere to them during the term in office, realizing them in practice as projects which can provide constructive changes for all strata of the population. With this comes the problem of forming an efficient team arises for the new elite, with the necessity of having enough qualified personnel with high working capacity at the level of top management as well as at the regional level.

A powerful factor in the success of the ‘silent’ revolutions and the creation of new elites has been the active support shown by the world community for these ‘velvet’, ‘pink’, ‘orange’, and other revolutions. This support has appeared in various stages:

- The introduction of negotiating processes for the non-violent, non-forced solution of a political crisis, and the search for consensus, under the patronage of international intermediaries.
- Ensuring transparent and fair elections with the presence of international observers.
- Sharp increase in opportunities for working together to develop a democratic state which will make a return to authoritarianism and totalitarianism impossible. Market relations are the instruments of growth of the well-being of the population, and not a means of reducing standards of living.

Here we are talking about two levels of international support: the recognition of the right of the population to live in a democratic society; and financial and scientific (analytical as well as advisory) support for implementing the projects of the new authorities.

A study of the Orange Revolution would be incomplete without an analysis of the compelled transition of the previous ruling elite to the status of an oppositional force. This is especially pressing if we consider its vast resources for influencing society, and the possibilities of attempted political revenge on the part of:

- the majority in the legislative organs and institutions of local government that kept their positions after the elections;
- the presence of an ‘army’ of bureaucrats in state bodies, a sig-
significant part of whom were appointed on the basis of personal fidelity to the previous leaders;

• The system of controlled mass-media, which were actively used by the previous authorities and which can influence the formation of public consciousness, and even dominate a society at the regional level. This system contributed to the spread of information meant to discredit the new political leadership through charges of a great number of unresolved problems (though these were actually problems inherited from the previous authorities) and the distribution of myths (e.g. about the absence of experts and mass political reprisals);

• Blocking the policies of the new authorities by controlling parts of the official and shadow economy through influence on pricing and possible attraction of workers of private enterprises – as a social protest on the legality of privatization of key objects of state ownership;

• The overall thought patterns and awareness in society: these are influenced by previous standards of education and mass media, and are not characterized by critical thought and the ability to employ SWOT analysis, but rather by slogans and highly-charged emotional expectations of rapid change.

These factors define the theme of this article. The focus of public awareness at the regional level reflects expectations for change, the results of the actions of the new leadership, the readiness for greater trust towards the authorities in the republic of Crimea and the regions, the political forces that are included in the new leadership, and the rating and perceptivity of the opposition (both yesterday’s elite and other political forces, especially latent ones which may unexpectedly enter the political arena, like the Green Party in the parliamentary elections of 1998).

What factors influence the formation of public consciousness in the regions, and what risks define the development of this process in the interval between the Orange Revolution in November 2005 and the parliamentary elections in March 2006?

Civic action against ill-fated decisions
One of most important factors influencing the development of public consciousness in the regions has been the practice of public action to protect the interests of the community against wrongful decisions of the previous authorities. It was on the basis of such movements
that the Orange Revolution was born: the demonstrations on the Maidan were a result of the will of the community to protect their interests through practical action.

Traditions of social movements, and their influence on the formation of public consciousness in the regions, are a powerful component of the formation of civil society. The Sumy region experienced such social actions between April and August 2004, with a student resistance movement against the government decision to merge the three universities of Sumy. At first, the movement consisted of a small group of students, employees and teachers at Sumy State University, later joined by representatives of other institutes of higher learning and society at large. The movement held mass demonstrations in support of the students and in parallel there were demonstrations demanding the resignation of the regional representative of the president.

Irina Merkun, one of leaders of the movement, has in cooperation with our centre undertaken an analysis of the effect of these events on the popularization of the movement. As she commented on these events at the international conference ‘Integration of countries with a transitional economy into the world economic space: conditions and prospects’, held at the Lviv national university (May 2005, Lviv):

We have a certain experience of public actions. The reason for our consolidation was the decision of the Ministry of Education and Science to merge three Sumy universities into a united National University. We were against the organizational decisions that were offered. In our opinion, the university that was to be the core of the new united university carried with it authoritative, and not democratic traditions, and there was a threat of these principles being transferred to the new structure of our university. We understood that teachers were depending on renewal of their contracts, and thus became hostages of the situation. Consequently, a spontaneous initiative was taken by the student administration that found a common ground among the students through interviews and questionnaires. The student firmly opposed the loss of the democratic basis of our institutions of higher education and the prospects of mass commercialization of education. As a result, we created an initiative group of student activists, that led student meetings at all faculties, and that had the support of the parental community. We tried to operate officially by addressing the Minister of Education and Sciences, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Head of the Parliament, but we were told that we were mistaken.\(^1\)

\(^{1}\) The quotation in the Ukrainian original version is considerably longer, but made shorter here (eds remark).
These young activists have lifted and awakened the community. By putting enormous pressure to bear on the old authorities, they achieved their aim, with the support of the population. They were able to protect their interests and make the community understand the strength of unification and struggle for democracy.

Such movements should be the basis for a united community that can support the development and implementation of the programme of the new authorities. After all, the future of Ukraine lies in joining together to push forward the transformation to a valid, and not only declared democracy, a civilized market, a social state, and a civil society.

**Innovative transformation at the regional level**

A crucial factor is the ability of the new authorities at the regional level to implement a programme for real changes and to carry out innovative transformation. First of all, this concerns those regional centres that have entered into a cycle of negative development. In our opinion, one of the most acute problems in the Sumy region from 1991 to 2005, as in many other areas of Ukraine, has been priorities in the development of the regional economy. The Soviet model for development of regional towns involved creating a central enterprise, or group of enterprises, to serve as guarantors of employment for the population, as main actor in the formation of local budgets and developing a social infrastructure, as well as solving housing problems for the population. These enterprises were thus integrated into a uniform economic complex, and, to a significant extent, relied on the delivery of production to other regions. During the period from 1991 to 2005, numerous such enterprises simply ceased to exist, or found themselves at the brink of bankruptcy. This has especially been the case for heavily industrialized cities, where unemployment has skyrocketed and the social infrastructure provided by the industrial complexes has practically disappeared. The result has been a sharp reduction in opportunities for self-realization of the population, especially among young people – as is evident from the departure of the workforce and the reduction in the standard of living.

In fact, in towns like Putivl, Kroloetz, Konotop, Belopolie, Shosteka etc., the population does not expect changes in general, but changes on the local level. Regional leaders should thus try to involve the scientific-analytical potential of the regions, by mapping existing problems and finding sustainable solutions to them, with the
focus on projects that are realizable. This requires a different system of cooperation between community, politicians and authorities, and public discussions with representatives of all political forces of the region. The best means of blocking political demagogy and confrontation is to implement a programme of real action that can lead to real changes. The authorities should set up a priority list of problems and their proposed solutions for the term in office. The people want changes instead of talk about complexities.\(^2\)

Additionally, we should not forget to consider the factor of sabotage from conservative officials, representatives of the old elite and the shadow economy. We must bear in mind that the majority in local authorities is still loyal to the previous leaders.

Success in the formation of a community usually depends on a series of actions by the country’s management, but that would entail a new imperial command. The community has no need for scandals and splits between the new elite, who on the Maidan lit a hope for a new Ukraine that would come closer to Europe. This would be a country with respect for personal rights and freedoms, overcoming poverty and the creation of a modern economy as guarantor for the well-being of the population. The community wants results. This in turn will determine to what degree the community will support the authorities, instead of taking up new forms of opposition, especially in view of the political competition in the run-up to the 2006 parliamentary elections.

Another crucial factor is an accelerated consolidation of political forces before the 2006 parliamentary elections. For the first time, elections in Ukraine will be held completely according to a proportional system. We should recall, however, that six political forces were elected on a proportional basis in the last parliamentary elections, not taking into account a significant spectrum of factions in the Parliament. Therefore, there will be an enormous struggle for each vote. Unfortunately, this will not occur as a competition between programmes and models for development, but as an opposition of slogans, criticism, charges, falsifications and myths. If the new authorities fail to provide a minimum of results and changes, it could come to a situation in which part of the electorate reorients itself towards new latent and centrist forces.

Another factor that should be addressed is the integration of the regional information space into the global information space. For

\(^2\) Our centre would like to take part in the development of such programmes. However, we also acknowledge that we are in the process of learning such analytics, and need partners who can help us in this learning process.
example, the concession of the authorities after the arrest of student activists marching towards Kiev in a peace march largely depended on the fact that CNN reported from these events the same day. We must never forget the power of the mass media.

**Risks in the formation of a civic consciousness**

Among the risks involved in the formation of civil consciousness in the regions, we may note the following:

- The level of trust among the population towards the political leadership is more a matter of emotional expectations, than analytical arguments and practical programmes for modernization. Without an understanding of the reasons behind problems, the time perspective for their decision and the possible results, there is the possibility that the population will withdraw from active politics. The authorities need to learn how to explain their strategies in precise terms, in which short-term projects that can produce real changes will have an important role.

- There is also the problem of the negative influence of conflicts, incompetent actions, zigzagging between priorities declared on the Maidan (for example re-privatization and punishment for falsification of the elections and pressure upon voters) and split among the leaders and their subsequent opposition towards each other. These problems are seen also in the regions, where there have been instances of misunderstandings between newly elected representatives of the authorities, newly appointed mayors, and authorities assigned by the President. Some negative results have also been a consequence of the September 2005 split in the new leadership,\(^3\) with mutual accusations of corruption and abuses. Many people became confused and disoriented by these events.

- Frequent appeals to the values proclaimed on the Maidan and general references to the Maidan as a still-active influence, especially under conditions of split in the monolithic and imperial-style leadership, can serve to dilute the meaning of these terms. In fact, the Maidan as the leading factor of the Orange Revolution was a reaction of the population towards the falsifications of the elections, where their rights to elect the leaders they wanted were ignored – it did not involve any exact understanding of the rates of transformation and their timing, necessary resources, and results.

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\(^3\) In September 2005 the Timoshenko-government was replaced by a new government led by Yuriy Yekhanurov (eds remark).
These and other risks require active analysis if we are to prevent a decrease in the support of the development of Ukraine as a European state, and a valid member of the Council of Europe.

**Regional views on European Integration**

The Centre for Social-Humanitarian Research into Regional Problems at Sumy State University has conducted a sociological survey of a student community concerning attitudes towards Euro-integration. The aim was to understand attitudes to European integration and support to the new authorities’ plan for Euro-integration in terms of practical action and projects.\(^4\)

Indicators included:

- the level of student support to the course of Victor Yushchenko’s team towards European integration;
- expectations of constructive change through Euro-integration at the state, regional and university levels;
- factors to promote Euro-integration among the population.

It is interesting to note that Euro-integration is supported by 65% of those interviewed. More than half of them feel that this course can best be completed through partnership with Russia and CIS countries. Of the total of respondents in favour of Euro-integration, 49% of them connect this strategy with partnership with the USA – i.e. a trans-Atlantic orientation. But it is necessary to take into account that 21% give priority to partnership with Russia and CIS countries, while pursuing the course towards Euro-integration. The importance of working together with Russia was noted by 57% of those interviewed. Only 5% had no answer to the question.

### Table 1: ‘With which priorities of foreign policy of Ukraine do you connect its success as a state?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Euro-integration</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Euro-integration in partnership with the USA</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Euro-integration in partnership with the USA, with parallel strategic relations with Russia and CIS countries</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- strategic partnership with Russia and CIS countries while maintaining the course towards Euro-integration and partnership with the USA</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- I can’t say</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- other</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) Despite its possible shortcomings, this research does indicate the state of public opinion and certain problems in understanding the process of European integration from a Ukrainian perspective. This is the first such study to be performed by our team, but we would hope to create a monitoring group that could continue to conduct similar research work.
Thus we see that three times more respondents support Euro-integration in any form as a main priority of Ukraine’s development, than joining NATO.

Almost 86% on the whole clearly expressed a positive attitude to Euro-integration process – but only one of eight feels they have enough information about modern Euro-soviet and processes of Euro-integration. On the other hand, it was gratifying to note the desire for more information.

We have also found that the respondents connected Euro-integration to reforms at the state level, and not regionalization. The following table shows what the respondents felt should be expected from Euro-integration:

The last data is of great interest for us, because particularly students of our university actively influenced the formation of publicity through student resistance and participation in the Orange Revolution.5

Table 2: ‘Do you think that joining NATO is a necessary element of Euro-integration?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I don’t know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: ‘Do you know enough about system of Euro-soviet and NATO – membership, structure, programmes, especially for youth, and constructive changes, which occurred with new members, which were socialist countries or were the part of former USSR before?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I can’t say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: ‘Do you want to know more about the Euro-soviet? (Especially about the programmes for young people)?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I can’t determine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: ‘What do you understand by European integration?’

- democratization of society, protection of human and children rights and liberty 57%
- development of modern high technology and highly profitable economy 48%
- public accountability of those in power 37%
- introduction of Euro-standards for the quality of life and social welfare 34%
- opportunity to study and use the experience of European countries 32%
- the widening of opportunities of probationary period and studying in the countries of Euro-soviet 32%
- liquidation of clan power and shadow economy 28%
- new impetus for regional development 21%

But alongside with this, we also received these answers:
- inter-party struggle based on a competition of practical models of development for state, region, town 9%

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5 Ours was only a pilot survey, but it does enable some conclusions. For one thing, the majority of those interviewed support the course of Euro-integration of Ukraine. They want to study practical experience of life in the European Union, to find working partners and, together with them, implement common projects.
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Euro-integration in the Context of Regional Development

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